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The Right to Health in Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes

Emmanuel Kolawole Oke



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THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT DISPUTES

Emmanuel Kolawole Oke¹

SOUTH CENTRE

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¹ Lecturer in International Intellectual Property Law, Edinburgh Law School, University of Edinburgh. Email: emmanuel.oke@ed.ac.uk. This research paper is based on previously published work i.e., "Incorporating a Right to Health Perspective into the Resolution of Patent Law Disputes", *Health & Human Rights*, vol. 15, No. 2 (2013), pp. 97-109. An earlier version of this paper was published as: "Patent Rights, Access to Medicines, and the Justiciability of the Right to Health in Kenya, South Africa and India," in *Justiciability of Human Rights Law in Domestic Jurisdictions*, Alice Diver & Jacinta Miller (eds.) (Springer International Publishing, 2016) pp. 91-122. His research in this regard will be published in a forthcoming monograph titled: *Patents, Human Rights, and Access to Medicines* (Cambridge University Press, 2022).

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Any comments on this paper or the content of this paper will be highly appreciated. Please contact:

South Centre
International Environment House 2
Chemin de Balexert 7–9
POB 228, 1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland
Tel. (41) 022 791 80 50
south@southcentre.int
www.southcentre.int

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how the courts in three developing countries (Kenya, South Africa, and India) have addressed the tension between patent rights on pharmaceutical products and the right to health. The paper begins by examining the nature of the relationship between patent rights and the right to health. It thereafter explores the justiciability of the right to health in Kenya, South Africa, and India. Furthermore, the paper provides an analysis of how the courts in these three developing countries have adjudicated some of the pharmaceutical patent cases involving tensions between the right to health and patent rights. The paper contends that by incorporating the right to health into the adjudication of patent disputes, courts in developing countries can play a crucial role in improving access to medicines at affordable prices.

Este documento examina cómo los tribunales de tres países en desarrollo (Kenia, Sudáfrica e India) han abordado la tensión entre los derechos de patente sobre productos farmacéuticos y el derecho a la salud. El documento comienza examinando la naturaleza de la relación entre los derechos de patente y el derecho a la salud. A continuación, explora la justiciabilidad del derecho a la salud en Kenia, Sudáfrica y la India. Además, el documento ofrece un análisis de cómo los tribunales de estos tres países en desarrollo han resuelto algunos de los casos de patentes farmacéuticas que implican tensiones entre el derecho a la salud y los derechos de patente. El documento sostiene que, al incorporar el derecho a la salud en la resolución de los litigios sobre patentes, los tribunales de los países en desarrollo pueden desempeñar un papel crucial en la mejora del acceso a los medicamentos a precios asequibles.

Ce document examine comment les tribunaux de trois pays en développement (Kenya, Afrique du Sud et Inde) ont abordé la tension entre les droits de brevet sur les produits pharmaceutiques et le droit à la santé. Dans un premier temps, le document examine la nature de la relation entre les droits de brevet et le droit à la santé. Il explore ensuite la justiciabilité du droit à la santé au Kenya, en Afrique du Sud et en Inde. En outre, le document fournit une analyse de la manière dont les tribunaux de ces trois pays en développement ont statué sur certaines des affaires relatives aux brevets pharmaceutiques impliquant des tensions entre le droit à la santé et les droits de brevet. Le document soutient qu'en intégrant le droit à la santé dans le règlement des litiges relatifs aux brevets, les tribunaux des pays en développement peuvent jouer un rôle crucial dans l'amélioration de l'accès aux médicaments à des prix abordables.

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1 INTRODUCTION

The human right to health¹ is recognized in several international legal instruments and in the constitutions of a number of countries across the world.² The recognition of this right in legal instruments, however, is not a guarantee that it is being enjoyed on an equal basis all over the world. The enjoyment of this right is further being curtailed by the present global structure for the protection of intellectual property rights, especially patent rights. Patent rights have a direct impact on the right to health, especially in developing countries where pharmaceutical products are priced beyond the reach of poor patients.

One of the international agreements that provides for the right to health is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 12(1) of the ICESCR mandates the States parties to the Covenant to “recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”. In 2000, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) adopted General Comment No. 14 in an attempt to provide further definition for Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).³ Paragraph 12 of General Comment No. 14 is very relevant to the question of access to medicines. It enumerates four essential, interrelated components of the right to health: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality. In particular, it provides that essential drugs (as defined by the World Health Organization Action Programme on Essential Drugs) must be available in a country.⁴

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), essential drugs are drugs that “satisfy the priority health care needs of the population” and “are intended to be available within the context of functioning health systems at all times in adequate amounts ... and at a price the individual and the community can afford.”⁵ In addition, General Comment No. 14 states that health care services must be economically accessible to everyone, suggesting that the prices of essential drugs should not be so expensive as to be unaffordable for poor patients.⁶ This makes access to essential medicines an integral component of the right to health.⁷ Furthermore, States are obliged to take steps “to control the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties”.⁸

¹ See generally, Jonathan Wolff, *The Human Right to Health* (W. W. Norton & Co., 2012); John Tobin, *The Right to Health in International Law* (OUP, 2012); Therese Murphy, *Health and Human Rights* (Hart Publishing, 2013).

² See, the Constitution of the WHO, 1946; Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (1948); Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (1966). See also, Section 27 of the South African Constitution, 1996; Article 43(1)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution, 2010; and Article 196 of the Brazilian Constitution, 1988. There is also judicial recognition of the right to health as an integral component of the constitutional right to life in India. See for instance, *State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla* (1997), 2 S.C.C. 83 (Judgment of the Indian Supreme Court).

³ See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)”, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).

⁴ *Ibid.* para 12(a).

⁵ See World Health Organization, “Essential medicines.” Available from http://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en/.

⁶ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)”, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para 12(b).

⁷ See Mirela Hristova, “Are Intellectual Property Rights Human Rights? Patent Protection and the Right to Health”, 93 *Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society* 339, (2011) 356. See also, UN Human Rights Council, “Access to Medicines in the Context of the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health”, A/HRC/RES/23/14 (2013).

⁸ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)”, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para 35.

States have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health.⁹ The obligation to **respect** the right to health demands that states should not interfere directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health.¹⁰ Essentially, the obligation to respect the right to health requires that states should, *inter alia*, “refrain from denying or limiting equal access for all persons ... to preventive, curative and palliative health services”.¹¹ The obligation to **protect** the right to health requires states to, *inter alia*, “adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health care and health-related services provided by third parties”.¹² The obligation to **fulfil** the right to health demands that states should, *inter alia*, “give sufficient recognition to the right to health in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation, and to adopt a national health policy with a detailed plan for realizing the right to health”.¹³

The obligation of States to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health has implications for the design, implementation, interpretation and enforcement of their national patent laws. The obligation to fulfil the right to health demands that, when designing or amending their national patent laws, States should recognize the possible implications of such legislative proposals for the enjoyment of the right to health.¹⁴ In order to effectively protect the right to health, patent rights owned by third parties such as pharmaceutical companies should not be implemented and enforced in a manner that makes it more difficult for poorer citizens to have access to affordable generic drugs.¹⁵ Furthermore, the obligation to respect the right to health requires that when designing, implementing, or interpreting patent laws, the various arms and organs of government (including the courts) should not adopt an approach that interferes directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health.¹⁶ States equally have core obligations with regard to the right to health.¹⁷ One of the core obligations of States is to “provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs”.¹⁸ It must be stressed that a core obligation is one from which no derogation is permissible.¹⁹

The objective of this paper is to examine how the national courts in three developing countries (Kenya, South Africa, and India) have addressed the tension between patent rights on pharmaceutical products and the right to health. The paper is structured into three main parts. Part one examines the nature of the relationship between patent rights and the right to health while part two deals with the justiciability of the right to health in Kenya, South Africa, and India. Part three provides an analysis of how the national courts of these three developing

⁹ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)” E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para 33.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para 33.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para 34.

¹² *Ibid.*, para 35.

¹³ *Ibid.*, para 36.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para 52 (stating that, “Violations of the obligation to fulfil occur through the failure of States parties to take all necessary steps to ensure the realization of the right to health.”)

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para 51 (stating that, “Violations of the obligation to protect follow from the failure of a State to take all necessary measures to safeguard persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to health by third parties. This category includes such omissions as the failure to regulate the activities of individuals, groups or corporations so as to prevent them from violating the right to health of others.”)

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para 50 (stating that, “Violations of the obligation to respect are those State actions, policies or laws that contravene the standards set out in article 12 of the Covenant and are likely to result in bodily harm, unnecessary morbidity and preventable mortality. Examples include ... the suspension of legislation or the adoption of laws or policies that interfere with the enjoyment of any of the components of the right to health; and the failure of the State to take into account its legal obligations regarding the right to health when entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other States, international organizations and other entities, such as multinational corporations.”).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para 43.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para 43(d).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para 47 (noting that, “It should be stressed, however, that a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable”).

countries have adjudicated some of the pharmaceutical patent cases involving tensions between the right to health and patent rights.

2 THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENT RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH

There are divergent views on how the relationship between patent rights and human rights should be conceptualized.²⁰ In his review of the literature, Richard Gold identifies three broad approaches to the conceptualization of the relationship between patent rights and human rights:

1. The “subjugation approach”, which states that when patent rights and human rights conflict, human rights considerations should trump patent rights;
2. The “integrated approach”, which views patents as a human right; and
3. The “coexistence approach”, which asserts that patent law and human rights law are distinct but share a basic concern in defining the optimal amount of patent protection required to incentivize and practice socially useful innovation.²¹

In his description of the “subjugation approach”, Laurence Helfer notes that this approach “views human rights and intellectual property as being in fundamental conflict” and it considers “strong intellectual property protection as undermining—and therefore as incompatible with—a broad spectrum of human rights obligations, especially in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights”.²² Helfer further notes that the “prescription that proponents of this approach advocate for resolving this conflict is to recognize the normative primacy of human rights law over intellectual property law in areas where specific treaty obligations conflict”. Aurora Plomer suggests that this approach “might arguably be more accurately described as the ‘primacy of human rights’ view”.²³

Gold describes the “integrated approach” as an approach that assimilates “patent rights into human rights analyses” instead of “introducing human rights considerations into patent policy

²⁰ See generally, Peter Drahos, “Intellectual Property and Human Rights”, *Intellectual Property Quarterly*, 3 (1999) p. 349; Laurence Helfer, “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?” *Minnesota Intellectual Property Review* 5, (2003) p. 47; Peter Yu, “Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework”, *U. C. Davis Law Review* 40, (2007) p. 1039; Peter Yu, “Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights”, *Georgia State University Law Review* 23, (2007) p. 709; William Grosheide (ed.), *Intellectual Property and Human Rights: A Paradox* (Edward Elgar, 2010); Paul Torremans (ed.), *Intellectual Property and Human Rights* (Kluwer Law International, 2008); Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin, *Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface* (Cambridge University Press, 2011); E. Richard Gold, “Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis”, *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, vol. 41 (1) (2013) p. 185; Aurora Plomer, “The Human Rights Paradox: Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Access to Science”, *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 35, Number 1, February 2013, p. 143; Aurora Plomer, *Patents, Human Rights and Access to Science* (Edward Elgar, 2015).

