

Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.) Analysis Series

STATE OF PLAY IN THE WTO AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: COUNTRY GROUPINGS' POSITIONS

SYNOPSIS

The present note provides an overview of the position of various countries and group of countries active in the WTO agriculture negotiations, with respect to the critical issues under discussion. The paper is organised in accordance with the main areas under negotiation: market access, domestic support and export subsidies. Particular reference is made to the cotton initiative being discussed as part of the overall agriculture negotiations.

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COUNTRY GROUPINGS' POSITIONS**

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STATE OF PLAY IN THE WTO AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: COUNTRY GROUPINGS' POSITIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of the present note is to provide an overview of the position of various countries and group of countries active in the WTO agriculture negotiations with respect to critical issues under discussion. This note provides an update of the state of play in the agriculture negotiations as of November 2005.
2. The note is organised on the basis of the three pillars of the agriculture negotiations around which the talks are organised, mainly market access, domestic support and export competition. The text includes a section on cotton as well, with indication of the status of progress on the cotton initiative sponsored by a group of African countries.
3. The note provides a description of the position of the following countries and groupings: United States, European Communities, G10, G20, Cairns Group, G33, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the African Group, and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the Small, Vulnerable economies. A listing of the countries participating in each of these groupings is also included. Finally, a glossary offers a definition of various concepts and terms used throughout the note.

II. MEMBERS OF COUNTRY GROUPINGS

G10: Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway and Switzerland.

Cairns Group : Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. The Philippines and Indonesia, although members of the Cairns Group do not share many of the positions taken by this group in the negotiations, especially with respect to market access.

G20 : Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

G33 : Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

LDCs : Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia.

The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP): The group encompasses 79 States of which 54 are WTO Members.

G90 Countries: members of the African Union, the ACP and the LDCs which informally coordinate positions with respect to the agriculture negotiations and other areas of the WTO Doha Work Programme.

Small, Vulnerable Economies: Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago made a submission specific on market access. These members in addition to Belize, Haiti, Jamaica, Solomon Islands and Sri Lanka associate themselves as Small, Vulnerable Economies.

III. GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Amber box

This refers to price support and production-linked support (i.e. subsidies) measures that had to be reduced or eliminated as a result of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Support of this kind was quantified during the Uruguay Round as the *Aggregate*

Measurement of Support (AMS). The AMS for each WTO Member is listed and is subject to reduction as part of each WTO Members' WTO commitments.

Blue box

This refers to agricultural support (i.e. subsidies) measures provided by WTO Members under Art. 6.5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). This provision allows WTO Members to provide direct payments to agricultural producers under the condition that such payments are part of programmes aimed at limiting agricultural production and that they meet the production-related criteria specified therein. According to the AoA, these payments are exempt from reduction commitments – i.e. they do not need to be reduced or eliminated.

Bound tariffs

This refers to the tariff rates or levels listed down by each WTO Member in its Schedule of commitments for each tariff line. These tariff levels represent the maximum tariff that may be applied by each Member at any point in time for a specific product. Bound tariffs may be different from the actual applied tariff in that the latter could be below or at the bound tariff level.

***De minimis* provisions**

This refers to Art. 6.4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) which allows WTO Members to exempt from the calculation of the “amber box” (i.e. AMS) product-specific and non-product-specific support below a certain threshold level. During the Uruguay Round that threshold was set for developed countries at 5 per cent of the value of agricultural production of the product concerned in the case of product-specific support, and at 5 per cent of the value of total agricultural production for non-product-specific support. For developing countries, the threshold was set at 10 per cent.

Green box

These are agricultural support (i.e. subsidies) measures that meet the general and programme-specific criteria identified in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). In general, such measures must be government-funded and do not entail price support. In

addition, they must fall within and comply with the additional conditions specified for each programme listed in Annex 2. These measures may include direct payments provided to agriculture producers which should not affect the farmer's production decisions (decoupled payments). These measures are given the "green light" in that they are not subject to reduction commitments - i.e. they do not need to be reduced or eliminated.

Special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions

These are provisions in the WTO's legal texts that seek to provide for a lower degree or level of obligations or commitments from developing countries as compared to those from developed countries in recognition of the lower level of economic development of developing countries.

Special Safeguards (SSG)

Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) on Special Safeguards (SSG) allows WTO Members to impose additional duties on imports of agricultural products when the volume of imports exceeds a specific threshold and when prices fall below a specified reference price. The special safeguard is available only for products marked as SSG in the Schedule of commitments of each Member. Only a few developing countries that undertook tariffication during the Uruguay Round have access to the SSG. Under provisions on the SSG, Members do not need to prove injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry to invoke the measure (as required under the general safeguard provision of Article XIX of GATT 1994). The SSG is thus triggered automatically.

Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)

Refers to the proposal by developing countries, especially the G33, to establish a SSG-type of safeguard for use by all developing countries. The objectives of the mechanism would be to allow developing countries to respond effectively to import surges and price depressions. The mechanism should improve on the current SSG in the sense of responding to the particular circumstances of developing countries.

Tariffs

These are taxes imposed by a State or separate customs territory on imported goods.

Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs)

These are treaty commitments or obligations made or assumed by WTO Members as a result of the Uruguay Round to provide a specified quota (i.e. level or volume) of market access opportunities for imported goods that would benefit from a lower tariff rate than the tariff rate resulting from tariffification. Goods imported over the quota would be subject to the higher tariff rate resulting from tariffification.

Tariffication

This is the process by which all non-tariff measures existing previous to the Uruguay Round were converted to a tariff equivalent which provided a similar level of trade protection. The resulting tariffs were, therefore, in some cases, very high.

Uruguay Round approach

Refers to a specific approach for the reduction of tariffs consisting of establishing an average reduction across all agricultural tariffs coupled with minimum reduction requirements per tariff line. This approach was used for the reduction of agricultural tariffs during the Uruguay Round. In that occasion, developed countries were required to reduce tariffs on average by 36 per cent with a minimum reduction per tariff line of 15 per cent. The figures for developing countries were established at 24 and 10 per cent, respectively.

Swiss formula

Refers to the following mathematical expression: $t_i = (a \cdot t_o) / (a + t_o)$ where, t_i = final tariff; t_o = initial tariff; and a = coefficient. The Swiss formula works in a manner that leads to higher proportional cuts on higher tariffs. The coefficient of the formula (a) determines the highest level of tariffs that may result from the application of the formula. That is, a coefficient of 25 would imply that after the

application of the formula no tariff will exceed 25 per cent. Thus the Swiss formula is advocated by members that favour harmonisation of tariffs across WTO members.

Country Groupings	United States	European Union	G10	G20	Cairns Group
Critical Negotiation Issues	MARKET ACCESS				
Formula for tariff reductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very ambitious, seeks harmonization of tariff across WTO members; - Considers G20 proposal of linear cuts lacks ambition; - Tiers: favours a single approach of four bands for developed and developing countries; - Thresholds: Same thresholds for developed and developing countries: 0-20, >20-40, >40-60, and >60; - Feels strongly that the thresholds for the utmost tier can not be established at above 60; - Formula within tiers: progressive cuts <u>within each band</u> with higher tariffs subject to deeper cuts for both developed and developing countries; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive and offensive interests; - Accepts G20 proposal of linear cuts within the bands as the starting point; - Tiers: favours a single approach of four bands for developed and developing countries with different threshold levels; - Thresholds: For developed countries: 0-30, >30-60, >60-90, >90; For developing countries: 0-30, >30-80, >80-130, >130; - Formula within tiers: Linear cut within tiers for both developed and developing countries, with additional flexibility for tariffs in the lowest band; - Level of cuts: For developed countries: tariffs between 0 and 30%, an average cut of 35% with min. cut of 20% and max. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interests; - Accepts G20 proposal on linear cuts as a starting point; - Tiers: favours a single approach of four bands for developed and developing countries but with different threshold levels; - Thresholds: For developed countries: 0-20, >20-50, >50-70, >70; For developing countries: 0-30, >30-70, >70-100, >100; - Formula within tiers: Members will have the choice between: i) simple linear cut fixed for each band; and ii) constrained flexibility within each tier by allowing deviations from the specified linear cut for each tier and a system of credits which would allow lower cuts for certain tariff lines within any particular tier to be compensated by higher cuts than that specified, for tariffs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has presented formula proposal of linear cuts, as a compromise position (middle way between Swiss and UR approach); - Tiers: favours a single approach of four bands for developed and developing countries but with different threshold levels; <li style="text-align: center;">Thresholds: For developed countries: 0-20, >20-50, >50-75, >75. For developing countries: 0-30, >30-80, >80-130, >130. - Formula within tiers: each tariff subject to a linear (uniform) cut for both developed and developing countries; - Level of cuts: For developed countries: tariffs between 0 and 20%, cut of 45%; >20-50, cut of 55%; >50-75, cut of 65%; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interests; seeks harmonization of tariff across WTO members; - Considers G20 formula lacks ambition; - Thresholds: similar to those proposed by the US. - Formula within tiers: Prefers Swiss formula but willing to accept alternative methods that guarantee progressivity.

