

**STATE OF PLAY IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS:
COUNTRY GROUPINGS' POSITIONS**

MARKET ACCESS PILLAR

SYNOPSIS

This note provides an overview of the position of various countries and group of countries active in the WTO agriculture negotiations with respect to critical issues discussed in the market access pillar. Similar information on the domestic support pillar, on the export competition pillar and on the cotton initiative is available in Analytical Notes N° SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-2, SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-3 and SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-4 respectively.

January 2008
Geneva, Switzerland

This Analytical Note is produced by the Trade for Development Programme (TDP) of the South Centre to contribute to empower the countries of the South with knowledge and tools that would allow them to engage as equals with the North on trade relations and negotiations.

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce the contents of this Analytical Note for their own use, but are requested to grant due acknowledgement to the South Centre and to send a copy of the publication in which such quote or reproduction appears to the South Centre.

Electronic copies of this and other South Centre publications may be downloaded without charge from:
<http://www.southcentre.org>.

STATE OF PLAY IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: COUNTRY GROUPINGS' POSITIONS

MARKET ACCESS PILLAR

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION.....	2
TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS.....	3
SENSITIVE PRODUCTS (SEPs)	8
SPECIAL PRODUCTS (SPs)	13
SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MECHANISM (SSM)	17
SPECIAL SAFEGUARD (SSG)	20
PREFERENCE EROSION.....	22
TROPICAL PRODUCTS.....	27

ANNEXES:

ANNEX 1: MEMBERS OF COUNTRY GROUPINGS	30
ANNEX 2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS.....	31

INTRODUCTION

1. The WTO agriculture negotiations are organised around the three pillars, mainly market access, domestic support and export competition. This note describes the position of various countries and group of countries active in the WTO agriculture negotiations with respect to critical issues discussed in the market access pillar.

2. The note provides an overview of the position of the following countries and groupings: United States, European Communities, G-10, G-20, Cairns Group, G-33, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the African Group, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), the Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) and APU (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay). Annex 1 contains a list of the countries participating in each of these groupings. A glossary is included in Annex 2, which offers a definition of various concepts and terms used throughout the note.

3. Similar information on the domestic support pillar, on the export competition pillar and on the cotton initiative (sponsored by a group of African countries) is available in Analytical Notes N° SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-2, SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-3 and SC/AN/TDP/AG/4-4 respectively.

Critical Negotiation Issue:	TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS			
Country Groupings:				
United States	European Union	G-10	G-20	Cairns Group
<p>- Very ambitious, seeks harmonization of tariff across WTO members;</p> <p>- Considers that Chairman's tiered formula¹ lacks ambition and that developing countries should make more meaningful commitments, reflecting their importance as emerging markets</p> <p>- Favoured the same thresholds for developed and developing countries: 0-20, >20-40, >40-60 and >60;</p> <p>- Level of cuts: For developed countries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 0-20%, cut of 55-65%, ✓ >20-40%, cut of 65-75%, ✓ >40-60%, cut of 75-85%, </p>	<p>- Defensive and offensive interests;</p> <p>- Has signalled willingness to accept Chairman's tiered formula as a working hypothesis².</p> <p>- Their original proposal for a tiered formula was the following: For developed countries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Tariffs between 0-30%, average cut of 35% ✓ >30-60%, cut of 45% ✓ >60-90%, cut of 50% ✓ >90%, cut of 60% For developing countries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 0-30%, average cut of 25%, with a min. cut of 10% and a max. cut of 40% ✓ >30-80%, cut of 30% </p>	<p>- Defensive interests</p> <p>- Has signalled willingness to accept Chairman's tiered formula as a working hypothesis².</p> <p>--Their original proposal for a tiered formula was the following: For developed countries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Tariffs between 0-20%, average cut of 27% ✓ >20-50%, cut of 31% ✓ >50-70%, cut of 37% ✓ >70%, cut of 45% <p>- Their proposal allowed for deviations from the linear cut and a system of credits to compensate with higher cuts within each tier.</p> </p>	<p>- Supports formula within tiers: each tariff subject to a linear (uniform) cut for both developed and developing countries;</p> <p>- Suggested the following thresholds for the tiered formula: For developed countries: 0-20, >20-50, >50-75, >75. For developing countries: 0-30, >30-80, >80-130, >130</p> <p>- Level of cuts: For developed countries: tariffs between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 0-20%, cut of 45% ✓ >20-50, cut of 55% ✓ >50-75, cut of 65% ✓ >75, cut of 75% <p>- For developing countries:</p> </p>	<p>- Offensive interests, seeks harmonization of tariff across WTO members;</p> <p>- Considers that Chairman's formula lacks ambition. Believes that a 75% cut in the top tier is not sufficient to meet the reform mandate</p> <p>Thresholds: similar to those proposed by the US</p> <p>Favours use of tariff cap and the need to eliminate in-quota tariff rates applied by developed countries.</p>

¹ The Chairman's tiered formula was included in the Draft Agriculture Modalities dated 1 August 2007 (Document TN/AG/W/4) and reviewed later on, with working papers circulated in January 2008. A matrix attached to this paper as Annex 3, illustrates this proposal.