²¹ E. Richard Gold, “Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis” *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* vol. 41 (1) (2013) pp.185, 186-187.

²² Laurence Helfer, “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?”, *Minnesota Intellectual Property Review*, vol. 5 Issue 1 (2003) pp. 47, 48. See also, E. Richard Gold, “Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis”, *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics*, vol. 41 (1) (2013) pp. 185-186 (noting that, the “subjugation approach” views patents and human rights as mutually exclusive spheres of law that are sometimes at odds with one another. Where a conflict between patent and human rights law arises, this approach requires that human rights considerations trump patent rights.). For statements in support of the “subjugation approach”, see Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, *Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?* (Earthscan, 2002) 200 (noting that, “In any principled national legal system, basic human rights to health, education and indigenous rights to their cultures take precedence over (trump) utilitarian considerations”); Peter Drahos, “Intellectual Property and Human Rights”, *Intellectual Property Quarterly* vol. 3 (1999) pp. 349, 367 (stating that, “rights created through the enactment of intellectual property laws are instrumental rights. Ideally, under conditions of democratic sovereignty, such rights should serve the interests and needs that citizens identify through the language of human rights as being fundamental. On this view, human rights would guide the development of intellectual property rights; intellectual property rights would be pressed into service on behalf of human rights.”).

²³ See, Aurora Plomer, “The Human Rights Paradox: Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Access to Science”, *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 35, Number 1, February 2013, p. 143, 151.

as advocated by some adherents of the subjugation approach”.²⁴ The “integrated approach” does not consider patents and human rights as distinct, rather it views “patents as part of human rights law”.²⁵ However, as will be demonstrated below, advocates of the “integrated approach” typically misconstrue the provisions of international human rights instruments such as Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR which provides for the protection of the moral and material interests of authors and inventors.²⁶ They build their arguments on the false premise that provisions such as Article 15(1)(c) show that intellectual property rights (including patent rights) are human rights.²⁷

Helfer provides a description of the “coexistence approach” as an approach that sees both human rights and intellectual property rights “as concerned with the same fundamental question: defining the appropriate scope of private monopoly power that gives authors and inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while ensuring that the consuming public has adequate access to the fruit of their efforts”.²⁸ Helfer further notes that this approach “views human rights law and intellectual property law as essentially compatible, although often disagreeing over where to strike the balance between incentives on the one hand and access on the other”.²⁹

Before identifying the correct one among the three approaches, it is essential to first determine the status of intellectual property rights (including patent rights) under international human rights law. Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR recognizes the right of everyone to “benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”. A similar provision is also contained in Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 27(2) of the UDHR provides that “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”. At first reading, these two provisions appear to equate intellectual property rights with other types of human rights, and this has led some authors to conclude that they provide a human rights basis for patent rights and other forms of intellectual property rights.³⁰

However, the CESCR, in its General Comment No. 17, has made it clear that human rights and intellectual property rights are not on the same level, and it will be erroneous to rely on

²⁴ E. Richard Gold, “Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis” *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* vol. 41 (1) (2013) pp. 185, 187-188.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 188.

²⁶ See for instance, Stephen Marks, “Access to Essential Medicines as a Component of the Right to Health”, in *Realizing the Right to Health*, A Clapham and M Robinson (eds.), Swiss Human Rights Book Series, vol. 3 (Ruffer & Rub, 2009) p. 87; see also, J. Millum, “Are Pharmaceutical Patents Protected by Human Rights?”, *Journal of Medical Ethics*, vol. 34:e25, Issue 11 (2008).

²⁷ E. Richard Gold, “Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis” *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* vol. 41 (1) (2013).

²⁸ Laurence Helfer, “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?”, *Minnesota Intellectual Property Review*, vol. 5, Issue 1 (2003) pp. 47-48. In her own description of the “coexistence approach”, Aurora Plomer notes that, “The ‘co-existence’ view claims that the paradox and conflict between IP rights and human rights, is only apparent. Some argue that the conflict is illusory because IP rights, or some aspects of them, are fundamental human rights too, albeit of ‘weaker’ weight than other rights. Others suggest that the normative content of the obligations prescribed by human rights instruments are so open-ended and general as to say very little on the impact of IP rights on the realization of other rights.” See Aurora Plomer, “The Human Rights Paradox: Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Access to Science”, *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 35, No. 1 (2013) pp. 143, 151. See also, E. Richard Gold, “Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis” *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* vol. 41 (1) (2013) pp. 185, 187.

²⁹ Laurence Helfer, “Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?”, *Minnesota Intellectual Property Review*, vol. 5, Issue 1 (2003) pp. 47, 48-49.

³⁰ Stephen Marks, “Access to Essential Medicines as a Component of the Right to Health” in *Realizing the Right to Health*, A Clapham and M Robinson (eds.), Swiss Human Rights Book Series, vol. 3 (Ruffer & Rub, 2009) p. 87; see also, J. Millum, “Are Pharmaceutical Patents Protected by Human Rights?”, *Journal of Medical Ethics*, vol. 34:e25, Issue 11 (2008).

Article 15(1)(c) to equate intellectual property rights with human rights.³¹ The CESCR adopted the view that Article 15(1)(c) solely “safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations ... as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living” while “intellectual property regimes primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments”.³² In essence, the human right contained in Article 15(1)(c) is not coterminous with intellectual property rights. The approach adopted by the CESCR is equally supported by the drafting history of both Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR. It has been noted that the provisions were included in both instruments after considerable debates and controversy.³³ According to Audrey Chapman, the drafting history of both the UDHR and ICESCR supports “relatively weak claims of intellectual property as a human right”.³⁴

Strictly speaking, the human right contained in both Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR and Article 27(2) of the UDHR is a right to the protection of the “moral and material interests” of authors and inventors in their creative works.³⁵ This right is separate from, and should never be confused with, intellectual property rights.³⁶ The CESCR, in General Comment No. 17, stresses the point that the protection of the moral and material interests of authors and inventors does not necessarily coincide with what is currently regarded as intellectual property right in national laws and international agreements.³⁷ While the right to the protection of the moral interests and material interests of authors and inventors in their creative works is a fundamental entitlement, intellectual property rights are not fundamental entitlements as they can be limited, traded, amended or even forfeited.³⁸

With regard to the scope of the right to the protection of the **moral** interests of authors and inventors in their works, the CESCR notes that it includes “the right of authors to be recognized

³¹ See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which He or She is the Author (Article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant)”, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (2006) paras 1, 3.

³² *Ibid.* para 2.

³³ See Peter Yu, “Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework”, *U. C. Davis Law Review*, vol. 40 (2007) pp. 1039, 1073.

³⁴ See Audrey Chapman, “Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c)”, (2001) 35 *Copyright Bulletin* 4, 13. See also, Aurora Plomer, “The Human Rights Paradox: Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of Access to Science”, *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 35, No. 1 (2013) pp. 143, 175.

³⁵ See, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which He or She is the Author (Article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant)”, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (2006) para 1 (noting that, “The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author is a human right, which derives from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons. This fact distinguishes article 15, paragraph 1 (c), and other human rights from most legal entitlements recognized in intellectual property systems”).

³⁶ *Ibid.* para 1 (noting that, “Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the benefit of society as a whole.”)

³⁷ *Ibid.* para 2 (noting that, “the human right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments. Moreover, the scope of protection of the moral and material interests of the author provided for by article 15, paragraph 1 (c), does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to as intellectual property rights under national legislation or international agreements.”)

³⁸ *Ibid.* para 2 (noting that, “In contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else. While under most intellectual property systems, intellectual property rights, often with the exception of moral rights, may be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended, and even forfeited, human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person”).

as the creators of their scientific, literary and artistic productions and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, such productions, which would be prejudicial to their honor and reputation”.³⁹ In other words, the right to the protection of the **moral** interests of authors and inventors is akin to the protection of moral rights contained in the copyright laws of countries such as Germany and France.⁴⁰ The moral rights of authors (or authors’ rights as recognized within civil law systems) should however not be confused with copyright.⁴¹ One can thus infer from this that moral rights (as distinct from copyright) enjoy the status of human rights.

In distinguishing between the “moral interests” of authors and inventors and the “material interests” of authors and inventors, the CESCR in General Comment No. 17 notes that “[u]nlike other human rights, the material interests of authors are not directly linked to the personality of the creator, **but contribute to the enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living**”.⁴² In other words, while **moral interests** protect the permanent connection between creators and their creations, **material interests** deal with the financial entitlements of creators. The recognition of the **material interests** of creators, in a sense, treats creators as “intellectual workers” that are entitled to financial benefits from their creative endeavors.⁴³

In an effort to distinguish between the protection of **material interests** on the one hand and the protection of intellectual property rights on the other hand, the CESCR notes that “the purpose of enabling authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living can also be achieved through one time payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of time, with the exclusive right to exploit his scientific, literary or artistic production”.⁴⁴ In other words, it is not mandatory to grant patent rights or copyright in order to protect the **material interests** of intellectual workers.⁴⁵ From a human rights perspective, the right of intellectual workers to an adequate standard of living, i.e. their **material interests**, can equally be protected through other means such as one-time payments, prizes, or monetary awards.⁴⁶

³⁹ Ibid. para 13.