	<p>- Level of cuts: For developed countries: (beginning of tier) 55- (end of tier) 65%; 65-75%, 75-85%, 85-90%, from the lowest to the highest tier, respectively. For developing countries: Not specified; but only "slightly lesser cuts" suggested. Developing countries to make meaningful commitments reflecting their importance as emerging markets;</p> <p>- Does not specify a target for the overall average cut;</p> <p>- Tariff cap: 75% for developed countries; level of capping for developing countries to be decided;</p> <p>- Sensitivities to be addressed through a few sensitive products only (i.e. no additional flexibilities to be in-built in the formula);</p>	<p>cut of 45%; >30-60, cut of 45%; for tariffs between >60-90, cut of 50%; for tariffs above 90%, cut of 60%; For developing countries: tariffs between 0 and 30%, an average cut of 25% with min. cut of 10% and max. cut of 40%; >30-80, cut of 30%; >80-130, cut of 35%; for tariffs above 130, cut of 40%;</p> <p>- Tariff cap: 100% for developed countries and 150% for developing countries;</p> <p>- Suggests proposed tariff cuts result in average reduction of tariffs of 46% for EU' own tariffs;</p> <p>- Sensitivities to be addressed through both the formula and sensitive products.</p>	<p>within the same tier. The number of tariff lines for which credit can be sought will be limited. The credit gained should be less than the extra effort made.</p> <p>- The overall reduction achieved in each tier under the constrained flexibility option, should be higher than that specified under the simple linear cut option.</p> <p>- Level of cuts: For developed countries: i) option of simple linear cut tariffs between 0 and 20% will be reduced by 27%; >20-50, cut of 31%; >50-70, cut of 37%; and >70, cut of 45%; ii) option of constrained flexibility, tariffs between 0 and 20% will be reduced by 32±7%; >20-50, cut of 36±8%; >50-70, cut of 42±9; and >70, cut of 50±10%; For developing countries: no indication.</p> <p>- Strongly opposes setting tariff caps; - Sensitivities to be addressed through both the formula for tariff reductions and provisions on sensitive products.</p>	<p>for tariffs above 75%, cut of 75%; For developing countries: tariffs between 0 and 30%, cut of 25%; >30-80%, cut of 30%; >80-130%, cut of 35%; for tariffs above 130%, cut of 40%;</p> <p>- Requires overall tariff reduction by developed countries of at least 54% on average; developing countries to undertake overall tariff reductions of maximum 36%, on average.</p> <p>- Tariff cap: 100% for developed countries and 150% for developing countries.</p>	
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<p>Sensitive Products</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views sensitive products as exceptions; - Number of sensitive products: 1% of tariff lines for developed countries; no indication regarding the number of sensitive products for developing countries; - Favours a trade-off between the deviation from the tariff reduction formula and the number of sensitive products; - Emphasises full compensation through tariff rate quota expansion should be provided for less than formula cuts in sensitive products.; - Opposes establishing new tariff quotas for products designated as sensitive; - Proposes tariff rate quotas should be expanded based on domestic consumption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views sensitive products as part of the negotiations on all components of the market access pillar, not to be treated as exceptions; - Number of sensitive products: maximum of 8% of tariff lines for the EU; no specification regarding sensitive products for developing countries; - Would like sensitive products to be designated in any of the bands of the tiered formula, at the discretion of the member concerned; - Proposes a combination of tariff reduction and tariff rate quota expansion for sensitive products. Substantial improvement in market access on sensitive products should be less than that resulting from the application of the formula for tariff reductions to those products; - Deviation from the formula: minimum deviation from the corresponding formula cut of 1/3 and maximum 2/3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Issue of special interest to the group; opposes the view of sensitive products as exceptions; - Number of sensitive products: 10% of tariff lines under simple linear cut option for the formula for tariff reductions; 15% of tariff lines under the option of linear cut with constrained flexibility of the formula for tariff cuts (figures are shown for illustrative purposes). Under any option, members will be able to designate additional tariff lines as sensitive as long as compensation is offered through TRQ commitments and tariff reduction in a standard combination; - Members with a percentage of tariff lines (to be decided) falling in the highest tier of the formula, will be able to designate an additional number of sensitive products; - Would like sensitive products to be designated in any of the bands of the tiered formula, at the discretion of the member concerned; - Insists on de-linking the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views sensitive products as exceptions; - Number of sensitive products: For developed countries: a very limited number of tariff lines not exceeding 1% of total tariff lines. For developing countries: the number of sensitive tariff lines will be 50% higher than the absolute number of tariff lines designated as sensitive by the developed member having the highest number of such tariff lines; - The higher the number of tariff lines designated as sensitive the higher the compensation in their treatment; the higher the deviation from the required formula cut the higher the TRQ expansion in that particular tariff line; - Deviation from the formula: to be measured in absolute percentage points as the difference between the tariff to be bound for the particular 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views sensitive products as exceptions; - Number of sensitive products: no number specified. Likely to support G20's and US' position of restricting sensitive products to no more than 1% of total tariff lines; - Emphasises the need of substantial improvement in market access in every tariff line designated as sensitive product; - Sees tariff quota expansion as the fundamental mechanism for achieving improved market access in sensitive products; - Opposes TRQ creation.
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		<p>for each tariff line designated as sensitive, to the discretion of each member;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tariff rate quota expansion: TRQ to be expanded on the basis of the current level of imports: tariff cut deviation / (1+ AVE); this percentage should be adjusted by a coefficient of 0.8%; - Would like to maintain option of creating new TRQs for products designated as sensitive. 	<p>designation of sensitive products from the tariff reduction formula;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposes a standard combination of formula cuts and TRQ commitments on sensitive products; - Deviation from the standard combination possible but shortfall in one element (e.g. formula cut) needs to be compensated by additional commitments in the other elements (e.g. TRQ expansion); - When a product designated as sensitive has no TRQ, the member concerned can opt for not creating a new TRQ. In this case, the following options will be available: i) reduction of tariffs derived from the standard combination will be achieved over a shorter implementation period; or ii) the formula cut will be applied although over a longer implementation period than otherwise required. - The base level for the expansion of TRQ should be established considering various elements affecting sensitivities including present 	<p>sensitive product, inclusive of tariff capping, and the tariff that would have resulted from the application of the formula. Maximum allowed deviation from the corresponding formula cut is 30%;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tariff rate quota expansion: specific rules to be established. Expansion based on the principle of MFN; - Opposes TRQ creation; - Stresses that sensitive products will be subject to tariff capping; - TRQ expansion based on domestic consumption. For developed countries: base level should represent at least 6% of annual domestic consumption to be calculated as the simple average of the annual domestic consumption over the three most recent years for which data are available; For developing countries: the base level of minimum 	
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			<p>and future supply and demand, consumption patterns, and non-trade concerns;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For sensitive products whose TRQs are already substantial vis-à-vis domestic consumption, the TRQ expansion should be adjusted in an equitable manner; - Would like to maintain option of creating new TRQs for products designated as sensitive; 	<p>access should be less than two thirds of the annual domestic consumption established for developed countries (less than 4%). However, self-consumption of subsistence production should be extracted from the annual domestic consumption level in the base period according to data provided by the developing member concerned;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For developing countries' current TRQs resulting from article XXVIII of GATT 1994 negotiations and recent accession to the WTO, the base level for quota expansion will be the minimum access level defined as a percentage of annual <u>commercial</u> consumption, inclusive of SDT for developing countries, or the current access, whichever is lower; - For tariff lines designated as sensitive by developing countries for which no TRQ currently 	
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				<p>exist, the following options of treatment will be provided: i) lower than the corresponding formula tariff cut over the implementation period for developing countries; ii) maximum deviation from the corresponding formula cut of 45%, over a shorter implementation period; iii) corresponding formula cut over a longer implementation period than otherwise required; and iv) other options to be defined, including TRQ creation, which shall be kept to a minimum;</p> <p>- LDCs exempt from TRQ expansion.</p>	
<p>Special Products (SPs)</p>	<p>- Both the SPs and SSM should provide transitional protection to developing countries against import surges while providing “meaningful” improvement in market access for the products protected under these mechanisms;</p> <p>- Insists on the negotiation of indicators to designate special products.</p>	<p>- Not very supportive or interested;</p> <p>- Insists on the negotiation of indicators to designate special products. Would like to limit the scope of special products to a few tariff lines;</p> <p>- Would like special products to be subject to some tariff reductions. Strongly opposes SPs being exempt from tariff reductions.</p>	<p>- Generally supportive but not very interested in this category.</p>	<p>- Supportive, views special products as an integral element of SDT for developing countries;</p> <p>- Pledged to work with the G33 to operationalise and render effective the instrument;</p> <p>- Some countries favour limiting special products to a set percentage of tariff lines.</p>	<p>- Some countries welcomed the G33 proposal to develop indicators;</p> <p>- Others continue to express concern that special products can affect their exports of agricultural products, and many countries would like to limit their number;</p> <p>- Chile would like special products to be eligible only for non-commercial</p>