² I.e. their support could be reviewed at a later stage, once the configuration of commitments in different elements of the market access pillar is clearer.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ >60%, cut of 85-90% For developing countries: “slightly lesser cuts” suggested and longer implementation phase-in periods - Does not specify a target for the overall average cut; - Tariff cap: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 75% for developed countries ✓ level of capping for developing countries to be decided - Sensitivities to be addressed through a few sensitive products only (i.e. no additional flexibilities to be in-built in the formula). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ >80-130%, cut of 35% ✓ >130, cut of 40% - Tariff cap: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 100% for developed countries ✓ 150% for developing countries, - Suggests proposed tariff cuts result in average reduction of tariffs of 50% for EU’s own tariffs; - Sensitivities to be addressed through the formula and sensitive products. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - They proposed the following thresholds for the tiered formula for developing countries: 0-30%, >30-70, >70-100, >100 but did not indicate level of cuts proposed for each tier. - Oppose tariff capping because they believe it would require a disproportionate contribution from the group and thus lead to an unbalanced overall result. - The depth of tariff cuts and number and treatment of sensitive and special products have to be resolved simultaneously 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> tariffs between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 0-30%, cut of 25% ✓ >30-80, cut of 30% ✓ >80-130, cut of 35% ✓ >130, cut of 40% -Longer implementation periods for developing countries - Requires overall tariff reduction: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ by developed countries of at least 54% on average ✓ by developing countries of maximum 30%, on average. - Tariff cap applicable to non-sensitive products: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 100% for developed countries ✓ 150% for developing countries. -Tariff cap applicable to sensitive products: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 150% for developed countries, provided that TRQ is expanded 	
---	---	---	--	--

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 225% for developing countries - The concept of capping for sensitive products was proposed in December 2007 to introduce balance between the NAMA and agriculture negotiations. - Sees merit in additional reduction (beyond cut required under tiered formula) to address remaining tariff escalation. 	
--	--	--	---	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS			
Country Groupings:				
G-33	LDCs	African Group	ACP	SVEs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has not developed a common position on this issue but welcomes the Chairman's tiered formula proposal. - Opposes harmonization of tariffs across countries; - Insists on the need to take into account the different 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exempt from tariff reductions; - Have not been actively involved in the debate on the tariff reduction formula; - Calls for binding commitments by trading partners in granting duty-free and quota-free market 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally concerned with the treatment of S&D provisions in market access - Maintains there should be at least a 54% average tariff cut for developed countries and at most 24% for developing countries. - Maintains that developing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defensive interest. Primary objective is to retain the appropriate level of protection in the domestic market to enable domestic production to thrive in the ACP countries and to mitigate the erosion of preference margins, which will result from tariff reduction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Defensive interest: - Insists on addressing trade-related problems (they confront in view of their vulnerabilities) through flexibilities in order to enhance their participation in the multilateral trading system, in accordance with their development, economic, financial and trade

<p>tariff structures of developing countries;</p> <p>- Insists on the principle of overall? proportionality</p>	<p>access for all products from LDCs, to be implemented immediately on a secure and predictable basis, with no restrictive measures introduced</p>	<p>countries should undertake at most, cuts of two-thirds of those undertaken by developed countries</p> <p>- Calls for bound duty and quota free market access to agricultural products from LDCs;</p> <p>- Calls for improvement of market access for exports from Africa with special attention to tariff escalation, tariff peaks and NTBs;</p> <p>- Suggests addressing tariff escalation through identifying a list of products as part of the negotiations of modalities and assessing, at the end of the implementation period, the difference in percentage points between the primary and processed product.</p> <p>- Calls for provision of “policy space” and “flexibilities” for Africa to pursue agricultural policies</p>	<p>Supports Chairman’s proposal for a more flexible tariff reduction approach for countries with ceiling bindings, homogenous low bindings or facing “unsustainable adjustment burden” due to tiered approach</p> <p>The Chairman’s proposal consists of (a) less cuts per tier than developing countries and (b) the possibility of resorting to overall tariff reduction in case a 24% average cut is exceeded (see Annex 3)</p> <p>- Tariff cap: ACP countries oppose it for both developed and developing countries;</p> <p>- Non-tariff barriers and tariff escalation affecting products of export interest of ACP countries must be addressed leading to a lasting solution</p>	<p>needs</p> <p>Supports Chairman’s proposal for a more flexible tariff reduction approach for SVEs</p> <p>The Chairman’s proposal consists of (a) less cuts per tier than developing countries and (b) the possibility of resorting to overall tariff reduction in case a 24% average cut is exceeded (see Annex 3)</p> <p>2) Offensive interest: -Have insisted on the fact that modalities shall provide for substantial improvement in market access for products of export interest to SVEs.</p>
---	--	--	--	---

		<p>that support development goals, poverty reduction strategies, food security and livelihood concerns</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Also calls for technical and financial assistance in coordination with other IGOs to improve world market of commodities. - Insist on the need to take into account the different tariff structures of developing countries and the particular pattern of trade of African countries; - Calls for the full operationalisation of the principle of proportionality. 		
--	--	---	--	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	SENSITIVE PRODUCTS (SePs) ³			
Country Groupings:				
United States	European Union	G-10	G-20	Cairns Group
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views SePs as exceptions - Original US proposal: Number of SePs for developed countries: 1% of tariff lines. No indication regarding the number of SePs for developing countries. - Favours calculating percentage of SePs over <u>dutiable tariff lines</u>. - Emphasises full compensation through tariff-rate quota (TRQ) expansion should be provided for less 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views SePs as part of the negotiations on all components of the market access pillar, not to be treated as exceptions; - Original EU proposal: Number of SePs for developed countries: 8% of tariff lines. No indication regarding the number of SePs for developing countries. - Favours calculating percentage of SePs over <u>total of tariff lines</u>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Issue of special interest to the group; opposes the view of SePs as exceptions; - Original G-10 proposal: 15% of tariff lines with the possibility of designating more tariff lines as sensitive if a member has percentage of tariff lines falling in the highest tier of the formula. - Favours calculating percentage of SePs over <u>total of tariff lines</u>. - Would like sensitive products to be designated in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views sensitive products as exceptions - Original G-20 proposal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Number of SePs for developed members: very limited number, not exceeding 1% of tariff lines ✓ Number of SePs for developing countries should be 50% higher than the absolute number of tariff lines designated as sensitive by the developed member having the highest number of such tariff lines; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Views sensitive products as exceptions; - Has not specified a number for SePs. Likely to support G20's and US' position of restricting the number of sensitive products. - Favours calculating percentage of SePs over total of <u>dutiable tariff lines</u>. - Emphasises the need of substantial improvement in market access in every tariff line designated as sensitive