⁴⁰ See Peter Yu, “Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework”, (2007) 40 *U. C. Davis Law Review* vol 40 (2007) pp. 1039, 1081-1082. See also, Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.

⁴¹ As Peter Drahos points out, “The term ‘copyright’... refers to those common law systems that characterize the exclusive rights of authors in essentially economic terms (the rights to reproduce the work, to publish it and to adapt it are examples). Within civil law systems, the rights of authors are seen, at base, as being about the protection of the authorial personality (the right to be acknowledged as the author of the work and the right to control alterations to the work are the core rights). These systems are not referred to as copyright but rather as authors’ rights.” See, Peter Drahos, “The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and Development” in *Intellectual Property and Human Rights*, Proceedings of a Panel Discussion held by the World Intellectual Property Organization in collaboration with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, (9 November 1998) pp. 13-14.

⁴² UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which He or She is the Author (Article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant)”, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (2006) para 15 (emphasis added).

⁴³ Peter Yu, “Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework”, *U. C. Davis Law Review*, vol. 40 (2007) pp. 1039, 1088.

⁴⁴ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which He or She is the Author (Article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant)”, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (2006) para 16.

⁴⁵ As Peter Yu rightly notes, “Although it remains unclear why the delegates voted to adopt article 27(2), one can surmise that at least some delegates might have interpreted the phrase ‘material interests’ to mean just remuneration for intellectual labor ... Thus, the drafting history seems to suggest that the phrase ‘material interests’ should not be interpreted broadly to cover all forms of economic rights as protected in the existing intellectual property system, but rather narrowly to cover the limited interests in obtaining just remuneration for one’s intellectual labor”. Peter Yu, “Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework”, *U. C. Davis Law Review*, vol. 40 (2007) pp. 1039, 1088.

⁴⁶ See Peter Yu, “Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework”, *U. C. Davis Law Review*, vol. 40 (2007) pp. 1039, 1089. (noting that “To satisfy article 15(1)(c) obligations, states can consider using such other alternative systems as liability rules, prize funds, or even non-property-based authorship protection ... [T]he key criterion for satisfying the material interests obligation is not whether the offered protection

The CESCR admits that Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR does not specify the method or procedure for the protection of the **moral** and **material** interests of authors and inventors.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the CESCR notes that the protection under Article 15(1)(c) “need not necessarily reflect the level and means of protection found in present copyright, patent and other intellectual property regimes, as long as the protection available is suited to secure for authors the moral and material interests resulting from their productions”.⁴⁸

One other factor that distinguishes the protection of **moral** and **material** interests from the protection of intellectual property rights is the fact that the former, being human rights, are inalienable rights unlike intellectual property rights. As the CESCR points out, “intellectual property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else.”⁴⁹ The CESCR further notes that, “[w]hile under most intellectual property systems, intellectual property rights, often with the exception of moral rights, may be allocated, limited in time and scope, amended and even forfeited, human rights [such as the moral and material interests of authors and inventors] are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person”.⁵⁰

The analysis provided above on the real meaning of the phrase “moral and material interests” should be enough to dispel any notion that patent rights, or any other forms of intellectual property rights are human rights as canvassed by proponents of the “integrated approach”. With regard to the “coexistence approach”, Gold provides a very good critique thus:

...while proponents of the coexistence approach view human rights law and patent protection as essentially compatible in theory, disagreement often arises in practice over exactly where to strike the balance between incentives for innovation on the one hand and access on the other ... little exists by way of concrete examples of just how this “coexistence” plays out in practice. At best, the coexistence asserted by the proponents of this theory is more properly viewed as a **need** for coexistence, a need that recognizes that neither intellectual property rights nor human rights are likely to disappear as concepts or institutions anytime soon.⁵¹

Thus, in practice, it is quite difficult to foresee how human rights and intellectual property rights (including patent rights) can coexist in all aspects. There are aspects of patent rights, particularly patent rights on pharmaceutical products and processes, that negatively impact on the human right to health and when such conflicts occur, a practical choice has to be made between patent rights or human rights. More importantly, any notion that patent rights and human rights can “peacefully coexist” is swiftly dispelled by the recent trend of incorporating TRIPS-plus standards into bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements negotiated (or currently being negotiated) between developed and developing countries outside the multilateral framework provided by WTO.⁵² These TRIPS-plus standards further exacerbate

meets the level of protection required by existing international intellectual property agreements or whether such protection is based on the property rights model. Rather, one has to inquire whether the existing system provides meaningful protection of material interests in the creations by authors and inventors.”)

⁴⁷ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which He or She is the Author (Article 15, paragraph 1 (c), of the Covenant),” UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (2006) para 10.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* para 10.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* para 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* para 2. See also Peter Yu, “Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights”, (2007) 23 *Georgia State University Law Review* 709, 728 (noting that “human rights are inalienable. While corporations may have obtained rights from individual authors and inventors through assignment or under a work-made-for-hire arrangement, the human-rights-based interests of these individuals are not transferable”).

⁵¹ E. Richard Gold, “Patents and Human Rights: A Heterodox Analysis”, *Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics* vol. 41 (2013), pp. 185, 189 (emphasis in the original).

⁵² See Susan Sell, “TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines”, *Liverpool Law Review*, vol. 28 (1) (2007), pp. 41, 59 (noting that, “... the US and the EU aggressively have been pursuing efforts to ratchet up

the negative impact that patent rights have on the enjoyment of the right to health in developing countries.⁵³

For instance, the United States has concluded a number of bilateral free trade agreements (containing TRIPS-plus standards) with some developing countries.⁵⁴ The typical TRIPS-plus standards that are included in these bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements include: the extension of patent terms to compensate for delays in the examination of patent applications or in obtaining marketing approval for a drug; patent linkage requirements that prevent the grant of marketing approval to producers of generic drugs when there is an existing patent on the brand name drug; the grant of patents on new forms or new uses of known drugs; periods of exclusivity for clinical test data; and border enforcement measures that permit customs authorities to seize goods suspected to have infringed patent rights.⁵⁵ These TRIPS-plus standards can limit the ability of a country to use the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, delay the production of cheaper generic drugs, and consequently hinder access to affordable drugs.⁵⁶

The “subjugation approach” therefore appears to be the preferable way to conceptualize the relationship between patent rights and human rights (including the human right to health). Properly construed, the “subjugation approach” does not suggest that patent rights should be discarded or abolished. It rather recognizes the essential distinction between the fundamental nature of human rights and the regulatory nature of patent rights.⁵⁷ Thus, if patent rights are not human rights under international human rights law, there is no justifiable reason why a country should allow its patent system to trump the enjoyment of the human right to health. This does not necessarily mean that patent rights should no longer be protected, but it means that states should not permit patent rights to be exercised in ways that impede the enjoyment of the human right to health. In addition, patent rights should be made to serve the interests protected by human rights.⁵⁸

TRIPS standards, to eliminate TRIPS flexibilities and close TRIPS loopholes. Playing a multi-level, multi-forum governance game, countries like the United States have been able to extract a high price from economically more vulnerable parties eager to gain access to large, affluent markets. Bilateral Investment Treaties, Bilateral Intellectual Property Agreements, and regional FTAs concluded between the European Union and developing countries invariably have been TRIPS-Plus.”)

⁵³ See Peter Yu, “Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era”, *Florida Law Review*, vol. 64 (2012) pp. 1045, 1060 (noting that, “The stakes implicated by nonmultilateral agreements and new enforcement measures are ... much higher than those implicated by the TRIPS Agreement.”)

⁵⁴ The Free Trade Agreement signed in 2000 between the US and Jordan was the first TRIPS-Plus bilateral agreement in the post-TRIPS era. See, Mohammed El Said, “The Evolution of the Jordanian TRIPS-Plus Model: Multilateralism versus Bilateralism and the Implications for the Jordanian IPRs Regime”, *International Review of Intellectual Property & Competition Law*, vol. 37 (2006), pp. 501, 514. See also, Susan Sell, “TRIPS was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP”, *Journal of Intellectual Property Law*, vol. 18 (2011) pp. 447, 452 (noting that, “Since signing TRIPS, the U.S. has entered into bilateral treaties that include intellectual property provisions with numerous developing countries: Australia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Central American countries, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Korea, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vietnam.”)

⁵⁵ See, Carlos Correa and Duncan Matthews, “The Doha Declaration Ten Years on and Its Impact on Access to Medicines and the Right to Health” (UNDP Discussion Paper, December 2011) p. 21.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁵⁷ For a conceptualization of intellectual property rights through the lens of regulatory justice, see, Shubha Ghosh, “When Property is Something Else: Understanding Intellectual Property through the Lens of Regulatory Justice”, in *Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice*, Axel Gosseries, Alain Marciano, and Alain Strowel (eds.), (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) p. 106.

⁵⁸ See, Peter Drahos, “Intellectual Property and Human Rights” *Intellectual Property Quarterly*, vol. 3 (1999) pp. 349, 367.

3 THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN KENYA, SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA

3.1 *Kenya and South Africa*

The right to health is a justiciable right in Kenya pursuant to Article 43(1)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 which provides that everyone has the right to “the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care services, including reproductive health care”. Thus, Kenyans can institute legal proceedings to challenge any governmental action (including legislative enactments on patent rights and other intellectual property rights) that potentially or actually infringes on their right to health.

Section 27(1)(a) of the South African Constitution of 1996 provides that everyone has the right to have access to “health care services, including reproductive health care”. Section 27(2) further mandates the South African Government to take “reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights”. Section 27(3) provides that no one may be refused emergency medical treatment. The South African Constitutional Court has, in a line of cases, made pronouncements on the meaning and effect of these provisions on the right to health.