	<p>Would like to limit the scope of special products to a few tariff lines;</p> <p>- Strongly opposes to SP being exempt from tariff reductions.</p>				<p>products;</p> <p>- Colombia has proposed setting a percentage limit on the volume of the product exported as a benchmark for product eligibility.</p>
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)	<p>- Both the SPs and SSM should provide transitional protection to developing countries against import surges while providing "meaningful" improvement in market access for the products protected under these mechanisms;</p> <p>- Against SSM being triggered in response to both import surges and price depressions;</p> <p>- A volume trigger would suffice;</p> <p>- Would like to limit the scope and flexibility of the mechanism as much as possible.</p>	<p>- Generally supportive;</p> <p>- SSM should be used to deal with import surges only, and thus a volume trigger would be sufficient;</p> <p>- Likely to tie support for SSM to the continuation of SSG.</p>	<p>- Generally supportive of the concept of SSM for developing countries, as it would like the current SSG to be extended;</p>	<p>- Supportive of SSM, considered as an integral part of SDT for developing countries;</p> <p>- Willing to work with the G33 to operationalise and render effective the instrument;</p> <p>- Argentina and other members of the G20, has suggested only volume-triggered should be available under the SSM and question all agricultural products should be eligible for the SSM as proposed by the G33.</p>	<p>- Supportive to the extent that the SSM constitutes an incentive to undertake further liberalization;</p> <p>- Would like to limit the scope of the mechanism to a few products, mainly those subject to deep cuts in tariffs;</p> <p>- Most countries prefer that only volume-based trigger be available.</p>
Special Safeguard (SSG)	<p>- Remains silent on the issue;</p> <p>- Likely to support the continuation of SSG, as it continues to use the</p>	<p>- Would like the SSG to be extended;</p> <p>- Willing to negotiate on the product scope of the SSG. Indicated the mechanism</p>	<p>- Strongly supports the extension of the SSG.</p>	<p>- Opposes the continuation of SSG;</p> <p>- Would like the safeguard to be eliminated by developed countries at the</p>	<p>- Opposes the continuation of the SSG;</p> <p>- Prefers its immediate elimination or otherwise its discontinuation over a</p>

	safeguard on a regular basis.	should be kept for the following products: beef, poultry, butter, fruits and vegetables and sugar.		beginning of the implementation period; - Stresses that the date of elimination must be agreed to in these negotiations.	negotiated timeframe.
Preference Erosion	- Generally opposed to addressing the issue; - Likely to compromise in line with its overall alliance with the EU.	- Silent on the issue of preference erosion; - Sensitive products and sectors to which long-standing preferences are granted are likely to coincide.	- Generally supportive; - Suggests that concerns regarding preference erosion should be reflected in the designation and treatment of sensitive products.	- Recognizes the need to address the issue, but generally opposed to granting special treatment on market access to specific products to address preference erosion; - Proposes addressing the issue by expanding market access for products which are of vital export interest to the preference beneficiaries through: promoting effective utilization of existing preferences; providing additional financial assistance and capacity building to address supply constraints to those countries; promoting diversification and assisting in adjustment and restructuring.	- Generally opposed to addressing the issue; - Are of the view that preference erosion should be addressed but not at the expense of market access for other developing countries, particularly in tropical products (some Latin American countries with export interests feel strongly on this issue).
Tropical Products	- Generally in favour of full liberalisation of trade	- Direct confrontation;	- Generally against the agenda on tropical products.	- Generally supportive;	- Generally supportive;

	<p>in tropical products;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Arguments for liberalisation in tropical products fall in line with its push for market access. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Main demands of the group on tropical products affect sensitive sectors in the EU such as sugar and banana. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Considers agenda on tropical products as an integral element of special and differential treatment for developing countries; - Developed countries should provide duty and quota-free market access on primary tropical products and eliminate tariff escalation on processed tropical products; - Request the elimination of non-tariff barriers on tropical products; - Developed countries shall not designate products of export interest to developing countries (tropical products) as sensitive; - The same treatment will apply to products of particular importance for the diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops. The designation of those products will be made on the basis of specific programmes for diversification. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Critical issue in the agenda of some Latin American countries members of the group who also would like full liberalization for products of particular importance to the diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops.
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Country Groupings	G33	LDCs	African Group	ACP
Critical Negotiation Issues	MARKET ACCESS			
Formula for tariff reductions¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Welcomes the G20 formula proposal, but has not developed a common position on this issue; - Opposes harmonization of tariffs across countries; - Insists on the need to take into account the different tariff structures of developing countries; - Insists on the principle of proportionality (lower reduction rates for developing countries). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exempt from tariff reductions; - Have not been actively involved in the debate on the tariff reduction formula; - Calls for binding commitments by trading partners in granting duty-free and quota-free market access for all products from LDCs, to be implemented immediately on a secure, long-term and predictable basis, with no restrictive measures introduced. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Calls for the full operationalisation of the principle of proportionality; - Insist on the need to take into account the different tariff structure of developing countries and the particular pattern of trade of African countries; - Generally concerned with the treatment of S&D provisions in market access, and calls for the full operationalisation of all S&D elements; - Calls for bound duty and quota free market access to agricultural products from LDCs; - Calls for improvement of market access for exports from Africa with special attention to tariff escalation, tariff peak and NTBs; - Calls for provision of "policy space" and "flexibilities" for Africa to pursue agricultural policies that support development goals, poverty reduction strategies, food security and livelihood concerns. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More defensive interest; primary objective is to retain the appropriate level of protection in the domestic market to enable domestic production to thrive in the ACP countries and to mitigate the erosion of preference margins, which will result from tariff reduction; - Tiers: favours a single approach of four bands for developed and developing countries but with different threshold levels; - For developed countries: 0-20, >20-50, >50-80, >80. For developing countries: 0-50, >50-100, >100-150, >150. - Formula within tiers: Linear cut for both developed and developing countries but with flexibility to reduce tariffs within any particular band by less; - Level of cuts: For developed countries: tariffs between 0 and 20%, cut of 23%; >20-50%, cut of 30%; >50-80%, cut of 35%; for tariffs above 80%, cut of 42%; For developing countries: tariffs between 0 and 50%, cut of 15%;