³ Current Working hypothesis, as per the Draft Modalities for Agriculture (August 2008) and Working Paper on Sensitive Products (January 2008). Developed countries: *numbers*: [4 -6]% of dutiable tariff lines or [6-8] %, if more than 30% of tariffs fall in the top band of the tiered formula. *Alternatives for treatment – Developed countries*: (a) deviation of one third (from reduction required by the tiered formula) with increased access opportunities (through tariff quota expansion) equivalent to [4-6]% of domestic consumption or (b) deviation of two thirds (from reduction required by the tiered formula) with increased access opportunities (through tariff quota expansion) equivalent to [3-5] of domestic consumption or (c) reducing one half of the otherwise applicable reduction, with increased access opportunities (through tariff quota expansion) equivalent to [3.5-5.5]% of domestic consumption. Developing countries shall have the right to designate up to one-third more of tariff lines and they will also have two options to deviate (by one third or two thirds) from reduction required by the tiered formula for developing countries. Developing countries shall expand quotas by two thirds of the amount for developed, excluding domestic consumption of subsistence production.

<p>than formula cuts in SePs;</p> <p>- Proposes TRQs should be expanded based on domestic consumption.</p>	<p>- Favours "<u>partial designation</u>", which would allow Members to designate products at the more specific 8-digit HS level (i.e. some, but not all, tariff lines within a product category). TRQ expansion should be defined by sorting out the participation of the tariff lines in the overall domestic consumption.</p> <p>- Proposes a combination of tariff reduction and TRQ expansion for SePs.</p> <p>- Deviation from the formula: minimum deviation: from the corresponding formula cut of 1/3 and maximum 2/3 for each tariff line designated as sensitive, to the discretion of each member,</p> <p>- TRQ expansion on the basis of the domestic consumption</p> <p>- Would like to maintain option of creating new TRQs for products designated as</p>	<p>any of the bands of the tiered formula, at the discretion of the member concerned;</p> <p>- Deviation from the standard combination possible but shortfall in one element (e.g. formula cut) needs to be compensated by additional commitments in the other elements (e.g. TRQ expansion);</p> <p>- When a product designated as sensitive has no TRQ, the member concerned can opt for not creating a new TRQ. In this case, the following options will be available: i) reduction of tariffs derived from the standard combination will be achieved over a shorter implementation period; or ii) the formula cut will be applied although over a longer implementation period than otherwise required.</p> <p>- Favours "<u>partial</u></p>	<p>- Favours calculating percentage of SePs over total of <u>dutiable tariff lines</u>.</p> <p>- Supports the "<u>product approach</u>" to selection, under which sensitive products would be designated at the 6-digit HS level.</p> <p>-Opposes the "partial designation" approach because it would: (a) decrease level of ambition in new access opportunities for processed products, (b) lead to lack of transparency in the scheduling process and (c) would lead a TRQ allocation unrepresentative of consumption patterns.</p> <p>- The higher the number of tariff lines designated as sensitive, the higher the compensation in their treatment; the higher the deviation from the required formula cut the higher the TRQ expansion in that particular tariff line;</p>	<p>product;</p> <p>- Sees tariff quota expansion (on an MFN basis) as the fundamental mechanism for achieving improved market access in sensitive products</p> <p>- To achieve substantial improvements in market access, the CAIRNS group has proposed a two-step approach to deviation (20 or 40% of the formula cut). This level of deviation would be compensated by corresponding tariff quota expansion (5 or 8.5 % of consumption).</p> <p>- Favours a "<u>product approach</u>" for the expansion of TRQ (on the basis of domestic consumption of the entire product, identifying SePs at the 6 digit HS level).</p> <p>-Opposes the partial designation approach as it</p>
--	---	--	--	---

	<p>sensitive.</p>	<p><u>designation</u>", which would allow Members to designate products at the more specific 8-digit HS level (i.e. some, but not all, tariff lines within a product category)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The base level for the expansion of TRQ should be established considering various elements affecting sensitivities including present and future supply and demand, consumption patterns and non-trade concerns; - For sensitive products whose TRQs are already substantial vis-à-vis domestic consumption, the TRQ expansion should be adjusted in an equitable manner; - TRQ expansion for sensitive products should be: determined under the principle of less than full compensation with no core expansion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deviation from the formula: to be measured in absolute percentage points as the difference between the tariff to be bound for the particular sensitive product, inclusive of tariff capping, and the tariff that would have resulted from the application of the formula. Maximum allowed deviation from the corresponding formula is 30%; - TRQ expansion based on the MFN principle. - TRQ expansion based on domestic consumption. For developed countries, base level should represent at least 6% of annual domestic consumption to be calculated as the simple average of the annual domestic consumption over the three most recent years for which data are available; For developing countries: the base level of minimum access should be less than two thirds 	<p>could substantially reduce the consumption base upon which tariff quota expansion would otherwise have occurred.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Favours domestic consumption and domestic "marketable" consumption (for developing countries) as the basis for TQ expansion - Proposes that developing countries expand by two-thirds of the percentage of marketable consumption and that they are allowed to have a higher percentage of SePs - Favours applying a tariff cap for sensitive products - Opposes TRQ creation
--	-------------------	--	---	--