In *Soobramoney v. Minister of Health*,⁵⁹ the appellant argued that section 27(3) of the South African Constitution imposed an obligation on the Government to provide treatment such as renal dialysis to patients who suffer from terminal illnesses.⁶⁰ However, the South African Constitutional Court made it clear that section 27 does not impose an absolute obligation on the Government to provide access to health care and the obligation to do so is “dependent upon the resources available for such purposes” and the right to have access to health care is equally “limited by reason of the lack of resources”.⁶¹

The court took the view that the implication of the appellant’s argument would be that the treatment of terminal illnesses will take priority over other forms of medical care and this will reduce the resources available for other purposes like preventative health care and medical treatment for persons with no life threatening ailments.⁶² The court noted that section 27(3) was designed to secure treatment in emergency situations, for instance, for persons who suffer sudden catastrophes which call for immediate medical attention.⁶³ It was held that the appellant’s condition was not an emergency that called for immediate remedial treatment and that section 27(3) was inapplicable to his case.⁶⁴ It was further held that the appellant’s demand to receive dialysis treatment at a state hospital must be determined in accordance with sections 27(1) & (2) which provides for access to health care services provided by the state “within its available resources”.⁶⁵ According to the court:

The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in KwaZulu-Natal has to make decisions about the funding that should be made available for health care and how such funds should be spent. These choices involve difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met. A court will be slow to interfere with rational

⁵⁹ *Soobramoney v. Minister of Health*, (CCT32/97) [1997] ZACC 17; 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).

⁶⁰ *Soobramoney*, para 12.

⁶¹ *Soobramoney*, para 11.

⁶² *Soobramoney*, para 19.

⁶³ *Soobramoney*, paras 20, 51.

⁶⁴ *Soobramoney*, para 21.

⁶⁵ *Soobramoney*, para 22.

decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.⁶⁶

The court in this case adopted what Ferraz calls the “reasonableness approach” and, as Ferraz points out, the court confined its role “to an assessment of the rationality and good faith of the decisions taken at the political and technical branches of the state”.⁶⁷ The court was wary of crossing the boundaries set by the doctrine of separation of powers⁶⁸ and it also wanted to avoid making an order that would result in the denial of resources to other patients to whom those resources could be better devoted.⁶⁹ According to Sachs J., “[i]n all the open and democratic societies ... the rationing of access to life-prolonging resources is regarded as integral to, rather than incompatible with, a human rights approach to health care”.⁷⁰

The “reasonableness approach” to the right to access to health care was also followed in the decision of the same court in the latter case of *Minister of Health & Ors v. Treatment Action Campaign & Ors (No. 2)*.⁷¹ There are however crucial differences between the facts of *Soobramoney* and the *Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case*. In the *TAC case*, TAC (an NGO involved in HIV/AIDS advocacy) challenged the restrictions imposed by the South African Government on the availability of nevirapine (a drug that can be used to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV) in the public health sector.⁷² The Government had confined the administration of the drug to research and training sites. TAC contended that these restrictions were unreasonable vis-à-vis the provisions of the Constitution.⁷³ According to TAC, “the measures adopted by government to provide access to health care services to HIV-positive pregnant women were deficient in two material respects: first, because they prohibited the administration of nevirapine at public hospitals and clinics outside the research and training sites; and second, because they failed to implement a comprehensive program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV”.⁷⁴ One of the key issues the court had to consider was whether, in the light of provisions such as section 27 of the Constitution, the government was constitutionally obliged and had to be ordered to plan and implement an effective, comprehensive, and progressive program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV throughout the country.⁷⁵

The court in applying its “reasonableness approach” held that the “policy of confining nevirapine to research and training sites fails to address the needs of mothers and their newborn children who do not have access to these sites.”⁷⁶ According to the court, the policy “fails to distinguish between the evaluation of programs for reducing mother-to-child transmission and the need to provide access to health care required by those who do not have access to the sites”.⁷⁷ Unlike its attitude towards government’s policy in *Soobramoney*, in this case, the court was willing to question the Government’s policy with regard to the administration of nevirapine and it held that “the policy of government in so far as it confines the use of nevirapine to hospitals and clinics which are research and training sites constitutes a breach of the State’s obligations under section 27(2) read with section 27(1)(a) of the

⁶⁶ *Soobramoney*, para 29.

⁶⁷ Octavio LM Ferraz, “Between Usurpation and Abdication? The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil and South Africa”, in *Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa*, Oscar Vilhena, Upendra Baxi and Frans Viljoen (eds.) (Pretoria University Law Press, 2013) 385.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Soobramoney*, para 30.

⁷⁰ *Soobramoney*, para 52.

⁷¹ *Minister of Health & Ors v. Treatment Action Campaign & Ors (No.2)*, (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721.

⁷² *TAC*, para 4.

⁷³ *TAC*, para 4.

⁷⁴ *TAC*, para 44.

⁷⁵ *TAC*, para 5.

⁷⁶ *TAC*, para 67.

⁷⁷ *TAC*, para 67.

Constitution”.⁷⁸ The policy was held to be unreasonable. According to the court, “a policy of waiting for a protracted period before taking a decision on the use of nevirapine beyond the research and training sites is also not reasonable within the meaning of section 27(2) of the Constitution”.⁷⁹

The South African Government tried to argue in this case that, even if its policies fell short of what the Constitution demands, the only competent order that a court can make is to issue a declaration of rights to that effect as this is what is mandated by the doctrine of separation of powers.⁸⁰ In other words, the Government contended that the court could only grant a declaratory order but not a mandatory order because according to the doctrine of separation of powers, as the government argued, “the making of policy is the prerogative of the executive and not the courts” and “courts cannot make orders that have the effect of requiring the executive to pursue a particular policy”.⁸¹ The court however held that the doctrine of separation of powers does not mean “that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an impact on policy”.⁸² According to the court:

We thus reject the argument that the only power that this Court has in the present case is to issue a declaratory order. Where a breach of any right has taken place, including a socio-economic right, a court is under a duty to ensure that effective relief is granted. The nature of the right infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in a particular case. Where necessary this may include both the issuing of a mandamus and the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction.⁸³

The court thus ordered the Government to, *inter alia*, remove without delay, “the restrictions that prevent nevirapine from being made available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and training sites”.⁸⁴

The implication of the *TAC* case is that, even though the South African Constitutional Court prefers to adopt a “reasonableness approach” in its evaluation of government policies that affect socio-economic rights and despite the fact that the court equally respects the doctrine of separation of powers, where the government adopts a policy that is unreasonable and inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the court can actually give an order that has an impact on policy making. It should also be noted that in the *TAC* case, the Government’s policies with regard to the administration of nevirapine was not based on resource constraints like in the *Soobramoney* case. As Ferraz notes, the “cost of providing the drug was virtually none, given a pledge by the pharmaceutical suppliers to give it for free”.⁸⁵ Even the court acknowledged the fact that the “cost of nevirapine for preventing mother-to-child transmission is not an issue in the present proceedings” and that it was “admittedly within the resources of the State”.⁸⁶ The government policies on nevirapine were based on what Ferraz calls “dubious (not to say completely ungrounded) assertions that the drug in question (Nevirapine) was not scientifically proven to work”.⁸⁷

⁷⁸ *TAC*, para 80.

⁷⁹ *TAC*, para 81.

⁸⁰ *TAC*, para 96.

⁸¹ *TAC*, para 97.

⁸² *TAC*, para 98.

⁸³ *TAC*, para 106.

⁸⁴ *TAC*, para 135(3)(a).

⁸⁵ Octavio LM Ferraz, “Between Usurpation and Abdication? The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil and South Africa” in *Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa*, Oscar Vilhena, Upendra Baxi and Frans Viljoen (eds.), (Pretoria University Law Press, 2013) 388.

⁸⁶ *TAC*, para 71.

⁸⁷ Octavio LM Ferraz, “Between Usurpation and Abdication? The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil and South Africa” in *Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa*, Oscar Vilhena, Upendra Baxi and Frans Viljoen (eds.), (Pretoria University Law Press, 2013) 388.

Subsequently, in *Minister of Health v. New Clicks*,⁸⁸ the South African Constitutional Court held that the right to health also includes the right to have access to affordable medicines and that the State has an obligation to “promote access to medicines that are affordable”.⁸⁹ According to Sachs J. in this case, “preventing excessive profit-taking from the manufacturing, distribution and sale of medicines is more than an option for government. It is a constitutional obligation flowing from its duties under section 27(2)”.⁹⁰ In the same case, Moseneke J. stated that:

It seems self-evident that there can be no adequate access to medicines if they are not within one’s means. Prohibitive pricing of medicine ... would in effect equate to a denial of the right of access to health care. Equally true is that the state bears the obligation to everyone to facilitate equity in the access to essential drugs which in turn affect the quality of care.⁹¹

A combined reading of section 27 and the decisions in *Soobramoney*, *TAC*, and *New Clicks* leads one to conclude that the right to healthcare in South Africa, which includes the right to have access to affordable medicines, imposes an obligation on the Government to facilitate access to affordable medicines through the adoption of reasonable measures though this obligation can only be fulfilled within the limits of available resources. Furthermore, where the Government adopts a policy that is inconsistent with the Constitution and which also violates the right to health, the court can demand that the Government should change its policy.

3.2 India

The Indian Constitution, which came into force in 1950, incorporates civil and political rights as fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution while socio-economic rights are contained in Part IV of the Constitution which deals with the Directive Principles of State Policy. In relation to health, Article 39(e), contained in Part IV of the Constitution, provides that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing “that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused”. Another provision in Part IV of the Constitution that touches on health is Article 41 which provides *inter alia* that the state “shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to ... public assistance in cases of ... sickness and disablement”. Furthermore, Article 47, also contained in Part IV of the Constitution, provides *inter alia* that the state “shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties”.

However, the provisions of Part IV of the Indian Constitution are non-justiciable. According to Article 37 of the Constitution, the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution “shall not be enforceable by any court” though “the principles therein laid are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country” and the State has the duty “to apply these principles in making laws”. Initially, the Indian Supreme Court adopted a strict approach towards the interpretation of this prohibition against the justiciability of the Directive Principles of State Policy. As Dhanda points out:

⁸⁸ *Minister of Health v. New Clicks*, [2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (8) BCLR 872 (CC). This case concerned certain regulations made pursuant to the South African Medicines Act to give effect to the pricing system for the sale of medicines instituted by the Act. The South African Medicines Act was amended in 1997 in order to facilitate access to cheaper drugs and the amendment, among other things, established a pricing committee to make recommendations for the introduction of a pricing system for all medicines sold in South Africa. See also, Andrew L. Gray, “Medicine Pricing Interventions – The South African Experience”, (2009) 2 *Southern Med Review* 15.