				<p>>50-100%, cut of 20%; >100-150%, cut of 25%; for tariffs above 150%, cut of 30%;</p> <p>- Requires overall tariff reduction by developed countries of 36% on average; developing countries to undertake overall tariff reduction of maximum 24%, on average.</p> <p>- Tariff cap: the ACP opposes tariff capping for both developed and developing countries;</p> <p>- Treatment of ceiling bindings: to be taken into account through specific modalities, which include the following options: i) members will ceiling bindings subject to the overall average reduction only; or ii) tariffs will be distributed across the lower tiers of the formula on the basis of their own assessment of sensitivities; or iii) irrespective of the thresholds for the tiers to be agreed, countries with ceiling bindings not be expected to undertake the level of cuts required in the highest tiers;</p> <p>- Non tariff barriers and tariff escalation affecting products of export interest of ACP countries must be addressed leading to a lasting solution.</p>
Sensitive Products	- The group does not have a specific position on this issue.	- The group does not have a common position on this issue;	- The group does not have a common position on this issue;	- Supportive of sensitive products;

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Likely to be concerned with the treatment of sensitive products to the extent that these may cover long-standing preferences. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To the extent that there is an overlap between sensitive products and those covered by long-standing preferences, the group is likely to be supportive of designating sensitive products; - Stresses that in the designation of sensitive products by developed countries, paramount consideration must be given to problems of preference erosion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensitive products category seen as critical to preserve their interests of developing countries benefiting from long-standing preferences; - Would like products relating to long-standing preferences to be designated as sensitive by preference-providing countries and its treatment moderated in light of its impact on preference erosion; - Any TRQ expansion on MNF basis should not undermine the existing ACP quotas; - Disciplines on TRQ administration for existing quotas must take into account the need to improve market access for developing countries.
Special Products (SPs)²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Main proponents of provisions on special products, thus this issue is of crucial importance to the group; - Highlights the value and need of SPs to protect legitimate commercial, developmental and political sensitivities; - Emphasises that a single set of indicators cannot be established for strict application to all developing countries because of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally supportive although the group has not shown special interest on this provision as it has been agreed that LDCs will be exempt from tariff reductions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This issue is very important for the group; - Stresses the need to develop meaningful modalities on the designation and treatment of special products in such a way that provides maximum flexibility to African countries to reflect their particular domestic circumstances and development needs; - There are divergent views 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This is an important issue for the group; - Would like to designate an appropriate number of SPs based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs; - SPs shall be exempt from tariff reduction and commitments on TRQ, and have automatic access to the SSM;

	<p>the difference of situations among them;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insists that operational indicators for the selection of SPs must be based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development as agreed in the July framework; - Opposes indicators linked to additional commitments in market access (e.g. ambition of the tariff reduction formula, designation of sensitive products, etc); - Insists on self-selection of SPs on the basis of an illustrative, non-prescriptive, non-exhaustive and non-cumulative list of indicators developed by the group; - Any agricultural product in its natural and/or processed form shall be designated SP based on at least one indicator at either national, regional or household level; - Special products will be identified with the symbol SP in each member's schedule of commitments; - Proposes the developing countries should have flexibility 		<p>within the group with respect to the concrete product scope and treatment of SPs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insist adequate provisions on SPs constitute an integral element of the modalities for agriculture negotiations.
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	<p>to designate at least 20% of their tariff lines as SPs;</p> <p>- The group has proposed an approach for the treatment of SPs based on three categories: i) 50% of SPs subject to no tariff reduction with an additional 15% of SPs exempt from tariff reductions under special circumstances such as high ceiling bindings, relatively low bound tariffs; high proportion low income or resource poor producers, high vulnerability in the agriculture sector, and limited policy options due to their tariff structures, etc.; ii) 25% of SPs subject to 5% tariff reduction; and iii) the residual tariff lines of SPs subject to 10% tariff reduction;</p> <p>- Indicates that SPs shall not be precluded from recourse to the SSM;</p> <p>- SPs should not be subject to new commitments on TRQ or tariff capping;</p> <p>- Insists that adequate provisions on SPs constitute an integral element of modalities for agriculture negotiations.</p>			
<p>Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)³</p>	<p>- Very important issue for the group;</p>	<p>- Supportive of the mechanism;</p>	<p>- Supportive of the mechanism;</p>	<p>- Insists all agricultural products shall be eligible to use the</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have reiterated that SSM is very different from SP in that whereas SP is a long-term exemption for rural development and food and livelihood security, SSM is a short-term mechanism to help developing countries cope with fluctuations in prices and import surges; - Proposes that SSM should be open to all developing countries and for all agricultural products; - The SSM should be applied to imports from all countries whether these are subsidised or not; - Proposes the SSM be automatically triggered either by import surges or price falls, thus both volume and price triggers should be contemplated; - Stresses the SSM should respond to the institutional capabilities and resources of developing countries and hence be simple, operational and for developing countries to implement; - Insists that remedy measures should take the form of an additional duty levied to the level necessary to address the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like SSM to respond to the needs and the particular circumstances of LDCs enabling them to adopt temporary emergency measures in order to address import surges and price declines with a view to safeguarding food and livelihood security as well as rural development; - Stresses that SSM to be agreed must take into account the institutional capacities and available resources of LDCs, and thus must be simple, effective and easy to implement; - Would like SSM to be triggered automatically either by import surges or price falls, thus both volume and price triggers should be contemplated. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stress that the SSM to be established for developing countries should be operationally effective to address the specific circumstances of African Countries. - Stresses that SSM constitutes a unique instrument that would respond to the concerns of developing countries and LDCs related to food security, livelihood security and rural development; - The group however does not share a common position with respect to product designation and scope. 	<p>mechanism;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Considers the SSM shall include both volume and price triggers; - Insists remedy measures should provide meaningful and effective relief from import surges and price depressions to the developing country Member concerned. Thus the remedy measure will be related to the nature and seriousness of the problem it intends to address. - Stresses that the SSM constitutes an integral element of the modalities for agriculture negotiations.
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	<p>problem at hand: the deeper the import surge the higher the additional duty;</p> <p>- Stresses that the SSM constitutes an integral element of the modalities for agriculture negotiations.</p>			
Special Safeguard (SSG)	<p>- Some members of the group use the provision;</p> <p>- Concerned about guaranteeing an adequate transition to the SSM.</p>	<p>- The group does not have a position on this issue.</p>	<p>- The group does not have a position on this issue.</p>	<p>- The group does not have a common position on the issue.</p> <p>- Likely to support the continuation of SSG where it may be used to guarantee long-standing preferences.</p>
Preference Erosion	<p>- The group does not have a common position on this issue;</p> <p>- For some countries preference erosion is a real concern and wants measures to tackle preference erosion to be put in place.</p>	<p>- Crucial issue for the group, as most are beneficiaries of long-standing preferences;</p> <p>- Stresses the need to strengthen the existing preferential schemes;</p> <p>- Would like the incorporation of special provisions in the modalities to address the erosion of preferences;</p> <p>- Would like to maintain preferences until such time as all domestic and export subsidies are removed that affect LDCs' commodities, complemented by compensatory and transitional measures to allow LDCs to fully prepare their commodity industries for open and fair</p>	<p>- Important issue for the group;</p> <p>- Stresses that mechanisms must be devised within the WTO context to fully address their concerns in accordance with the Paragraph 44 of the July Framework.</p>	<p>- Very important issue for the group, as these are beneficiaries of long-standing preferences;</p> <p>- Would like to maintain long-standing preferences, hence wish to moderate tariff reduction in the products by preference-granting countries, where these exist;</p> <p>- Insists that products related to long-standing preferences should be designated as sensitive by preference-providing countries, and stresses that TRQ expansion on a MFN basis should not be at the detriment of existing ACP quotas;</p>

		<p>competition;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Measures outside the WTO include "Aid for Trade" as an additional, substantial and predictable financial mechanism to strengthen supply-side and infrastructure capacity, diversification of trade in LDCs and address adjustment challenges and costs. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indicates that products of ACP States that have already been subject of liberalisation should not again be open for accelerated tariff cuts; - Insists that Paragraph 16 of TN/AG/W/Rev.1 (i.e. Harbinson text) will be used as a reference for further negotiations on preferences. This text provides for delayed and longer implementation period on products related to long-standing preferences; - Would like concrete provisions to address preference erosion as part of the modalities in agriculture; - Favours trade-related measures within the WTO to address this issue (as opposed to only adjustment assistance outside the trade sphere).
Tropical Products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue; - Some members favour full liberalization in tropical products. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To the extent that tropical products coincide with products in which long-standing preferences exists, the group will be concerned with the effects of full liberalisation of trade on these products on preference erosion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally opposes the complete liberalisation of trade in tropical products; - Main concern is preference erosion. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In direct confrontation with the agenda on the full liberalisation of trade in tropical products; - Stresses that any decision regarding tropical products and products related to the diversification from illicit narcotic crops should not prejudice the interests of developing countries concerned with preference erosion.