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Would like to maintain option of creating new TRQs for products designated as sensitive. - Opposes across-the-board elimination of in-quota duty rates, given the sensitive nature of products subject to TRQ commitments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opposes TRQ creation - Stresses that sensitive products will be subject to tariff capping; -Opposes TRQ expansion for developing countries -Believes there should an agreement on the level of domestic consumption data per tariff line or product, its methodology and calculation in the modalities (to reduce uncertainties related to the scheduling process) -Believes in-quota tariffs for sensitive products should be set at zero -Believed tariff quota administration should be improved through transparency mechanism and alternatives for unfilled quotas should be considered. 	
--	--	--	--	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	SENSITIVE PRODUCTS (SePs)			
Country Groupings:				
G-33	LDCs	African Group	ACP	SVEs
<p>- The group has insisted on the fact that developing countries should be allowed to designate SePs.</p> <p>-The group considers that unused allowances of Sensitive Products can be converted to Special Products.</p>	<p>- The group does not have a specific position on this issue;</p> <p>- Likely to be concerned with the treatment of sensitive products to the extent that these may cover long-standing preferences.</p>	<p>-View SePs as an instrument that may bar market access for developing countries. The selection or percentage of SePs should thus be as low as possible and developed countries wishing to avail themselves of this mechanism should compensate trading partners through tariff quota expansion.</p> <p>- Stresses that in the designation of sensitive products by developed countries, paramount consideration must be given to problems of preference erosion.</p>	<p>- Supportive of sensitive products.</p> <p>- Sensitive products category seen as critical to preserve their interests of developing countries benefiting from long-standing preferences;</p> <p>- Would like products relating to long-standing preferences to be designated as sensitive by preference-providing countries and its treatment moderated in light of its impact on preference erosion;</p> <p>- Any TRQ expansion on MFN basis should not undermine the existing ACP quotas;</p> <p>- Disciplines on TRQ administration for existing quotas must take into account the need to improve market access for developing countries.</p>	<p>The group does not have a specific position on this issue</p>

Critical Negotiation Issue:	SPECIAL PRODUCTS (SPs)			
Country Groupings:				
United States	European Union	G-10	G-20	Cairns Group
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SPs should provide transitional protection to developing countries against import surges while providing “meaningful” improvement in market access for the products protected under these mechanisms; - Would like to limit the scope of special products to a 5 tariff lines; - Strongly opposes to SP being exempt from tariff reductions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not very supportive or interested; - Would like to limit the scope of special products to few tariff lines; - Would like special products to be subject to some tariff reductions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally supportive but not very interested in this category. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive, views special products as an integral element of SDT for developing countries; - Pledged to work with G-33 to operationalise and render effective the instrument; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some members are concerned that special products, in particular the possibility of exempting some lines from any tariff reduction, can affect their exports of agricultural products and many would like to limit their number. - Chile would like special products to be eligible only for non-commercial products; - Colombia has proposed setting a percentage limit on the volume of imports of the product as a benchmark for product eligibility - Malaysia and Thailand have put forward proposals aiming at further restricting the scope of SPs by suggesting trade-related indicators to exclude certain products.
Critical Negotiation Issue:	SPECIAL PRODUCTS (SPs)			

Country Groupings:				
G-33	LDCs	African Group	ACP	SVEs
<p>- Main proponents of provisions on special products, thus this issue is of crucial importance to the group;</p> <p>- Highlights the value and need of SPs to protect legitimate commercial and developmental and political sensitivities</p> <p>- Insists that operational indicators for the selection of SPs must be based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development as agreed in the July framework;</p> <p>- Insists on self-selection of SPs on the basis of an illustrative, non-prescriptive, non-exhaustive and non-</p>	<p>- Generally supportive although the group has not shown special interest on this provision as it has been agreed that LDCs will be exempt from tariff reductions.</p>	<p>- This issue is very important for this group;</p> <p>- Stresses the need to develop meaningful modalities on the designation and treatment of special products in such a way that provides maximum flexibility to African countries to reflect their particular domestic circumstances and development needs;</p> <p>- There are divergent views within the group with respect to the concrete product scope and treatment of SPs</p>	<p>- This is an important issue for the group;</p> <p>- Would like to designate an appropriate number of SPs based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs;</p> <p>- SPs shall be exempt from tariff reduction and TRQ commitments</p> <p>- Insist on adequate provisions on SPs constitute an integral element of the modalities for agriculture negotiations.</p> <p>- ACP countries are listed as beneficiaries of Chairman's approach for Small and Vulnerable Economies.</p>	<p>- This is an important issue for the group.</p> <p>- Would like to have SPs designated by SVEs exempted from capping and tariff-quota commitments.</p> <p>Favour the Chairman's approach for SVEs, which entails:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Being exempted from the obligation to show compliance with indicators, in order to designate SPs ✓ Exempting tariff lines from tariff reduction, as long as a 24% overall reduction takes place

⁴ The current working hypothesis was proposed by the Chairman in the Revised Draft Modalities in Agriculture (August 2007): (a) agreeing on a minimum number of tariff lines available for designation as SP (b) using indicators to select those SPs (c) verifying the process of designation of SPs (d) using indicators for which data is publicly available and (e) reducing tariffs on products designated as SPs, allowing for deviations in the reduction that would have been required under the formula, establishing minimum and average cuts. According to this working hypothesis a maximum of 6-9% could be designated as SPs.