⁸⁹ *New Clicks*, para 514.

⁹⁰ *New Clicks*, para 659.

⁹¹ *New Clicks*, para 706.

In the early years, this prohibition of justiciability was strictly interpreted by the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court ruled that legislation was required for the implementation of the Directives. The [Directive Principles of State Policy] without more did not create a justiciable right in favor of individuals. Consequently, courts could not compel the state to carry out any of the [Directive Principles of State Policy]. Further, due to the prohibition on justiciability, no law could be declared void on the ground that it infringed the [Directive Principles of State Policy].⁹²

However, in subsequent years, the Indian Supreme Court began to adopt an “expanded reading” of the justiciable provisions on civil and political rights and they “started to pronounce upon matters of health which were by the text of the Constitution included in the [Directive Principles of State Policy]”.⁹³ Essentially, the court found a way of “settling the contours of the right to health” through the adoption of an expansive reading of the fundamental right to life contained in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.⁹⁴ According to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.

Dhanda notes that the Indian Supreme Court “started with a very formal and legalistic interpretation” of the right to life by ruling “that the deprivation of life and liberty was permissible provided it was done by a duly enacted parliamentary legislation”.⁹⁵ The Supreme Court moved progressively from this formal and legalistic interpretation and it started to expand the ambit of the right to life by first enhancing “the fairness requirements of the right to life and liberty depriving procedure” and then the court later pronounced on “the quality of life guaranteed by the Constitution”.⁹⁶ The court ruled that the right to life “was not a right to bare physical existence but a right to a full and meaningful life. And a full and meaningful life includes the right to health within its purview”.⁹⁷ Some of the cases where the Indian Supreme Court has made pronouncements on the right to health are examined below.

In *Consumer Education & Research Centre and others v. Union of India and others*,⁹⁸ the Indian Supreme Court held that the “expression ‘life’ assured in Art. 21 of the Constitution does not connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider meaning which includes right to livelihood, better standard of life, hygienic conditions in [the] workplace and leisure”.⁹⁹ In the same case, the Supreme Court held that “the right to health and medical care is a fundamental right under Article 21”.¹⁰⁰

In *Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal*,¹⁰¹ which involved the failure of government medical hospitals to provide timely emergency medical treatment to an individual who fell off a train and who suffered serious head injuries and brain hemorrhage, the Indian Supreme Court held that:

Article 21 imposes an obligation on the State to safeguard the right to life of every person. Preservation of human life is thus of paramount importance. The Government hospitals run by the State and the Medical Officers employed therein are duty bound

⁹² Amita Dhanda, “Realising the Right to Health through Co-operative Judicial Review: An Analysis of the Role of the Indian Supreme Court”, in *Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa*, Oscar Vilhena, Upendra Baxi and Frans Viljoen (eds.), (Pretoria University Law Press, 2013) 406.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* 406-407. See also, *Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi*, (1981) 1 SCC 608; AIR 1981 SC 746.

⁹⁸ *Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*, 1995 SCC (3) 42 (decided on 27 January 1995).

⁹⁹ *Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*, para 24.

¹⁰⁰ *Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*, para 26.

¹⁰¹ *Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal*, (1996) 4 SCC 37 (decided on 6 May 1996).

to extend medical assistance for preserving human life. Failure on the part of a Government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment results in [a] violation of his right to life guaranteed under Article 21.¹⁰²

The court further noted that the limitation of financial resources cannot justify the failure of the state to fulfil its constitutional obligations with regard to the provision of adequate medical services. According to the court:

It is no doubt true that financial resources are needed for providing these facilities. But at the same time, it cannot be ignored that it is the constitutional obligation of the State to provide adequate medical services to the people. Whatever is necessary for this purpose has to be done. In the context of the constitutional obligation to provide free legal aid to a poor accused this Court has held that the State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation in that regard on account of financial constraints ... The said observations would apply with equal, if not greater force, in the matter of [the] discharge of [the] constitutional obligation to provide medical aid to preserve human life.¹⁰³

However, arguments relating to the limitation of financial resources in the context of the right to health and the provision of medical facilities by the State are not entirely foreclosed by the Indian Supreme Court. Where, due to the limitation of financial resources, the Government has adopted a particular policy with regard to the provision of medical services, the Indian Supreme Court assesses the particular policy by adopting an approach akin to the “reasonableness approach”.

For instance, in *State of Punjab and others v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*,¹⁰⁴ the Indian Supreme Court had to determine whether the State of Punjab was justified in adopting a policy of not reimbursing an employee for his full medical expenses if such expenses were incurred in any hospital in India that was not a government-owned hospital in Punjab. The State of Punjab argued that no right under the Constitution is absolute and a right has to be balanced with the need, equity and the resources available.¹⁰⁵ According to the State of Punjab, it would not be a violation of the Constitution if a medical facility is not provided in absolute terms because of financial constraints.¹⁰⁶ In this case, the Supreme Court held that:

[S]o far as questioning the validity of governmental policy is concerned, in our view it is not normally within the domain of any court, to weigh the pros and cons of the policy or to scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or equitable disposition for the purpose of varying or modifying it, based on however sound and good reasoning, **except where it is arbitrary** or violative of any constitutional, statutory or any other provision of law. When Government forms its policy, it is based on [a] number of circumstances ... including constraints based on its resources ... it would be dangerous if [the] court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The Court would dissuade itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive. It is within this matrix that it is to be seen whether the new policy violates Article 21 when it restricts reimbursement on account of ... financial constraints.¹⁰⁷

In other words, once the Government has already adopted a policy with regard to the provision of a medical facility, unless the said policy is arbitrary or unreasonable, the court will not

¹⁰² *Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal*, para 9.

¹⁰³ *Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal*, para 16.

¹⁰⁴ *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, (1998) 4 SCC 117 (decided on 26 February 1998).

¹⁰⁵ *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, 3.

¹⁰⁶ *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, 3.

¹⁰⁷ *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, 10 (emphasis added).

interfere in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. This is in congruence with the approach adopted by the South African Constitutional Court in the *Soooramoney case* discussed earlier. In addition, it should also be noted that, apart from the requirement that a policy should not be arbitrary, the court in the *Lubhaya Bagga case* also stressed that the policy should not violate any constitutional or statutory rule. The implication of this is that the government cannot rely on the argument that it has financial constraints to justify its failure to provide a medical facility. As the court held in the *Samity case*, the State cannot avoid its obligation on account of financial constraints.¹⁰⁸ The State has to take steps to establish a policy with regard to the provision of medical facilities and limited financial resources will not excuse the Government's failure to establish a policy in this regard. But once the Government has adopted a particular policy with regard to the provision of a medical facility, the court will only interfere where that policy is unreasonable or violative of the Constitution or any statute.

Thus, in the *Lubhaya Bagga case*, the court held that, "the State can neither urge nor say that it has no obligation to provide [a] medical facility. If that were so it would be ex facie violative of Article 21".¹⁰⁹ The court then noted that under the policy adopted by the State of Punjab, "medical facility continues to be given and ... an employee is given [the] free choice to get treatment in any private hospital in India but the amount of payment towards reimbursement is regulated".¹¹⁰ The court held that this policy was not in violation of Articles 21 or 47 of the Constitution because:

No State of any country can have unlimited resources to spend on any of its projects. That is why it only approves its projects to the extent [to which] it is feasible. The same holds good for providing medical facilities to its citizens including its employees. Provision of facilities cannot be unlimited. It has to be to the extent finance[s] permit.¹¹¹

The approach adopted by the court in the *Lubhaya Bagga case* was followed in the latter case of *Confederation of Ex-Servicemen Associations and others v. Union of India and others*.¹¹² In that case the court had to determine whether it was unconstitutional and unreasonable to require ex-servicemen to make one time payments before benefitting from an Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS). The court held that "such a contributory scheme cannot be held illegal, unlawful or unconstitutional" because "[i]n the light of financial constraints and limited means available, if a policy decision is taken to extend medical facilities to ex-defense personnel by allowing them to become members of [a] contributory scheme and by requiring them to make [a] 'one time payment' which is a 'reasonable amount', it cannot be said that such [an] action would violate fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution".¹¹³

In 2014, in the case of *Mohd. Ahmed (Minor) v. Union of India and others*,¹¹⁴ the Delhi High Court made some landmark pronouncements on the right to health in the context of access to medicines as it affects a patient suffering from a rare disease. The central issue before the court was whether a child born to poor parents and who is suffering from Gaucher's disease

¹⁰⁸ *Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal*, para 16.

¹⁰⁹ *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, 11.

¹¹⁰ *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, 11.

¹¹¹ *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, 11.

¹¹² *Confederation of Ex-Servicemen Associations and others v. Union of India and others*, AIR 2006 Supreme Court 2945 (decided on 22 August 2006).

¹¹³ *Confederation of Ex-Servicemen Associations and others v. Union of India and others*, 26-27. However, in recognition of the "exemplary and extremely useful services rendered by [the] defense personnel" and because "the safety, security and comfort enjoyed by the countrymen depend largely on [the] dedication and commitment of [the] soldiers, sailors and airmen", the Indian Supreme Court directed the government "either to waive the amount of [the] contribution or to pay such amount on behalf of those ex-servicemen ... who intend to avail [of the] medical facilities and benefits under the said scheme by exercising [the] option [of] becoming members of ECHS". Invariably, the court ruled that "it is open to ex-defense personnel ... to become members of ECHS and to claim medical facilities and benefits under the said scheme without payment of [the] contribution amount". *Ibid.*, 27, 29.

¹¹⁴ *Mohd. Ahmed (Minor) v. Union of India and others*, W.P.(C) 7279/2013 (Decision of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, 17 April 2014).