Country Groupings	United States	European Union	G10	G20	Cairns Group
Critical Negotiation Issues	DOMESTIC SUPPORT				
Formula for the Reduction of Overall Trade Distorting Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of a three band approach for the reduction of overall trade-distorting support; - Thresholds of the bands: support above USD 60 billion; support above USD 10 billion and up to USD 60 billion; support at or below USD 10 billion; - Level of cuts: 31% cut for TDS at or below USD 10 billion; 53% for TDS up to USD 60 billion and 75% cut for TDS above USD 60 billion. - The US would be placed in the middle tier with a reduction of 53% while the EU will be placed in the highest tier for cuts of 75%. - Developing countries entitle to "slightly lesser cuts" over a longer implementation period than developed countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of a three band approach for the reduction of overall trade-distorting support; - Thresholds of the bands: no specified. Likely to agree to the thresholds proposed by the G20 and the US; - Levels of cut: 70% for the EU (highest tier); 60% for the US (middle band); and 50% for members placed in the lowest tier; - Insists that countries with relative high levels of trade distorting support vis-à-vis the value of agricultural production should make additional cuts to those required by the tiered approach (e.g. Japan, Norway, Switzerland, etc). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest, particularly with regards to reduction of the Amber Box; - Strongly opposes reduction commitments based on the relative importance of trade-distorting support to the total value of agriculture production. Such an approach will penalise small countries with proportionally large subsidies by imposing deeper cuts than would result otherwise (i.e. from reduction commitments established on the basis of the absolute level of support); - Generally supportive of a three band approach for the reduction of overall trade distorting support. Members of the group likely to fall in the lowest tier. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Proposed a three band approach for the reduction of overall trade-distorting support; - Thresholds of the bands: support above USD 60 billion; support above USD 10 billion and up to USD 60 billion; support at or below USD 10 billion; - Level of cuts: 80% cut for TDS above USD 60 billion; 75% for TDS above USD 10 billion and up to USD 60 billion; and 70% cut for TDS at or below USD 10 billion; - The proposed thresholds would place the European Communities in the highest tier with cuts of 80% and the US in the middle band with cuts of 75%; - Insists that countries with relative high levels of trade distorting support vis-à-vis the value of agricultural 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group is divided on this issue, where countries which use the Amber Box support are more hesitant to undertake commitments; - Generally supportive of a three band approach for the reduction of overall trade-distorting support; - Would like the European Communities be placed in the highest tier, followed by the US and Japan in the middle tier.

				<p>production should make additional cuts to those required by the tiered approach;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Requires front loading of commitments (e.g. imposing higher cuts during the early years of implementation); - Proposes that developing countries without AMS entitlements must be exempt from undertaking reduction commitments on overall trade-distorting domestic support; - For developing countries with AMS entitlements (amber box), a separate band for cuts in overall trade-distorting support should be established. 	
<p>Tiered Formula for the Cuts in Final Bound Total AMS (amber box)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest - Supportive of a three band approach for the reduction of Amber Box; - Thresholds of the bands: support above USD 25 billion; support above USD 12 billion and up to USD 25 billion; support at or less than USD 12 billion; - Level of cuts: 37% cut for 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest; - Supportive of a three band approach for the reduction of Amber Box; - Thresholds of the bands: no specified. - Level of cuts: EU placed in the highest tier with a 70% cut of AMS; the US in the middle tier with a cut of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally defensive interest given that they have high levels of amber box support; - Would like to minimize cuts being placed in the lowest tier possible; - Japan seems to agree being placed in the middle band in a scenario of a three band approach. No clear whether 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Proposes a three band approach for the reduction of Amber Box subsidies; - Thresholds of the bands: AMS above USD 25 billion; AMS above USD 15 billion and up to USD 25 billion; AMS up to USD 15 billion for the lowest tier; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Agrees with proposal to establish three tiers, with the EU in the highest tier, followed by the US and Japan in the middle band.

	<p>AMS at or below USD 12 billion; 60% for AMS up to USD 25 billion and 83% cut for AMS above USD 25 billion.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This thresholds would require the EU and Japan to reduce final bound AMS by 83% whereas the US will undertake a reduction of 60%. - Developing countries entitle to "slightly lesser cuts" over a longer implementation period than developed countries. 	<p>60%; Japan should be placed either in the top tier with the EU or in the middle band with the US provided it makes an additional contribution. The third lowest tier will command a reduction of AMS of 50%.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Countries in the third band having a relatively high level of AMS support vis-à-vis the total value of their agricultural production should make an additional effort in the reduction of the AMS. 	<p>Japan and other members will accept additional commitments based on the relative level of AMS vis-à-vis total value of agricultural production.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of cuts: 80% for bound final AMS above USD 25 billion; cut of 70% for AMS above USD 15 and 25 billion; and 60% for AMS at or below USD 15 billion. - The proposed thresholds would place the EU and Japan in the top tier for the highest reduction of AMS. The US would be placed in the middle tier. - Countries with relative high levels of trade distorting support vis-à-vis the value of agricultural production should make additional cuts to those required by the tiered approach; - Requires front loading of commitments (e.g. imposing larger cuts during the early years of implementation); - Developing countries would make less than two-thirds of the cuts that would be required from developed countries in the same band. 	
Product-specific caps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Caps to be established based on the levels of support provided over the period 1999-2001. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Caps to be established based on the levels of support provided over the whole implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No indication of preference so far. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Caps to be established based on the level of support provided over the whole implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No indication of preference so far.

		period.		<p>period (1995-2000);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing countries may use their own implementation period of the UR (1995-2004) or that of developed country members (1995-2000); - Product-specific caps should apply from the first day of implementation of the new agreement; - Disciplines should be developed to avoid circumvention of product-specific caps; - SDT: considering the special circumstances of developing countries, such as low applied levels, few supported products, discontinued AMS, and budgetary constraints, product-specific support should not exceed the ceiling set by either of the following alternatives: i) the average applied levels during the implementation period; ii) two-times the member's product-specific <i>de minimis</i> level; iii) a percentage of 20% of the total bound AMS in any 	
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				<p>year;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Specific provisions are made with respect to transparency (submission of supporting data to establish the ceiling levels) and the source of that data. 	
<p>Reduction in De minimis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very sensitive issue given that it has been a regular user of <i>de minimis</i> support; - Proposed to reduce product-specific and non-product-specific <i>de minimis</i> by 50% (or up to 2.5% of the total value of agriculture production or the value of production of the product in question); - Developing countries entitle to "slightly lesser cuts" over a longer implementation period than developed countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not sensitive in this issue; - Proposes the reduction of <i>de minimis</i> support of developed countries (both product and non-product-specific) by 80%, from the current allowance of 5%. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not particularly sensitive on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like the elimination of all <i>de minimis</i> support in developed countries; - Proposed that reductions be made to both product and non-product specific <i>de minimis</i>; the level of such reduction will be such to adjust to the rate of cut for the overall trade-distorting support; - Proposes exempting developing countries without AMS entitlements from reduction commitments on <i>de minimis</i>; - Indicates that for developing countries that do provide AMS support, the level of <i>de minimis</i> reduction would be determined in relation to the overall reduction of trade distorting domestic support. Further, as established by the July framework, developing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like the elimination of all <i>de minimis</i> support in developed countries; - Developing countries that allocate almost all <i>de minimis</i> support for subsistence and resource-poor farmers should be exempt from reduction.