<p>cumulative list of indicators developed by the group and updated in March 2007</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have opposed negotiations on thresholds and parameters of indicators, because of the difference in productive practices and systems among developing countries; - Proposes the developing countries should have flexibility to designate at least 20% of their tariff lines as SPs; - Proposed that, out of this 20%, developing country members shall have the flexibility⁴ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ to self-designate a guaranteed minimum number [x] % of total tariff lines as SPs, which shall be higher than the number of Sensitive Products for developing country members ✓ to self-designate an 				
---	--	--	--	--

<p>additional of [y] % of SPs provided that these are guided by indicators.</p> <p>- The group has proposed an approach for the treatment of SPs based on three categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) 40% of SPs subject to no tariff reduction ii) 30% of SPs subject to 8% tariff reduction and iii) the residual tariff lines of SPs subject to 12% tariff reduction. <p>- Favours that there shall not be a priori exclusion of any agricultural product from the designation of SPs</p> <p>- Favours that developing country Members designate additional SPs by converting unused Sensitive Products allowance by a certain exchange rate and that unused Sensitive Products allowances can be converted to SPs with an exchange rate of 3:2.</p>				
--	--	--	--	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MECHANISM (SSM)				
Country Groupings:					
United States	European Union	G-10	G-20	Cairns Group	APU
<p>- SSM should provide transitional protection to developing countries against import surges while providing “meaningful” improvement in market access for the products protected under this mechanism.</p> <p>- Would like to limit the scope and flexibility of the mechanism as much as possible. For instance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Few products (limited percentage tariff lines - at the detailed duty level-) would be eligible ✓ Only products that are produced domestically or are close substitutes or products produced domestically would be eligible 	<p>- Generally supportive;</p> <p>- Likely to tie support for SSM to the continuation of SSG.</p>	<p>- Generally supportive of the concept of SSM for developing countries, as it would like the current SSG to be extended.</p>	<p>- Supportive of SSM, considered as an integral part of SDT for developing countries;</p> <p>- Willing to work with G-33 to operationalise and render effective the instrument;</p>	<p>- Supportive to the extent that SSM constitutes and incentive to undertake further liberalization;</p> <p>-Would like to limit the scope of the mechanism to a few products, mainly those subject to deep cuts in tariffs;</p>	<p>- Suggested that this instrument should be strictly limited in terms of (1) <i>product coverage</i> (just for those products that would improve their market access after the full tariff cut of the tiered tariff reduction formula) and (2) <i>duration</i> (as a transitory instrument, limited to the implementation period and hence SSM must have a defined date of expiration.</p> <p>-APU fears that SSM trigger levels, as suggested by G-33, may lead to a permanent activation of the mechanism, due to data unavailability. They believe SSM triggers should take into consideration normal growth of trade.</p> <p>APU also favour the idea of</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ The use of the price-based trigger and the volume-based trigger should comply with a "market test" ✓ The additional duty (remedy) shall be no greater than 50% of the difference between the Uruguay Bound Rate and Current Bound Rate ✓ The SSM should be eliminated by the end of the Doha implementation period 					<p>cross-check or market test. According to these, a causality link between price and volume effects should be established prior to applying remedies</p> <p>- Strongly opposes that the SSM additional duty may be greater than existing (Uruguay Round) bindings</p> <p>- Supports establishing a cap on the remedial duty that guarantees current volumes of trade.</p>
--	--	--	--	--	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MECHANISM (SSM)			
Country Groupings:				
G-33	LDCs	African Group	ACP	SVEs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very important issue for the group; - Have reiterated that SSM is very different from SP in that whereas SP is a long-term exemption for rural development and food and livelihood security, SSM is a short-term mechanism to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of the mechanism; - Would like SSM to respond to the needs and particular circumstances of LDCs enabling them to adopt temporary emergency measures in order to address import surges and price 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of the mechanism; - Stresses that the SSM to be established for developing countries should be operationally effective to address the specific circumstances of African countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insists all agricultural products shall be eligible to use the mechanism; - Considers the SSM shall include both volume and price triggers; - Insists remedy measures should provide meaningful 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of the mechanism

<p>help developing countries cope with fluctuations in prices and import surges;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Proposes SSM should be open to all developing countries and for all agricultural products; - The SSM should be applied to imports from all countries whether these are subsidised or not; -Stresses the SSM should respond to the institutional capabilities and resources of developing countries and hence be simple, operational and for developing countries to implement; - Insists that remedy measures should take the form of an additional duty levied to the level necessary to address the problem at hand: the deeper the import surge the higher the additional duty, regardless of the (Uruguay Round) 	<p>declines with a view to safeguarding food and livelihood security as well as rural development;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses that SSM to be agreed must take into account the institutional capacities and available resources of LDCs and thus must be simple, effective and easy to implement; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses that SSM constitutes a unique instrument that would respond to the concerns of developing countries and LDCs related to food security, livelihood security and rural development; - The group however does not share a common position with respect to product designation and scope 	<p>and effective relief from import surges and price depressions to developing country Member concerned. Thus, the remedy measure will be related to the nature and seriousness of the problem it intends to address.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses that the SSM constitutes an integral element of the modalities for agriculture negotiations. -Supports having a remedy that is lined to the level of import surge and price depression. -Supports 12-month duration of remedy 	
--	---	--	--	--

<p>bound rate</p> <p>Remedies should apply during a maximum period of 1 year</p> <p>Considers that price and volume triggers must work independently for invoking the SSM. Considers cross check or market test procedures could render the mechanism ineffective and could be administratively burdensome.</p> <p>Considers a compensation in tariff terms equivalent to less than the price difference could render the mechanism ineffective</p>			
---	--	--	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	SPECIAL SAFEGUARD (SSG)				
Country Groupings:					
United States	European Union	G-10	G-20	Cairns Group	APU
- Wants the SSG to be discontinued	- Would like the SSG to remain in place for as long of the agriculture reform process takes place;	- Would like the SSG to remain in place for as long of the agriculture reform process takes place;	- Opposes the continuation of SSG; - Would like the safeguard to be	- Supports its immediate elimination, by developed country members, from day	- Strongly opposed SSG continuation. They say it ✓ Is politically unsustainable, ✓ Is contrary to the