(a chronic and rare disease) is entitled to free medical treatment especially when the treatment for the disease is known, the prognosis is good, and there is every likelihood that the child can lead a normal life.¹¹⁵ The court observed that the cost of the drugs for this disease is exorbitant because it is a rare disease.¹¹⁶

It was argued on behalf of the child that, since the drugs needed for the treatment of the child is available in India, both the Central Government and the Government of Delhi had an obligation under Article 21 of the Constitution to provide free treatment to the child and other patients in the same situation.¹¹⁷ The child's counsel argued that the Government could not raise the plea of financial constraint.¹¹⁸ The plea of financial constraint was however the kernel of the submissions made by the Central Government and the Government of Delhi. They contended that because of their limited resources they are unable to fund the treatment of the child as the disease is a lifelong one and the condition of the child is chronic.¹¹⁹

In particular, the Government of Delhi contended *inter alia* that "the right to health in a developing country like India could not be so stretched ... to mean [the provision of] free health facilities to a terminally ill patient while other citizens were not even provided basic health care".¹²⁰ In addition, the Delhi Government argued that "the State had an equal obligation towards all citizens and it had to use its limited resources so as to provide the maximum benefit to the maximum number of people" and the State's obligation to provide health care to all people is not an absolute fundamental right as it is subject to just exceptions.¹²¹ Essentially, the Delhi Government argued that "the State cannot concentrate all its resources on one person, while denying basic facilities to others".¹²²

Anand Grover, a former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, equally made some legal submissions in this case. Grover argued that, as India had signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), India is duty bound to fulfil its international legal obligations.¹²³ Grover contended that:

States are required to adopt and implement a public health strategy and plan of action that reflects the epidemiological burden of disease that not only addresses major disease burdens but also the health concerns of the whole population. Therefore ... even if a small percentage of the population had a life-threatening condition there should be [a] public health strategy and plan to address their treatment needs. In other words, the Government can be directed to have a plan in place to make medicines available for rare diseases, like Gaucher disease etc.¹²⁴

Grover's argument brings into focus the central problem with the Indian Government's argument in this case. Essentially, the Government had failed to put in place a policy or adopt a public health strategy to provide medicines to those suffering from rare diseases such as Gaucher's disease. This is a violation of the Government's obligation with regard to the right to health. It is true that the Government has limited resources, but as the Indian Supreme Court held in the *Samity* case, the State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation with regard to the right to health on account of financial constraints.¹²⁵ Even in the *Lubhaya Bagga* case where the Indian Supreme Court recognized the fact that the financial resources of the State

¹¹⁵ *Mohd*, para 1.

¹¹⁶ *Mohd*, para 4.

¹¹⁷ *Mohd*, para 11.

¹¹⁸ *Mohd*, para 14.

¹¹⁹ *Mohd*, para 27.

¹²⁰ *Mohd*, para 22.

¹²¹ *Mohd*, para 22.

¹²² *Mohd*, para 24.

¹²³ *Mohd*, para 34.

¹²⁴ *Mohd*, para 35.

¹²⁵ *Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal*, para 16.

are not unlimited, the court still made it clear that the failure to adopt a policy with regard to the provision of a medical facility is *ex facie* violative of the constitution.¹²⁶

In this case, neither the Central Government nor the Delhi Government had adopted any policy or public health strategy for the provision of drugs to those suffering from rare diseases. As the Delhi High Court pointed out, “[u]nfortunately, the Government of India does not have any policy measure in place to address rare diseases, particularly those of a chronic nature. All the Central and State schemes at the highest provide for a one-time grant for life-saving procedures and do not contemplate continuous financial assistance for a chronic disease such as [Gaucher’s disease], which involves lifelong expenditure”.¹²⁷ The court however stated that, in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, it could not direct parliament to enact a legislation on the right to public health with regard to rare diseases or orphan drugs, even though this may be eminently desirable.¹²⁸ According to the court, as the “formulation of a policy is within the exclusive domain of the Executive”, it will refrain from issuing directives for the formulation of a policy.¹²⁹

In its decision in this case, the Delhi High Court noted that the human right to health is recognized in numerous international instruments including Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 12 of the ICESCR.¹³⁰ The court also referred to the CESCR’s General Comment No. 14 on the right to health.¹³¹ The court quoted paragraph 12 of General Comment No. 14 which deals with the essential elements of the right to health and which states, *inter alia*, that health facilities, goods and services must be both available and accessible.¹³² In addition, the court quoted paragraph 43(d) of General Comment No. 14 which states that one of the core obligations with regard to the right to health (from which no derogation is permissible) is the provision of essential drugs.¹³³ Furthermore, the court quoted paragraph 52 of General Comment No. 14 which provides that a state violates its obligation to fulfil the right to health when it fails to, *inter alia*, “adopt or implement a national health policy designed to ensure the right to health for everyone”.¹³⁴

The court admitted that the State does not have unlimited financial resources. According to the court, “availability of finance with the government is a relevant factor ... No court can direct that [the] entire budget of a country should be spent on health and medical aid” and “courts cannot direct that all [the] inhabitants of this country [should] be given free medical treatment at [the State’s] expense” and if such a directive is issued, “it would not be implementable as there would be neither infrastructure nor finance” for complying with such a directive.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, the court held that “no government can say that it will not treat patients with chronic and rare diseases due to financial constraint[s]”.¹³⁶ The court, apparently relying on

¹²⁶ In the *Lubhaya Bagga* case, the Indian Supreme Court held that, “the State can neither urge nor say that it has no obligation to provide [a] medical facility. If that were so it would be *ex facie* violative of Article 21”. See, *State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga*, 11.

¹²⁷ *Mohd*, para 42. The court also lamented the fact that “no incentives were in place for Indian manufacturers to develop local alternatives to orphan drugs [i.e., drugs developed for the treatment of rare diseases]”. According to the court, no promising orphan drug will be developed, and the prohibitive costs of orphan drugs will not be reduced “unless changes are made in the applicable laws to reduce the costs of developing such drugs and to provide financial incentives to develop such drugs”. *Ibid.*, paras 42-43. The court also advised the government to increase its investment in the health sector. According to the court, “If poor patients are to enjoy [the] benefit of recent innovations in the medical field, like robotic surgery [and] genome engineering the Government must immediately think of increasing its investment in the health sector.” *Ibid.*, para 80.

¹²⁸ *Mohd*, para 44.

¹²⁹ *Mohd*, para 45.

¹³⁰ *Mohd*, para 52.

¹³¹ *Mohd*, para 53.

¹³² *Mohd*, para 53.

¹³³ *Mohd*, para 53.

¹³⁴ *Mohd*, para 53.

¹³⁵ *Mohd*, paras 62-63.

¹³⁶ *Mohd*, paras 64.

the provisions of paragraph 43(d) of General Comment No. 14 which it had previously quoted, adopted the view that “core obligations under the right to health are non-derogable” and that though “this minimum core is not easy to define,” it “includes at least the minimum decencies of life consistent with human dignity”.¹³⁷ Invariably, the court came to the conclusion that the state has an obligation to provide access to medicines, including medicines for rare diseases. According to the court:

Article 21 of the Constitution clearly imposes a duty on the Government to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that everyone has access to health facilities, goods and services so that they can enjoy, as soon as possible, the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. By virtue of Article 21 of the Constitution, the State is under a legal obligation to ensure access to life saving drugs to patients. A reasonable and equitable access to life saving medicines is critical to promoting and protecting the right to health. This means that Government must at the bare minimum ensure that individuals have access to essential medicines even for rare diseases like enzyme replacement for Gaucher disease ... Government cannot cite financial crunch as a reason not to fulfil its obligation to ensure access to medicines or to adopt a plan of action to treat rare diseases ... no government can wriggle out of its core obligation of ensuring the right of access to health facilities for [the] vulnerable and marginalized section of society [such as] the petitioner by stating that it cannot afford to provide treatment for rare and chronic diseases.¹³⁸

Thus, by failing to adopt a policy for the provision of medicines for the treatment of rare diseases such as Gaucher’s disease, the Government of India had violated its constitutional obligation with regard to the right to health.¹³⁹ Furthermore, the Government has a non-derogable core obligation to provide access to essential medicines at affordable prices (irrespective of resource constraints).¹⁴⁰ As health is a subject matter within the jurisdiction of the State Government in India, the court ordered the Government of Delhi to “discharge its constitutional obligation and provide the petitioner with enzyme replacement therapy ... free of charge as and when he requires it”.¹⁴¹

The ruling of the court with regard to the non-derogable core obligation of the State to provide access to essential medicines at affordable prices, irrespective of resource constraints, has enormous implications for the tension between patent rights and the right to health in India. Even though the court in this case did not consider the tension between patent rights and the right to health, the court confirmed by its ruling that the Indian Government has a non-derogable core obligation to facilitate access to essential medicines at affordable prices.

This ruling implies that in any case where the exercise or enforcement of patent rights on pharmaceutical products granted by the Government hinders poor patients from having access to essential medicines, there is a violation of the government’s obligation to provide access to essential medicines at affordable prices. If this approach is incorporated in the decisions of the Indian courts whenever they are adjudicating disputes involving the interpretation or enforcement of patent rights, it will ensure that owners of patent rights on pharmaceutical products are not allowed to exercise their patent rights in a manner that impedes the enjoyment of the right to health.

Thus, three clear principles are discernible from the decisions of the Indian courts on the right to health. One, the State cannot justify its failure to provide medical facilities by arguing that it has limited financial resources. The State is obliged to at least adopt a policy with regard to

¹³⁷ *Mohd*, paras 67.

¹³⁸ *Mohd*, paras 68-69.

¹³⁹ *Mohd*, paras 85-86.

¹⁴⁰ *Mohd*, para 87.

¹⁴¹ *Mohd*, para 89.

the provision of medical facilities. Two, once a policy has been adopted by the State, the court will only interfere with such a policy if it is unconstitutional or unreasonable or arbitrary. As long as the policy itself is not unreasonable, the measures contained in the policy need not be adequate. Three, the State has a core obligation to provide access to essential medicines at affordable prices. There can be no derogation from this core obligation irrespective of financial constraints.