				countries that allocate almost all <i>de minimis</i> programmes for subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt from <i>de minimis</i> reductions.	
Blue Box, including expansion of criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very sensitive issue as it seeks to become large user; - Main proponent of expansion of the Blue Box criteria as provided for in the second bullet of paragraph 13 of the July Framework; - Key objective is to lock-in counter cyclical payments in the Blue Box; - Opposes additional criteria (to that already reflected in paragraph 13 of the July framework) being imposed on the Blue Box that could limit flexibility with respect to counter cyclical payments; - Has proposed instead, capping the –expanded- Blue Box at 2.5% of the total value of agricultural production rather than at 5% as reflected in the July framework. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest: Sensitive issue as has historically has been a large user of this type of support; - Would like to preserve the status quo in the Blue Box; - Opposed to the review of the criteria of the Blue Box that would affect the reform efforts it has undertaken; - Concerned that tightening current criteria under the Blue Box may end up penalising those who have been undertaken reform, instead of those who have taken no initiative in this regard (US); - Offensive interest: Links any movement on its part on market access to US movement on Blue Box criteria (i.e. US accepting additional criteria on the blue box to that already reflected in paragraph 13 of the July framework); 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensitive issue; - Would like to preserve the status quo in the current Blue Box; - Not interested in expanding criteria, more so if it is to limit current allowed flexibilities; - Insists on negotiating additional criteria to that established in paragraph 13 of the July framework related to the expanded Blue Box, in order to restrict the amount of countercyclical payments the US can shift to this box. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong offensive interest; - Would like a review of criteria of the Blue Box to ensure that Blue Box payments are less trade distorting than AMS measures and additional disciplines to avoid box shifting and concentration of support in a few products. The new criteria should target both payments under the current and expanded Blue Box; - Proposes the establishment of product-specific caps for Blue Box programmes, similar to those proposed in the Amber box, with flexibilities for developing countries; - Main proponent of additional criteria for the Blue Box. The group further stresses that the acceptance of an expanded Blue box is subject on agreement on the criteria applicable to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Stresses that Blue Box criteria must ensure that the payments under the box are truly less trade – distorting than Amber Box measures but have not proposed any additional criteria to limit the flexibility allowed under the box, or the expansion of the criteria on the US terms.

		<p>- In this regard the EU has stressed that the introduction of disciplines should focus on the additional definition of the new Blue Box, rather than the current Blue Box criteria which the EU considers are less trade distorting measures;</p> <p>- May consider reducing the ceiling of the Blue Box from the level established in the July framework, but can not agree to a 50% cut as proposed by the US.</p>		<p>payments under this category;</p> <p>- The additional criteria proposed include: i) On direct payments which do not require production (new or expanded Blue Box): limiting the price gaps that can be compensated through subsidies (e.g. the level of countercyclical payments); and avoiding accumulation of support by prohibiting Blue Box payments for products on which other forms of trade distorting support have been provided (with the exception of <i>de minimis</i>); ii) On direct payments which limit production (current Blue Box): demonstration that production has indeed not increased;</p> <p>- The group has also proposed additional criteria to improve transparency and the administration of the direct payments;</p> <p>- Developing countries that have not previously used the Blue Box should not be precluded from establishing a base period for the</p>	
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<p>Green Box review and clarification</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Insist no “material changes” should be introduced in the current green box; - Willing to consider SDT provisions as long as these cover measures considered no trade distorting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like to maintain the status quo; - Willing to work with developing countries on elements of SDT. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like to maintain the status quo. 	<p>provisions of these payments in the future.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Main driver of the review process, especially with respect to criteria related to direct payments; - Would like new disciplines for the Green Box to avoid box shifting; - Would like modifications to the Green Box to include specific provisions designed to take into account the special circumstances of developing countries; - The group has made concrete proposals aimed at excluding production and trade-distorting subsidies from the Green Box. Some of the criteria proposed include: new eligibility conditions for receiving direct payments; support should continue to be provided through publicly-funded government programmes, not involving transfers from consumers and should not require production; credible and time consistent policies with no changes in the eligibility rules should be established; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally in favour of establishing criteria for the Green Box to ensure that these measures have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects , though there are divergent views among countries in this group; - Canada is very vocal; it worries that some of the programmes under the box might, in contradiction to its objectives, distort trade, and has proposed detailed amendments (e.g. simplify calculations, increase clarity and make sure that reference periods are representative, fixed and notified. Need to ensure structural adjustment payments for retirement of producers and resources are time limited).
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				<p>base periods used as reference for the calculation of payments should be fixed and remain unchanged over time; and additional conditions for eligibility to receive certain direct payments.</p> <p>- Some of the suggested amendments to provide SDT for developing countries include: exempting from reduction commitments income support provided to low-income producers; adding an exemption for subsidies for land reform in developing countries; and waiving some of the more stringent criteria for exempting payments made under regional assistance programmes.</p>	
Peace Clause	- Request litigation protection (re-introduction of the peace clause) for subsidy programmes that stay within the allowed levels and conform to the green box criteria.	- Has made no specific reference to this issue; - Likely to support the US' request.	- No specific reference to this issue; - Likely to support the US' request.	- Likely to oppose the US' request for re-introducing the peace clause.	- No specific reference to this issue.

Country Groupings	G33	LDCs	African Group	ACP
Critical Negotiation Issues	DOMESTIC SUPPORT			
Formula for the Reduction of Overall Trade Distorting Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue; - Generally supportive of the principle of proportionality applied to developing countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like significant reduction on all forms of trade distorting support, while taking into account all SDT provisions and recognising the need for transitional measures that will offset the negative, short-term effects of removal of subsidies in terms of reducing or removing LDCs' preferential margins into the markets of developed countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Underlines the importance of meeting the Doha objective of real reductions in trade distorting support; - States that African countries must be provided enough policy space to for the development of the farming communities, based on fair and equitable targets of poverty reduction, food and livelihood security, and rural development; - Modalities on domestic support should include disciplines to prevent box shifting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like the formula to result in meaningful and effective reductions in the domestic support granted by develop countries to their farming communities; - Indicates that ACP countries should be allowed to maintain policy space for the development of their farming communities based on targets of poverty reduction, food and livelihood security, rural development, and other development policy objectives.
Tiered Formula for the Cuts in Final Bound Total AMS (amber box)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses that African Countries must be exempted from AMS reduction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a position on this issue.
Product-specific caps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue.
Reduction in <i>De minimis</i>⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like developed countries to eliminate <i>de minimis</i> support; - Stresses that all developing countries should be exempt from making cuts on <i>de minimis</i> programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a position on this issue; - Likely to oppose the reduction of <i>de minimis</i> for developing countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses that African Countries must be exempted from <i>de minimis</i> support reduction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ACP countries should be exempted from reduction of <i>de minimis</i> support.

Blue Box, including expansion of the criteria	- The group does not have a position on this issue.	- The group does not have a position on this issue.	- Stresses that disciplines on domestic support should not lead to “box-shifting” subsidies. - Views the tightening of the Blue Box criteria as critical.	- The group does not have a position on this issue;
Green Box review and clarification	- The group does not have a position on the issue; - Generally supportive of proposals for rendering the Green Box more user friendly for developing countries.	- The group seeks to engage on this issue to improve obligations for monitoring and surveillance to avoid box shifting.	- Insists on the need to review the Green Box Criteria to provide “Policy Space” for developing countries. - Calls for review and tightening of the Green Box Criteria for developed countries to ensure that it is no or at most, minimal trade-distorting.	- Considers members should engage in the review and clarification of the green box criteria to ensure measures under this category have no or minimal impact of production and trade, and provide adequate policy space for developing countries.
Peace Clause	- The group does not have a position on this issue so far; - Most members likely to oppose the reintroduction of the peace clause.	- The group does not have a position on this issue so far; - Most members likely to oppose the reintroduction of the peace clause.	- The group does not have a position on this issue so far; - Most members likely to oppose the reintroduction of the peace clause.	- The group does not have a position on this issue so far; - Most members likely to oppose the reintroduction of the peace clause.

