

CONTENTS

PREFACE	ix
CHAPTER 1	
GUIDELINES ON PATENTABILITY AND	
ACCESS TO MEDICINES	1
Germán Velásquez	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, WHO AND MEDICINES	5
II.1 The Mandate of WHO	5
II.2 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health.....	8
II.3 Strategy on Intellectual Property and Public Health	10
II.4 Pharmaceutical Policies and TRIPS Agreement	12
II.5 Examination of Patents and Access to Medicines.....	13
III. THE PATENT SYSTEM APPLIED TO MEDICINES	14
III.1 The Problem.....	16
III.1.1 Reduction in pharmaceutical innovation	16
III.1.2 High prices of medicines	17
III.1.3 Lack of transparency in R&D costs.....	18
III.1.4 Proliferation of patents	20
III.2 The International Context	20
III.3 Human Rights and Intellectual Property	22
IV. GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: DEVELOPING A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE	24
IV.1 A History of the Guidelines	24
IV.2 What are the Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents?	29
IV.3 Content of the Guidelines	31

IV.3.1 Formulations and compositions	31
IV.3.2 Combinations	31
IV.3.3 Dosage/dose	32
IV.3.4 Salts, ethers and esters	32
IV.3.5 Polymorphs	32
IV.3.6 Markush claims	32
IV.3.7 Selection patents	33
IV.3.8 Analogy processes	33
IV.3.9 Enantiomers	33
IV.3.10 Active metabolites and prodrugs	33
IV.3.11 Method of treatment	34
IV.3.12 Use claims, including second indications	34
IV.4 The Case of India	34
IV.5 Experiences in the Implementation of Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents	37
IV.5.1 Argentina	37
IV.5.2 MERCOSUR	37
IV.6 Compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement of WTO	38
V. CONCLUSIONS	38
 ANNEX I	
World Health Assembly Resolutions on Intellectual Property	42
 ANNEX II	
WHO Publications on Intellectual Property and Public Health	44
 CHAPTER 2	
THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON GENERIC MEDICINES OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGIN	49
Germán Velásquez	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	49
I. INTRODUCTION	49
II. THE PROBLEM OF PATENTS AND DATA EXCLUSIVITY	50

III.	WHY ARE GENERIC DRUGS THE “SAME” AND BIOSIMILARS ONLY “SIMILAR” TO THEIR CORRESPONDING REFERENCE PRODUCTS?	52
III.1	Chemically Synthesized versus Biological Medicines....	53
III.2	Position of the Pharmaceutical Industry	54
III.3	Scientists and Academics Hold a Different Opinion	55
III.4	Industry Strategies Aimed at Blocking Access to Generics.....	56
IV.	CLASSIFICATION OF BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS BY THERAPEUTIC USE	58
IV.1	Classification of Biological Medicines by Therapeutic Use	59
V.	BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS GOVERNING THE APPROVAL OF GENERIC BIOLOGICAL MEDICINES	60
V.1	EU 2006 Guidelines for the Evaluation of Competitor Therapeutic Proteins	60
V.2	Colombian Decree on Biological Medicines	62
V.3	WHO 2009 Guidelines.....	63
VI.	INTERNATIONAL NONPROPRIETARY NAMES (INNS) ASSIGNED BY WHO TO BIOLOGICAL MEDICINES	66
VI.1	International Nonproprietary Names	66
VI.2	International Nonproprietary Names “Biological Qualifier” (BQ).....	67
VII.	CONCLUSIONS	70
 ANNEX I		
	Biosimilars Approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA)	72
 ANNEX II		
	World Health Organization, World Health Assembly, Document A69/43, 1 April 2016: “Progress reports”, Report by the Secretariat	73