4 INCORPORATING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH INTO THE ADJUDICATION OF DISPUTES INVOLVING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS

4.1 Kenya

In the 2008 case of *Pfizer Inc. v. Cosmos Limited*, Pfizer alleged that Cosmos had infringed its patent on a medicinal product known as “azithromycin dihydrate”.¹⁴² Cosmos argued, *inter alia*, that it was entitled to import, manufacture, sell, and export the patented product without the authorization of Pfizer by virtue of section 58(2) of the Kenyan Industrial Property Act which allows parallel importation. Section 58(2) provides that “the rights under the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put on the market in Kenya or in any other country or imported into Kenya by the owner of the patent or with his express consent”. Cosmos presented evidence to the tribunal establishing that the medicines containing the patented product were available in Kenya having been imported from India, Bangladesh, and China.¹⁴³ In other words, the patent rights of Pfizer, with respect to those products which were readily available in Kenya, had been exhausted. Cosmos was trying to rely on the principle of international exhaustion of patent rights as reflected in section 58(2), and though this principle might not give Cosmos the right to manufacture the patented product, it would entitle Cosmos to import those patented products from India, Bangladesh, and China and to resell them in Kenya.¹⁴⁴

However, in a rather curious and confusing manner, the tribunal conflated parallel importation with compulsory licenses and voluntary licenses. According to the tribunal, “parallel importation ... is applicable for instance where the government has allowed a third party to exploit the patent, and that party imports the product from other countries where it is legitimately put on the market ... This could also be with the authority of the patent holder by way of a contractual or voluntary license”.¹⁴⁵ The tribunal could not comprehend a situation where a third party could engage in the parallel importation of a patented product without the authorization of the patentee, or the government and its definition of parallel importation clearly contradicts what is contained in section 58(2) of the Kenyan Industrial Property Act. Section 58(2) does not require a person or a company to obtain government authorization or a compulsory/voluntary license before engaging in parallel importation.¹⁴⁶

Cosmos equally argued that the patented product was used for the treatment of opportunistic infections in HIV/AIDS patients and that the WHO listed the product as an essential medicine for the treatment of genital chlamydia trachomatis and trachoma.¹⁴⁷ By raising this argument, Cosmos had highlighted a tension between the enforcement of Pfizer’s patent rights on one hand and the need to facilitate access to this essential medicine for Kenyan patients on the other hand. The resolution of this tension therefore required a proper appreciation of the fact that patent rights ought to serve the needs and interests of fundamental rights such as the right to have access to affordable medicines. If the tension had been approached from this dimension, it would have enabled the tribunal to interpret the patent law with the objective of

¹⁴² *Pfizer Inc. v. Cosmos Limited* (Case No. 49 of 2006, Judgment of the Industrial Property Tribunal at Nairobi, 25 April 2008) 1.

¹⁴³ *Pfizer*, 3, 4.

¹⁴⁴ Rajnish K Rai and Srinath Jagannathan, “Parallel Imports and Unparallel Laws: An Examination of the Exhaustion Doctrine through the Lens of Pharmaceutical Products”, *Information & Communications Technology Law*, vol. 21 (2012) p. 53.

¹⁴⁵ *Pfizer*, 13.

¹⁴⁶ See also, Linda M Opati, “Intellectual Property Rights in Health – Impact on Access to Drugs”, in *Intellectual Property Rights in Kenya*, Moni Wekesa and Ben Sihanya (eds.) (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung & SportsLink Limited, 2009) 27.

¹⁴⁷ *Pfizer*, 16.

ensuring that it does not impede access to medicines. However, in this particular case, the Kenyan tribunal took the view that the product was not a first-line treatment for HIV/AIDS patients and that even if this was the case, it would not entitle the respondents to exploit the patent without authorization.¹⁴⁸

By interpreting the provisions of section 58(2) of the Kenyan Industrial Property Act in this manner and ignoring the impact this could have on access to anti-retroviral drugs in Kenya, the tribunal overlooked the rationale behind the introduction of parallel importation into the Kenyan Industrial Property Act of 2001 via the provisions of section 58(2). During the parliamentary debates on the 2001 Act, it was stated that the provision on parallel importation was specifically introduced to permit the importation into Kenya of “medicines which are required for human life, especially [for the treatment of] HIV/AIDS and [other] opportunistic diseases, as well as malaria”.¹⁴⁹

The tribunal thus failed to appreciate the essential distinction between the regulatory nature of patent rights and the fundamental nature of the right to have access to essential medicines. It could be argued that the tribunal failed to appreciate this essential distinction because Article 43(1)(a), which made the right to health a justiciable right in Kenya, was only introduced into the Kenyan Constitution in 2010 i.e., two years after the tribunal’s judgment. However, even without invoking a constitutional right to health, a court that is mindful of the fundamental importance of securing access to medicines would have examined the rationale behind the inclusion of section 58(2) in the Kenyan patent law. As noted above, section 58(2) was introduced in order to facilitate the importation of medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS and opportunistic ailments. A court that is mindful of the fundamental importance of facilitating access to affordable medicines would have construed section 58(2) in accordance with the objective of ensuring that the enforcement of a patent right does not defeat the aims of the drafters of the patent law.

In the more recent case of *Patricia Asero Ochieng et al. v. Attorney General*, the Kenyan High Court had an opportunity to consider the relationship between intellectual property rights and the right to health.¹⁵⁰ In that case, the petitioners were HIV/AIDS patients, and they alleged that certain sections of the Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Act of 2008 threatened their access to essential drugs thereby infringing their right to life, dignity, and health.¹⁵¹ The petitioners argued that the government failed to specifically exempt generic drugs from the definition of counterfeit goods in the Act.¹⁵² Specifically, section 2 of the Act defines counterfeiting in relation to medicine to mean “the deliberate and fraudulent mislabeling of medicine with respect to identity or source, whether or not such products have correct ingredients, wrong ingredients, have sufficient active ingredients or have fake packaging”. The respondents, however, argued that the Anti-Counterfeit Act was enacted to prohibit trade in counterfeit goods in Kenya and was not intended to prohibit generic drugs.¹⁵³ The respondents argued that the Act was intended to “protect the public from the harm of using counterfeit goods and that extra care needs to be taken to ensure that the medicine in the market meets the required standard”.¹⁵⁴

Contrary to the arguments of the respondents in this case, it appears that the real intent behind the Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Act is not really the protection of the public from harm, but the Act

¹⁴⁸ *Pfizer*, 17.

¹⁴⁹ Statement by the Kenyan Minister for Trade and Industry during the parliamentary debates on the Industrial Property Act. See, Kenyan National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), 12 June 2001, p. 1043.

¹⁵⁰ *PA Ochieng, M Atieno, and J Munyo v. Attorney General* (Petition No. 409 of 2009, Judgment of the Kenyan High Court, 20 April 2012).

¹⁵¹ *Ochieng*, para 1.

¹⁵² *Ochieng*, para 14.

¹⁵³ *Ochieng*, para 39.

¹⁵⁴ *Ochieng*, para 42.

was designed to secure, among other things, the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies. Von Braun and Munyi point out that, because the two bills preceding the enactment of the Anti-Counterfeit Act were not backed by any public policy decision, it is “difficult to discern the real motive or motivations behind the enactment of the legislation” but “during the legislative process, there was a lot of public debate, at least as demonstrated by numerous media reports on the effect counterfeiting has had on the local manufacturing sector” and the “Kenya Association of Manufacturers ... was leading in the lobbying towards legislation on anti-counterfeiting”.¹⁵⁵ Harrington and O’Hare equally note that the Kenya Association of Manufacturers played a key role in securing the passage of the Act.¹⁵⁶ According to Harrington and O’Hare, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers “represents over 700 members, both domestic and foreign-owned firms, among whom are major pharmaceutical concerns marketing and manufacturing their products in Kenya”.¹⁵⁷ They note that the Association established an Anti-Counterfeit Committee and “engaged closely in the legislative process itself” while also “frequently briefing key parliamentary committees”.¹⁵⁸

Anand Grover, (former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health), filed an *amicus* brief in the *Ochieng* case. According to the former Special Rapporteur, “the definition of ‘counterfeiting’ within the Act effectively conflates generic medicines with medicines which are produced in violation of private intellectual property rights, and this conflation of legitimately produced generic medicines with those that possibly violate intellectual property rights is likely to have a serious adverse impact on the availability, affordability and accessibility of low-cost, high-quality medicines”.¹⁵⁹ Grover agreed with the contention of the petitioners that the Act could endanger the right to health because it does not exclude generic drugs.¹⁶⁰ Grover also provided a definition of generic medicines (which was quoted in the court’s judgment) as drugs that “have the same composition and contain the same substances as patented formulations of the same drugs, and are essentially identical copies [that] can be used for the same purposes as their non-generic counterparts”.¹⁶¹

In its analysis of the meaning and implication of the right to health, the High Court referred to Article 43(1)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution which guarantees the right to health, Article 12 of the ICESCR, and the CESCR’s General Comment No. 14 on the Right to Health. The High Court proceeded to delineate the nature of the State’s obligation with regard to the right to health. The court held that the State’s obligation entails both a positive and a negative duty. The State has a positive duty to ensure that its citizens have access to healthcare services and medicines; it equally has a negative duty to refrain from taking actions that would affect access to these health care services and medicines.¹⁶² Thus, any legislative enactment that would make medicines too expensive for citizens would be in violation of the State’s obligation.¹⁶³

The court equally highlighted the danger inherent in conflating the definition of counterfeit drugs and generic drugs by referring to cases where generic drugs in transit were seized on the basis of being counterfeit.¹⁶⁴ Though the court did not mention any particular country, it is obvious that the court was referring to instances like the seizure by Dutch Customs authorities

¹⁵⁵ Johanna Von Braun and Peter Munyi, “New Enforcement Mechanisms Challenge the Legality of Generics in the Name of Public Health: The Emergence of Anti-Counterfeiting Legislation in East Africa”, (2010) 18 *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, vol. 18 (2010) pp. 238, 243.

¹⁵⁶ John Harrington and Alasdair O’Hare, “Framing the National Interest: Debating Intellectual Property and Access to Essential Medicines in Kenya”, *The Journal of World Intellectual Property*, vol. 17 (2014) pp. 16, 22.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ochieng*, para 35.

¹⁶⁰ *Ochieng*, para 34.

¹⁶¹ *Ochieng*, para 76.

¹⁶² *Ochieng*, para 66.

¹⁶³ *Ochieng*, para 66.