Country Groupings	United States	European Union	G10	G20	Cairns Group
Critical Negotiation Issues	EXPORT COMPETITION				
Timeframe for the elimination of export subsidies	- Defensive interest to the extent that commitments on the elimination of export subsidies is linked to programmes extensively used by the US such as export credits and certain food aid transactions;	- Defensive interest; - Would like a long time frame for the elimination of export subsidies, namely on certain sensitive products; - Has put forth several conditions for the	- Defensive interest; - Would like a long time frame for the elimination of export subsidies; - Has put forth several conditions for the elimination of export	- Offensive interest; - The group has proposed a five year deadline at the latest for eliminating all export subsidies; - Direct export subsidies are to be eliminated in a period	- Offensive interest; - Would like export subsidies to be eliminated in the shortest time frame possible.

	<p>- Proposes the elimination of export subsidies on all products by no later than 2010, with accelerated elimination for specific products.</p>	<p>elimination of export subsidies: i) full parallelism within the export competition pillar (reduction on subsidies, export credits, food aid, and STEs handled in parallel); ii) that its concerns on domestic support, market access and non – trade concerns are fully taken into account; and that ambitious liberalisation outcomes are achieved in other areas such as Services and NAMA;</p> <p>- No indication of a suitable end date for the elimination of export subsidies.</p>	<p>subsidies: i) full parallelism within the export competition pillar (reduction on subsidies, export credits, food aid, and STEs handled in parallel); ii) that its concerns on domestic support, market access and non – trade concerns are fully taken into account; and that ambitious liberalisation outcomes are achieved in other areas such as Services and NAMA.</p>	<p>no longer than 5 years, with frontloading of commitments (e.g. larger concessions at early stages of the implementation period);</p> <p>- Has called for an immediate standstill on all forms of export subsidies.</p>	
<p>Disciplines on export credits and related programmes</p>	<p>- Defensive interest as the main provider of export credit and similar programmes;</p> <p>- Government programmes to be aligned with commercial terms to prevent export subsidies.</p> <p>- Insists on providing special provisions in favour of developing countries that are beneficiaries of these programmes. Such flexibilities constitute a means to relax disciplines</p>	<p>- Offensive interest;</p> <p>- Main objective is to pressure the US to adopt stricter disciplines on this issue;</p> <p>- Programmes of repayment period beyond 180 days to be eliminated as per the July framework;</p> <p>- Short-term self-financing principle to be established as the core rule for the remaining programmes; officially supported credit agencies should be able to</p>	<p>- Not particularly concerned with this issue;</p> <p>- Likely to support the development of strong disciplines to pressure the US.</p>	<p>- Offensive interest;</p> <p>- Would like to develop strict disciplines so that export credits and similar programmes are not used in a way that displaces third country commercial exports or promotes surplus disposal;</p> <p>- Insists that discussions on provisions in favour of developing countries beneficiaries of export credit and similar programmes, do not nullify or create exceptions to the agreed</p>	<p>- Offensive interest;</p> <p>- Would like to develop strict disciplines with comprehensive coverage;</p> <p>- Does not support extending flexibilities on this issue to developing countries as these may lead to relaxation of the agreed disciplines.</p>

	on providers of export credit and similar programmes.	demonstrate on an annual basis that premiums charged ensure self-financing; - The scope of officially-supported export financing to be narrowed down permitting guarantees for pure risk cover only.		disciplines.	
Disciplines on Food Aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest; - Would like to maintain the status quo, particularly the flexibility to provide tied, in kind food aid. The US usually conditions food aid to export of domestic commodities and services. - Would like to maintain current flexibility to provide food aid regardless of whether there is an emergency or not (i.e. programme and project food aid); - Stresses donor members should have broad discretion to meet needs in emergency situations and low-income countries; tighter disciplines would apply to other situations; - Strongly opposes cash- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Main objective is to pressure the US to discipline its food aid programmes; - Would like to limit food aid to emergency and humanitarian interventions as declared by specialised UN agencies; - Insists food aid should be provided fully in grant form; - Would generally support reform towards fully untied aid; - Would like in-kind food aid to be subject to strict disciplines during the implementation period of the new agreement and remain permitted only in exceptional genuine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Supports strict disciplines for food aid; - Generally supports European Communities' stance on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Favours developing strict disciplines in order to ensure that operations will be carried in grant form only, that food aid will be fully untied and is granted only for emergency situations at the request of UN agencies; - Stresses need to ensure that commitments regarding the maintenance of food aid levels be in line with requirements under the Food Aid Convention. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Supports developing strict disciplines for food aid; - Supports disciplining food aid to ensure that it is granted only for emergency situations at the request of UN agencies and be fully in grant form.

	only requirements.	emergency situations under criteria to be agreed.			
Disciplines on State Trading Enterprises (STEs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Main objective is to pressure Canada and Australia to discipline their exporting STEs' practices; - Would like to prohibit monopoly status for exporting STEs, including for developing countries; - Would like the termination of financial privileges for STEs, and insists on greater transparency in the operation of these enterprises. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Main objective is to pressure Canada and Australia to discipline their exporting STEs' practices; - Would like an end to statutory privileges for STEs that have trade-distorting effects, including the following elements of a non-exhaustive illustrative list of issues: price-pooling, anti-trust immunity, direct and indirect-preferential transport services, use of monopoly powers inclusive of single-desk selling and exclusive utilization of preferential market access quotas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Offensive interest; - Supports strict disciplines on exporting STEs in both developed and developing countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Both defensive and offensive interests; - Would like to discipline exporting STEs of Canada and Australia use exporting STEs; - Stresses developing countries should have the right to maintain the monopoly status of their exporting STEs. The group is willing to discuss new disciplines as long as these do not undermine the ability of developing country members to pursue their social policies; - Suggests the focus of the discussion regarding exporting STEs should be put on the implementation of existing rules or those that may be developed, rather than on the monopoly status of STEs per se. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest; - Key members such as Australia and Canada have defensive interests.

Country Groupings	G33	LDCs	African Group	ACP
Critical Negotiation Issues	EXPORT COMPETITION			
Timeframe for the elimination of	- The group does not have a	- Supports setting a short time frame	- Stressed the need to eliminate all	- Would like a commitment to

<p>export subsidies</p>	<p>common position on this issue;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some countries concerned with the effect of eliminating export subsidies on their capacity to import food. 	<p>for the elimination of all export subsidies, but taking into account SDT provisions;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some countries concerned with the effect of eliminating export subsidies on their capacity to import food; - Calls for full implementation of the Marrakesh Decision on NFIDCs and LDCs. 	<p>forms of export subsidies by 2010, without prejudice to SDT of NFIDCs and LDCs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Calls for immediate implementation of the Marrakech Decision on NFIDCs and LDCs, in accordance with paragraph 4 of that Decision, as it is long overdue. 	<p>phase out all forms of export subsidisation by a credible end date.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Likely to support longer time frame for elimination of export subsidies in products where long-standing preferences are granted; - Commitments on the elimination of export credits should be accompany by flaking measures for NFIDCs and LDCs.
<p>Disciplines on export credits and related programmes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue; - NFIDC members call for full implementation of the Marrakesh Decision on NFIDCs and LDCs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some countries concerned with the effect of eliminating of export credits on their capacity to import food; - Calls for full implementation of the Marrakech Decision on NFIDCs and LDCs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supports the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision on NFIDCs and LDCs as a clear reflection of the SDT component in any disciplines to be developed on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Any discipline on export credits and similar programmes should incorporate provisions for the implementation of the Marrakech Decision in favour of NFIDCs and LDCs.
<p>Disciplines on Food Aid</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a position on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supports modalities on food aid that will discipline the commercial displacement effects of food aid, but would like to ensure that food aid is available at all times to ensure the needs of LDCs and NFIDCs; - Stresses that modalities must include commitments by donors in the context of the Food Aid Convention and improved monitoring of food aid transactions; - Would like local and regional purchase of products to be 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses the needs of food aid recipients must be taken into account in developing disciplines on this issue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses the need for the interest of food aid recipients to be taken into account in developing disciplines on this issue.; - Supports food aid in both in cash and in kind.