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indicated the mechanism should be kept for the following products: beef, poultry, butter, fruits, vegetables and sugar. - Willing to reduce number of tariff lines eligible for SSG. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Believes that the impact of SSG is limited given its limited scope (to exceptional cases and few products) - Willing to reduce the percentage of tariff lines covered by SSG, with special consideration given to countries that were subject to ceiling bindings during UR. 	<p>eliminated by developed countries as of the first day of the implementation period;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stresses that the date of elimination must be agreed in these negotiations. 	<p>one of the Doha implementation period</p>	<p>tariffication process,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Perpetuates imbalances, ✓ Is a systemic exception in the WTO rules ✓ Severely undermines market access outcomes deriving from formula cuts in agricultural products.
--	---	---	--	--	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	SPECIAL SAFEGUARD (SSG)			
Country Groupings:				
G-33	LDCs	African Group	ACP	SVEs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Some members of the group use the provision; - Concerned about guaranteeing an adequate transition to the SSM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue - Likely to support the continuation of SSG where it may be used to guarantee long-standing preferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue

Critical Negotiation Issue:	PREFERENCE EROSION			
Country Groupings:				
United States	European Union	G-10	G-20	Cairns Group
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally opposed to addressing the issue; - Likely to compromise in line with its overall alliance with the EU. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Believes preference erosion should be addressed by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Implementation of tariff reduction over an additional period years ✓ Deferral of first year of the implementation period. ✓ Targeted technical assistance to help address supply-side constraints and to promote the diversification of existing production in the territories of preference receiving Members. - Sensitive products and sectors to which long-standing preferences are granted may coincide - Products benefiting from long standing preferences will need to taken into 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supportive of the EU's approach to address preference erosion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Longer implementation period for the tariff reductions ✓ Accompanying measures to allow preference-receiving countries to diversify their economic base and build competitiveness. - Suggests that concerns regarding preference erosion should be reflected in the designation and treatment of sensitive products. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognizes the need to address the issue; - Proposes addressing the issue by expanding market access for products that are of vital export interest to the preference beneficiaries through: promoting effective utilization of existing preferences; providing additional financial assistance and capacity building to address supply constraints to those countries; promoting diversification and assisting in adjustment and restructuring. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally opposed to addressing the issue; - Are of the view that preference erosion should be addressed but not <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ at the expense of market access for other developing countries, particularly in tropical products and alternative products ✓ through flexibilities granted to developed countries such as: longer implementation periods or designation of such products as sensitive products, thus sparing them from the treatment provided for under the formula (some Latin American countries with export interest feel strongly on this issue)

	account when any concessions are made on tropical products			
--	--	--	--	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	PREFERENCE EROSION			
Country Groupings:				
G-33	LDCs	African Group	ACP	SVEs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group does not have a common position on this issue - For some countries preference erosion is a real concern and want measures to tackle preference erosion to be put in place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Crucial issue for the group, as most are beneficiaries of long-standing preferences; - Stresses the need to strengthen the existing preferential schemes. - Would like the incorporation of special provisions in the modalities to address the erosion of preferences; - Would like to maintain preferences until all domestic support and export subsidies that affect LDCs' commodities are removed. - Would also like to have compensatory and transitional measures to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Important issue for the group; - Maintains that there is need for trade related solutions for products benefitting from preferences including a longer implementation period of not less than 10 years - Maintains that preference giving countries should provide a package of measures to enable preference receiving countries to diversify. This package should be monitored and reviewed on an annual basis by the General Council. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very important issue for the group, as these are beneficiaries of long-standing preferences; - Would like to maintain long-standing preferences, hence wish to moderate tariff reduction in the products by preference granting countries, where these exist; -Prepared a list of products affected by preference erosion that present the following concurring conditions: (a) a minimum of 3% of export revenue in at least one ACP country and (b) loss of a minimum of 5 percent preference margin; -Favours trade-related 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The group does not have a common position on this issue

	<p>allow LDCs to fully prepare their commodity industries for open and fair competition.</p> <p>- Measures outside the WTO include "Aid for Trade" as an additional, substantial and predictable financial mechanism to strengthen supply-side and infrastructure capacity, diversification of trade in LDCs and address adjustment challenges and costs.</p>		<p>measures within the WTO to address this issue (as opposed to only adjustment assistance outside the trade sphere)</p> <p>Proposed that products affected by preferences will be addressed as follows:</p> <p><u>Trade-based solutions</u></p> <p>* In implementing their tariff reduction commitments, preference-granting Members undertake to maintain the nominal margins of tariff preferences and other terms and conditions of preferential arrangements they accord to their preference-receiving partners.</p> <p>* Tariff reductions by preference-granting Members with respect to the products on the ACP list shall be implemented in equal annual instalments over a period of 15 years, with the first instalment</p>	
--	---	--	--	--

			<p>being deferred to the end of the tenth year of the implementation period.</p> <p>* Where a preference-granting Member designates any of the products in the ACP list as sensitive, the maximum possible deviation in tariff cuts and the minimum TRQ expansion shall be applicable on such products.</p> <p><u>Non-trade solutions</u></p> <p>* Preference-granting Members shall make binding commitments to provide targeted technical assistance to address supply-side constraints, ease adjustment burden and promote the diversification of production in preference-receiving Members. In that regard, a Monitoring Body shall be established to ensure that the commitments will be fully implemented; and it shall report to the General Council</p>	
--	--	--	--	--

			<p>on annual basis.</p> <p>* There shall be continued bilateral consultation between preference-granting and preference-receiving countries to ensure that preference-receiving countries will not be disadvantaged by the outcome of the Round, as regards longstanding preferences.</p>	
--	--	--	---	--