CHAPTER 3	
ACCESS TO HEPATITIS C TREATMENT:	
A GLOBAL PROBLEM	77
Germán Velásquez	
I. GENERAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF THE DEBATE ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES.....	77
I.1 Problems of the R&D Model	78
I.1.1 Lack of transparency of R&D costs.....	79
I.1.2 Pharmaceutical innovation has significantly diminished in recent years	80
I.2 What Has Changed in the Last Few Years?.....	82
I.3 A Paradigm Shift in the Debate on Access to Medicines: 2014-2016	83
II. THE HEPATITIS C VIRUS: FIGURES AND DATA'	84
II.1 What are Hepatitis C Genotypes?	85
II.2 Why do HCV Genotypes Matter?	85
II.3 Where are the HCV Genotypes Found?.....	85
III. ACCESS TO HEPATITIS C TREATMENT	86
III.1 The Direct-Acting Antiviral Treatments.....	86
III.2 Essential Medicines that Cure.....	87
III.3 Sofosbuvir: Between Financial Engineering and Public Health.....	88
III.4 HCV Diagnosis	89
III.5 World Health Organization Standardized Treatment Guidelines.....	92
III.6 The Sofosbuvir Patents	92
III.7 Oppositions to the Sofosbuvir Patent of Gilead	94
III.8 Voluntary Licenses Granted by Gilead	95
III.9 Anti-diversion Measures.....	97
IV. HOW TO OVERCOME THE BARRIERS TO ACCESS USING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES	99
IV.1 Information on International Prices	100
IV.2 Adoption of Patentability Criteria from a Public Health Perspective	100
IV.3 Compulsory Licenses – Aspects and Practical Procedures.....	102
IV.3.1 Identify relevant patents	103

IV.3.2 Explore possible sources of supply based on local production	103
IV.3.3 Identify possible sources of importation of the required medicines	104
IV.3.4 Marketing approval	104
IV.3.5 Request for a compulsory license	104
IV.3.6 Granting of the compulsory license by the competent department.....	105
IV.3.7 Negotiation with patent holder about royalty rate.....	105
IV.3.8 Determination of royalty fee by the Patent Administration Department	106
IV.3.9 Appeal	106
IV.3.10 Other considerations	107
 V. SOME COUNTRIES HAVE LAUNCHED THE NEW HCV TREATMENT	107
 VI. CONCLUSIONS	109
 CHAPTER 4	
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC HEALTH AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	111
Germán Velásquez	
 I. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.....	111
I.1 Background: First Mandate of the World Health Assembly	111
I.2 The “Red Book”	111
I.3 TRIPS Flexibilities	112
I.4 The Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health.....	112
I.5 Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property – Resolution WHA 61.21.....	113
I.6 WHO Consultative Expert Working Group (CEWG).....	115
I.7 The Collaboration of WHO with Other International Organizations.....	115

II.	THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION	117
II.1	Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, or the Decision of 30th August 2003	117
II.2	The WHO Proposal to Solve the Problem Exposed in Paragraph 6	119
III.	THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION	120
IV.	THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT	121
V.	THE JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS.....	122
V.1	Some Examples of the Current Work of UNAIDS on Intellectual Property-related Issues	123
VI.	THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL	124
VII.	THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)	125
VII.1	HIV and Health.....	125
VII.2	HIV and the Law: Risks, Rights, and Health	126
VIII.	AN EXAMPLE OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN WHO, UNDP AND UNCTAD	127
IX.	THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS	129
IX.1	The Report of the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines	129
X.	CONCLUSIONS	132
CHAPTER 5		
ACCESS TO MEDICINES: EXPERIENCES WITH COMPULSORY LICENSES AND GOVERNMENT USE – THE CASE OF HEPATITIS C*		135
Carlos M. Correa and Germán Velásquez		
I.	INTRODUCTION	135

II.	HIGH PRICES, LOW PERFORMANCE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	136
III.	INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS	140
IV.	THE CASE OF HEPATITIS C – TOWARDS A PARADIGM SHIFT?.....	143
V.	THE USE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT'S FLEXIBILITIES AND THE DOHA DECLARATION	145
	V.1 Background.....	146
	V.2 Reaffirmation of the TRIPS Agreement's Flexibilities	147
	V.3 Obstacles to the Implementation of the Doha Declaration	148
VI.	USES WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE PATENT HOLDER	149
VII.	COMPULSORY LICENSES/GOVERNMENT USE IN LATIN AMERICA.....	154
	VII.1 The Case of Ecuador.....	156
	VII.2 Experiences from Colombia and Peru	160
VIII.	EXPERIENCES OF GOVERNMENT USE.....	164
IX.	CONCLUSIONS	166
	REFERENCES	169