		encouraged, limiting to a minimum the impact of food aid on the local production of LDC recipient countries.		
Disciplines on State Trading Enterprises (STEs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a position on this issue; - Likely to support disciplines for developed country STEs while seeking to maintain exemption for developing country's STEs in the context of SDT provisions. 	- The group does not have a position on this issue.	- Strongly calls for African Countries' STEs to be excluded from the application of any disciplines on STEs, in recognition of the critical role played by STEs in sustaining livelihoods, food security and poverty reduction in these countries.	- Calls for an exemption of ACP States' STEs from additional disciplines taking into account the role they play in promoting national development goals and objectives.

Country Groupings	United States	European Union	G10	G20	Cairns Group
	COTTON				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest; - Has generally remained silent on the issue; - Stresses that the outcome for cotton will be determined by the overall agricultural negotiations, where reductions in the three pillars may affect US Cotton programmes; - Emphasises the development aspects of the cotton initiative diverting attention from the trade-related problems; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has made specific proposal on decisions to be adopted by Ministers at the 6th Ministerial Conference on cotton; - Suggests Ministers must agree that the results of the negotiations on cotton will be more ambitious and farther reaching than those to be achieved for the agriculture sector as a whole, with respect to commitments in every pillar of the agreement; - Commitments in market access with respect to cotton, should be more ambitious 	- The group does not have a position on this issue.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insists on addressing the trade-related and development aspects of the cotton initiative; - Very supportive of the proponents of the cotton initiative urging the Sub-Committee on cotton to negotiate specific modalities on cotton; - Broadly supported (as does the African Group) the proposal by the proponents that 80% of trade distorting domestic support be scrapped by the end of 2006 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a position on this issue; - Would generally favour full liberalization of trade in cotton.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insists on limiting the mandate of the Cotton Sub Committee to general discussions on progress in the overall agriculture negotiations opposing attempts by the proponents of the cotton initiative to negotiate specific modalities on cotton; - On 10 November 2005, the US announced the launching of the West African Cotton Improvement Program (WCIP) aimed at the cotton sector of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Senegal. The program has been allotted US\$ 7 million. The US National Cotton Council (lobby group of cotton producers in the US) will be directly involved in the initiative. The programme will focus in seven actions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) reduce soil degradation and expand the use of good agricultural practices; ii) strengthen private agricultural organisations; iii) establish a West African regional training programme for ginners; iv) improve the quality of C-4 cotton through better 	<p>than those resulting from the formula yet to be negotiated;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Negotiations on domestic support should lead to substantial reductions in the levels of trade-distorting support for cotton and the remaining authorised support for the sector should be subject to the disciplines, including those still to be negotiated; - On export competition, commitments on cotton need to be implemented expeditiously; - Suggests that commitments with respect to cotton must be implemented from day one of implementation of the new agreement, and to the extent possible, the major part of implementation of these commitments should be made by the end of the first year; - The EU is willing to: eliminate all duties and quantitative restrictions on imports on cotton on an MFN basis; eliminate most of AMS support to cotton and apply all disciplines applicable to the Blue Box; and eliminate all forms of export subsidies on cotton, from day one of 		<p>with 10% each in 2007 and 2008, leading to total elimination by 2009;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Broadly supported (as does the African Group) the proposal by the proponents for the elimination of export subsidies on cotton by the end of 2005. - Stresses the need to provide urgent development assistance to countries that are net cotton producers and exporters; - Insists that the US need to fully implement the panel ruling decision on cotton; - Stresses the need to address this question through effective measures consistent with all aspects of the July framework, not later than the 6th Ministerial Conference. 	
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	classification of seed cotton and lint; v) improve linkages between US and West African agricultural research organisations involved in cotton; vi) improve the enabling environment for agricultural biotechnology; and vii) policy/institutional reform.	implementation of the new agreement; - On development-related aspects of the cotton initiative, the EU suggests Ministers must take note of report prepared by the WTO Secretariat and commit to maintain and intensify efforts to ensure adequate response to the need of cotton producing developing countries.			
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Country Groupings	G33	LDCs	African Group	ACP
	COTTON			
	- The group does not have a position on this issue.	<p>- Offensive interest;</p> <p>- Would like an ambitious, expeditious and specific cotton – related decision as part of the overall agriculture negotiations;</p> <p>- Calls for the elimination of domestic support measures and export subsidies that distort trade in cotton by no later than the WTO 6th Ministerial Conference;</p> <p>- Would like bound duty – free and quota – free access for cotton and products derived from cotton from</p>	<p>- Critical issue for the group;</p> <p>- Would like developed countries to eliminate all forms export subsidies on cotton by 31 December 2005,</p> <p>- Would like substantial reductions in domestic support measures that distort international trade in cotton by the following timeframe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 80% by 31 December 2006; • 10% by 1 January 2008; and • 10% by 1 January 2009. <p>- Stresses the need for appropriate</p>	<p>- Important issue for the group;</p> <p>- Would like developed countries to eliminate all forms export subsidies on cotton by 31 December 2005,</p> <p>- Would like substantial reductions in domestic support measures that distort international trade in cotton by the following timeframe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 80% by 31 December 2006; • 10% by 1 January 2008; and

		<p>LDC countries;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Seeks the creation of an Emergency Support Fund for cotton; - Stresses the need for commitment by WTO members to address the development related aspects of the Cotton Initiative. 	<p>disciplines that prevent Box-shifting in domestic support;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like an ambitious, expeditious and specific cotton – related decision as part of the overall agriculture negotiations; - Would like bound duty – free and quota – free access for cotton and products derived from cotton from LDCs cotton producers and net exporters; - Seeks the creation of an Emergency Support Fund for cotton to address cotton revenue deficits resulting from cotton price depressions in international market; - Requests technical and financial assistance for the cotton sector in Africa. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10% by 1 January 2009. - Stresses the need for appropriate disciplines to that prevent Box-shifting in domestic support. - Requests substantial improvement in market access for trade in cotton, duty and quota free market access for cotton and its by-products of LDCs producers and exporters of cotton; - Seeks the creation of an Emergency Support Fund in favour of all African countries producers and exporters of cotton aimed at reinforcing their cotton sector and contributing to the promotion and processing of cotton; - Would like the mobilisation of technical and financial assistance for the reinforcement of the cotton sector in Africa in order to build capacity to process and add value to cotton and its by-products.
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Endnotes

¹ Small, vulnerable economies suggests that developing members whose average share of world merchandise exports over the period 1995-2004 does not exceed 0.10%, will undertake linear cuts of no more than 15 per cent, with a minimum reduction per tariff line of 10%, from bound rates. They will not make tariff capping or other commitments resulting from other elements in the market access pillar as may be agreed. The modalities on agriculture should provide them substantial market access for products of interest to them.

² Small, vulnerable economies propose that they will designate SPs based on their food security, livelihood security and rural development needs; and that their designated SPs will be exempt from tariff reductions and tariff rate quota commitments.

³ Small, vulnerable economies insist that all agricultural tariff lines should be eligible for SSM; that SPs of Small, vulnerable economies will have automatic access to the SSM; that price and volume-based triggers for SSM should be considered and that remedy measures should be effective and flexible to respond to the needs of the Small, vulnerable economies.

⁴ Small, vulnerable economies stress there is no justification for the reduction of *de minimis* support by developing countries. These members should be exempt from commitments in this respect.

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