Critical Negotiation Issue:	TROPICAL PRODUCTS			
Country Groupings:				
United States	European Union	G-10	G-20	Cairns Group
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally in favour of full liberalisation of trade in tropical products; - Arguments for liberalisation in tropical products fall in line with its push for market access 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Direct confrontation; - Main demands on tropical products affect sensitive sectors in the EU such as sugar and banana - Believes Uruguay Round list⁵ of tropical products should be the basis for concessions on tropical products - Believes list submitted by CAIRNS is an unacceptable basis because: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Tropical and diversification products should be negotiated separately ✓ Because it served as an effective basis for concessions on tropical products during the Uruguay Round 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally against the agenda on tropical products -Believes indicative UR list should be the basis for concessions on tropical products - Members should improve market access of tropical products beyond the formula cuts, only if they are in a position to do so -Diversification products should be identified separately. For the selection of these products, Members must provide documentation proving that these products are genuinely grown and particularly important for diversification purposes, or which clearly associate them to actual diversification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generally supportive; -Considers agenda on tropical products as an integral element of special and differential treatment for developing countries; - Developed countries should provide duty and quota free access on primary tropical products and eliminate tariff escalation on processed tropical products - Requests the elimination of non-tariff barriers on tropical products - Developed countries shall not designate products of export interest to developing countries (tropical products) as sensitive. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Critical issue in the agenda of some Latin American countries of the group, who would also like full liberalization for products of particular importance to the diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops. - Proposed a list to identify tropical and alternative products, which contains 134 tariff lines at the 6 digit HS level. - Proposed a treatment consisting of (a) elimination of tariffs, for tariffs equal or below 25% and (b) 85% reduction for tariffs above 85% - Insists that reduction or elimination of bound tariffs

⁵ This list contains 192 tariff lines at a 6-digit level

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Believes tropical products should receive adequate MFN treatment on a reciprocal basis in terms of tariff reduction whilst concessions made by members in relation to diversification products should be available only for countries engaged in effective diversification programmes -Tropical products may be declared as sensitive or as special products and be treated as such - Believes that products benefitting from long-standing preferences will need to be taken into account when any concessions are made on tropical products. 	<p>programs in the related countries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Believe that products in the list of tropical products should be allowed to be designated as sensitive products or special products 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The same treatment will apply to products of particular importance for diversification of production of particular importance for diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops. The designation of those products will be made on the basis of specific programmes for diversification. 	<p>should be done on the schedules of developed country members.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insists that solutions should be implemented on an MFN basis. - Favours that products included in the list should not be designated as SePs and that they should have a shorter implementation period
--	--	---	---	---

Critical Negotiation Issue:	TROPICAL PRODUCTS			
Country Groupings:				
G-33	LDCs	African Group	ACP	SVEs
- The group does not have a	- To the extent that tropical	- Maintains that tropical	- In direct confrontation with	- The group does not have a

<p>common position on this issue;</p> <p>- A few members favour full liberalization in tropical products.</p>	<p>products coincide with products in which long-standing preferences exists, the group will be concerned with the effects of full liberalisation of trade on these products on preference erosion</p>	<p>products should be liberalized as long as this does not have a negative impact on existing preferences.</p>	<p>the agenda on full liberalisation of trade in tropical products;</p> <p>- Stresses that decisions regarding tropical products and products related to the diversification from illicit narcotic crops should not prejudice the interests of developing countries concerned with preference erosion.</p>	<p>common position on this issue</p>
---	--	--	--	--------------------------------------

ANNEX 1: MEMBERS OF COUNTRY GROUPINGS

G10: Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Republic of Korea, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway and Switzerland.

Cairns Group : Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. The Philippines and Indonesia, although members of the Cairns Group do not share many of the positions taken by this group in the negotiations, especially with respect to market access.

G20 : Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

APU: Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay

G-33 : Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Bolivia, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

LDCs : Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia.

The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP): The group encompasses 79 States of which 54 are WTO Members.

Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs). Since the criteria to identify SVEs are still under negotiation, SVEs so far have been self-designated. The configuration of the group varies depending on the subject-area of negotiations. In the context of the agriculture negotiations, this group comprises: Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago.

ANNEX 2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Tariffs

These are taxes imposed by a State or separate customs territory on imported goods.

Bound tariffs

This refers to the tariff rates or levels listed down by each WTO Member in its Schedule of commitments for each tariff line. These tariff levels represent the maximum tariff that may be applied by each Member at any point in time for a specific product. Bound tariffs may be different from the actual applied tariff in that the latter could be below or at the bound tariff level.

Tariffication

This is the process by which all non-tariff measures existing before the Uruguay Round were converted to a tariff equivalent that provided a similar level of trade protection. The resulting tariffs were, therefore, in some cases, very high.

Tiered formula for tariff reductions

Formula that provides for progressive tariff reductions depending on the initial bound rate, i.e deeper cuts in higher tariffs. The tiered approach consists in applying a linear cut to tariffs. The band in which the initial tariff is located defines the level of the cut. This approach was decided in the July Framework (2004). Four bands have been envisaged to structure the tariff cuts. When this note was prepared, the working hypothesis was the one proposed by the Chairman's, as per the Draft Agriculture Modalities dated 1 August 2007 and illustrated in Annex 3.

Uruguay Round approach

Specific approach for the reduction of tariffs consisting of establishing an average reduction across all agricultural tariffs, coupled with minimum reduction requirements per tariff line. This approach was used for the reduction of agricultural tariffs during the Uruguay Round. In that occasion, developed countries were required to reduce tariffs on average by 36 per cent with a minimum reduction per tariff line of 15 per cent. The figures for developing countries were established at 24 and 10 per cent, respectively.

Swiss formula

Refers to the following mathematical expression: $t_i = (a \cdot t_o) / (a + t_o)$ where, t_i = final tariff; t_o = initial tariff; and a = coefficient. The Swiss formula works in a manner that leads to higher proportional cuts on higher tariffs. The coefficient of the formula (a) determines the highest level of tariffs that may result from the application of the formula. That is, a coefficient of 25 would imply that after the application of the formula no tariff will exceed 25 per cent. Thus the Swiss formula is advocated by members that favour harmonisation of tariffs across WTO members.

Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs)

These are treaty commitments or obligations made or assumed by WTO Members as a result of the Uruguay Round to provide a specified quota (i.e. level or volume) of market access opportunities for imported goods that would benefit from a lower tariff rate than the tariff rate resulting from tariffication. Goods imported over the quota would be subject to the higher tariff rate resulting from tariffication.

Special Safeguards (SSG)

Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) on Special Safeguards (SSG) allows WTO Members to impose additional duties on imports of agricultural products when the volume of imports exceeds a specific threshold and when prices fall below a specified reference price. The special safeguard is available only for products marked as SSG in the Schedule of commitments of each Member. Only a few developing countries that undertook tariffication during the Uruguay Round have access to the SSG. Under provisions on the SSG, Members do not need to prove injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry to invoke the measure (as required under the general safeguard provision of Article XIX of GATT 1994). The SSG is thus triggered automatically.

Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)

Refers to the proposal by developing countries, especially the G-33, to establish a SSG-type of safeguard for use by all developing countries. The objectives of the mechanism would be to allow developing countries to respond effectively to import surges and price depressions. The mechanism should improve on the current SSG in the sense of responding to the particular circumstances of developing countries.

Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) provisions

Provisions in the WTO's legal texts that seek to provide for a lower degree of level of obligations or commitments from developing countries, as compared to those from developed countries, in recognition of the lower level of economic development of developing countries.

Proportionality (principle of):

In the context of current Agriculture negotiations, this principle was set out in the G-20 proposal in the following manner "*The formula shall guarantee neutrality in respect of tariff structures and proportionality of tariff reductions based on the principle of less than full reciprocity between developed and developing members so as to ensure a fair and equitable outcome*". In this sense it suggested that overall average reduction of tariffs by developing countries cannot exceed two-thirds of the average reduction undertaken by developed countries.

This principle was also reflected in the 2004 Framework Agreement suggesting that proportionality will be achieved by requiring lesser tariff reduction commitments (lesser tariff reduction commitments in each band of tiered formula) or TRQ expansion commitments from developing countries.

ANNEX 3
CHAIRMAN'S PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS⁶

Developed countries		Developing countries-general		Recently Acceded Members (RAMs)		Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) ⁷		Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
<i>Thresholds</i>	<i>Reduction</i>	<i>Thresholds</i>	<i>Reduction</i>	<i>Thresholds</i>	<i>Reduction</i>	<i>Thresholds</i>	<i>Reduction</i>	
> 75%	[66%-73%]	> 130%	[44%-48%]	> 130%	[39%-43%]	> 130%	[34%-38%]	
75% ≥ X > 50%	[62%-65%]	130% ≥ X > 80%	[41%-43%]	130% ≥ X > 80%	[36%-41%]	130% ≥ X > 80%	[31%-33%]	
50% ≥ X > 20%	[55%-60%]	80% ≥ X > 30%	[37%-40%]	80% ≥ X > 30%	[32%-35%]	80% ≥ X > 30%	[27%-30%]	
20% ≥ X > 0%	[48%-52%]	30% ≥ X > 0%	[32%-35%]	30% ≥ X > 10%	[27%-30%]	30% ≥ X > 0%	[22%-25%]	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No provision for overall average reduction 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maximum average reduction: [36%-40%] If overall average reduction is higher than [36%-40%], members would apply lesser reductions, in a proportionate manner across tiers to keep within such an average level 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bound duties below 10% shall be exempt from tariff reduction Implementation of Doha Round commitments start 1 year after implementation of accession commitments Implementation period: 2 more years 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If overall average cut is higher than [24] percent, members may self-designate as Special Products (and self-select the treatment for) any such number of tariff lines that it determines would be sufficient to attain an overall maximum 24 per cent average cut 		No tariff reduction

]

⁶ As contained in Draft Modalities for Agriculture (TN/AG/W/4, dated 1 August 2007) and revised through Working papers dated January 2008 on: tiered formula for tariff reductions and Recently Acceded Members

⁷ Defined (in Annex C of Draft Modalities for Agriculture -TN/AG/W/4, dated 1 August 2007-) as members “whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent”. Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria are considered eligible for this treatment as, according the Chairman, the SVE treatment is considered being “comparably appropriate”.

READERSHIP SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

South Centre Analytical Note
STATE OF PLAY IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: COUNTRY GROUPINGS' POSITIONS
(MARKET ACCESS PILLAR)

An important objective of the South Centre is to provide concise and timely analytical inputs on selected key issues under ongoing negotiation in the WTO and other related multilateral fora such as WIPO. Our publications are among the ways through which we try to achieve this objective.

In order to improve the quality and usefulness of South Centre publications, we would like to know your views, comments, and suggestions regarding this publication.

Your name and address (optional): _____

What is your main area of work?

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Academic or research | <input type="checkbox"/> Media |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Government | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-governmental organization |
| <input type="checkbox"/> International organization | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) |

How useful was this publication for you? [Check one]

- Very useful Of some use Little use Not useful

Why? _____

What is your assessment of the contents of this publication? [Check one]

- Excellent Very Good Adequate Poor

Other comments: _____

Would you like to be on our electronic and/or hardcopy mailing lists? Yes No

If yes, please indicate:

Electronic - please indicate your name and email address:

Hardcopy - please indicate your name and mailing address: _____

Personal Information Privacy Notice: Your personal contact details will be kept confidential and will not be disseminated to third parties. The South Centre will use the contact details you provide solely for the purpose of sending you copies of our electronic and/or hardcopy publications should you wish us to do so. You may unsubscribe from our electronic and/or hardcopy mailing lists at anytime.

Please return this form by e-mail, fax or post to:

South Centre Feedback
Chemin du Champ d'Anier 17
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland

E-mail: south@southcentre.org

Fax: +41 22 798 8531



**Chemin du Champ d'Anier 17
Case postale 228, 1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland**

**Telephone : (41 22) 791 8050
Fax : (41 22) 798 8531
Email : south@southcentre.org**

**Website:
<http://www.southcentre.org>**