¹⁶⁴ *Ochieng*, para 75.

in 2008 and 2009 of multiple shipments of drugs that were in-transit from India to developing countries in Africa and Latin America.¹⁶⁵ The court agreed with the petitioners and the Special Rapporteur that the “definition of ‘counterfeit’ in section 2 of the Act is likely to be read as including generic medication” and quoting from the Special Rapporteur’s *amicus* brief, it stated that “this would affect the availability of generic drugs and pose a real threat to the petitioners’ right to life, dignity and health”.¹⁶⁶ The court disagreed with the respondent’s argument that the Act was primarily intended to protect consumers from counterfeit medicines. According to the court “the tenor and object of the Act is to protect the intellectual property rights of individuals”.¹⁶⁷

The court was of the view that the rights to life, dignity, and health must take priority over intellectual property rights. The court noted that if the Act is implemented as originally written, “the danger that it poses to the right of the petitioners to access essential medicine ... is far greater and more critical than the protection of the intellectual property rights that the Act seeks to protect” and that “[t]he right to life, dignity and health of the petitioners must take precedence over the intellectual property rights of patent holders”.¹⁶⁸ The High Court further held that, “[i]t is incumbent on the state to reconsider the provisions of section 2 of the Anti-Counterfeit Act alongside its constitutional obligation to ensure that its citizens have access to the highest attainable standard of health and make appropriate amendments to ensure that the rights of petitioners and others dependent on generic medicines are not put in jeopardy.”¹⁶⁹ The court thus adopted and applied the “subjugation approach” by upholding the primacy of human rights over intellectual property rights.

Thus, unlike the approach adopted by the tribunal in the *Pfizer v. Cosmos* case, the decision of the Kenyan High Court in this case demonstrates the court’s recognition of the tension between the enforcement of intellectual property rights and the protection of the right to health. The court refused to be misguided into overlooking the fact that the Anti-Counterfeit Act was enacted to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights in Kenya. With the recognition that there was a tension to be resolved, the court equally demonstrated an implicit understanding of the essential distinction between the fundamental nature of the right to health and the regulatory nature of intellectual property rights. This can be seen from the court’s statement that the danger posed by the Anti-Counterfeit Act to the petitioner’s right to access essential medicines was far greater and more critical than the protection of intellectual property rights. It is therefore not surprising that the court, while not disparaging intellectual property rights, held that the right to health must take priority over intellectual property rights.

These two cases from Kenya illustrate the important role that courts can play in enhancing access to medicines in developing countries. In a situation where most courts adopt the approach of the tribunal in the *Pfizer* case, there is no doubt that patent rights will almost always trump the right to health. However, if courts adopt the more robust approach that was applied by the Kenyan High Court in the *Ochieng* case, it will lead to two things: one, States will be careful in implementing legislation (especially legislation on patent rights) that can significantly impede access to medicines; and two, pharmaceutical companies that own patents on pharmaceutical products will ensure that they do not exercise their patent rights in ways that negatively affect the enjoyment of the right to health.

¹⁶⁵ See, Anna G Micara, “TRIPS-plus Border Measures and Access to Medicines” *The Journal of World Intellectual Property*, vol. 15 (2012), p. 73; see also, Brook K Baker, “ACTA – Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines”, *American University International Law Review*, vol. 26, pp. 579, 581-582.

¹⁶⁶ *Ochieng*, para 78.

¹⁶⁷ *Ochieng*, para 82.

¹⁶⁸ *Ochieng*, para 85. The High Court further held that, “It is incumbent on the state to reconsider the provisions of section 2 of the Anti-Counterfeit Act alongside its constitutional obligation to ensure that its citizens have access to the highest attainable standard of health and make appropriate amendments to ensure that the rights of petitioners and others dependent on generic medicines are not put in jeopardy.” *Ochieng*, para 88.

¹⁶⁹ *Ochieng*, para 88.

4.2 South Africa

In *Pfizer v. Cipla Medpro*,¹⁷⁰ Cipla Medpro had initiated revocation proceedings against Pfizer in 2004 with regards to one of Pfizer's pharmaceutical patents. Cipla had alleged that the patent was unclear and obvious. The patent in question concerned a "besylate salt of amlodipine, a drug used for hypertension and reduction of blood pressure".¹⁷¹ Pfizer markets a product called Norvasc which contains the patented chemical while Cipla had already started to market its own generic version called Nortwin in South Africa even before Pfizer's patent expired or was revoked.¹⁷² In response to Cipla's application for the revocation of the patent on besylate (which was set to expire in 2007), Pfizer brought this action for an interim interdict against Cipla to prevent the infringement of its patent pending the final determination of the revocation proceedings. In granting Pfizer's application for an interim interdict, Botha J., sitting as the Commissioner of Patents, held that:

If one looks at the broad picture: the respondents have hardly entered the market. The applicants have only two years of their patent left. In two years, the respondents will be at liberty to sell Nortwin in any event. The applicant is a manufacturer that relies on patent protection to recoup the cost of research and development. The respondent is a manufacturer of generic products that are manufactured without the expense of original research. For that reason, it is wrong to argue, as the respondents have done endlessly, that the applicants can retain their market share by reducing their prices. The regime of an open market is only something to which they have to submit on the expiry of the patent.¹⁷³

It is rather surprising that the only characters that featured in the court's "broad picture" were just the applicant and the respondent – Pfizer and Cipla. The court appears to have been more concerned about the importance of ensuring that Pfizer is able to recoup the money it spent on research and development. While it is fair for pharmaceutical companies to seek to recoup their investment in producing new drugs, the approach adopted by the court completely ignores other important characters like poor patients who might not be able to afford to pay for Norvasc sold by Pfizer but who might be able to afford Nortwin sold by Cipla. In other words, the court should have considered the potential impact that Pfizer's patent rights could have on the enjoyment of the right to health by poor patients in South Africa.

In a latter case, *Aventis v. Cipla*,¹⁷⁴ the dispute involved a patent for "New Taxoid-Based Compositions" that belonged to Aventis and which covered claims for compositions containing "Taxane" derivatives including the Taxane derivative known as "docetaxel".¹⁷⁵ Taxane derivatives such as docetaxel are used as chemotherapy treatments for a number of cancers.¹⁷⁶ Aventis was seeking an interim interdict against Cipla because in March 2011, Aventis discovered that Cipla was about to import into South Africa two products made in India, "Cipla Docetaxel" and "Cipla Docetaxel solvent", which when mixed with the relevant product will constitute an infringement of the patent belonging to Aventis.¹⁷⁷ Cipla's intention was to distribute and sell the two products in South Africa to oncologists and other healthcare professionals involved in the treatment of cancer.¹⁷⁸ Aventis therefore brought an application for an interdict to prohibit the respondents from mixing the Cipla products and an interdict to

¹⁷⁰ *Pfizer Ltd. v. Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd.* (2005) BIP 1; [2005] ZACCP 1.

¹⁷¹ *Pfizer v. Cipla*, 2.

¹⁷² *Pfizer v. Cipla*, 2.

¹⁷³ *Pfizer v. Cipla*, 22.

¹⁷⁴ *Aventis v. Cipla*, (Court of the Commissioner of Patents, Unreported Case No. P93/8936, Judgment delivered on 20 October 2011).

¹⁷⁵ *Aventis v. Cipla*, para 2.

¹⁷⁶ *Aventis v. Cipla*, para 2.

¹⁷⁷ *Aventis v. Cipla*, para 3.

¹⁷⁸ *Aventis v. Cipla*, para 3.

prohibit the respondents from selling the products to any person who will mix the products in accordance with the patent.¹⁷⁹ The interim interdict was refused because the Commissioner of Patents was of the view that the applicants' prospect of success at a full trial was slender.¹⁸⁰

Aventis however appealed to the South African Supreme Court of Appeal¹⁸¹ and the decision of the Commissioner of Patents was overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeal. With regard to Aventis' request for an interim interdict, the appellate court agreed with the arguments of the *amicus curiae*, Treatment Action Campaign, that the public interest cannot be ignored when deciding whether or not to issue an interim interdict.¹⁸² The NGO based its opposition to the grant of an interim interdict on the right to health guaranteed in section 27(1) of the South African Constitution and urged the appellate court to construe the Patents Act "through the prism of the Constitution" and in a way that appropriately balances the rights of a patentee against the constitutional rights of others.¹⁸³

The appellate court was however of the view that construing the Patents Act through the prism of the Constitution does not necessarily mean that Aventis should be denied the right to enforce its patent.¹⁸⁴ In its consideration of the balance of convenience and the public interest, the court noted that there was no suggestion that Aventis was not able to meet the demand for the patented drug nor could it be said that Cipla's version of the drug offered superior medicinal benefits.¹⁸⁵ The court further noted that there would be no material disruption to patients if an interdict was granted.¹⁸⁶ The court was not swayed by the argument that an interdict would adversely affect patients that could not afford Aventis's drug. According to the court, "[w]here the public is denied access to a generic [drug] during the lifetime of a patent, that is the ordinary consequence of patent protection, and it applies as much in all cases. To refuse an interdict only so as to frustrate the patentee's lawful monopoly seems to ... be an abuse of the discretionary powers of a court".¹⁸⁷

What can be deduced from this approach is that, while the court was willing to consider the public interest and the rights of patients, it was equally reluctant to allow these interests and rights to trump the monopoly rights of patentees. In essence, the court was willing to hold that the denial of access to generic drugs should be considered as part of the price the society pays for securing monopoly rights through the grant of patents. The court did not however attempt to consider whether the right to health could take precedence over patent rights in certain cases. This is probably because it was unnecessary to do so in this particular case. Based on the facts presented before the court, there would be no material prejudice to poor patients if an interim interdict was granted to Aventis. It was established before the court that Aventis was already marketing its own generic version of the patented drug and, more importantly, the patented drug itself was already being sold to the government at a rate which was cheaper than the price of Cipla's generic version.¹⁸⁸ The court therefore held that Aventis' patented drug was "considerably more accessible" to patients dependent on public health care than Cipla's generic version and that "there will be no prejudice at all to those patients, or to the State, if an interdict were to be granted".¹⁸⁹

¹⁷⁹ *Aventis v. Cipla*, para 3.

¹⁸⁰ *Aventis v. Cipla*, para 26.

¹⁸¹ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012] ZASCA 108 (26 July 2012).

¹⁸² *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 46.

¹⁸³ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 44.

¹⁸⁴ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 45.

¹⁸⁵ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 55.

¹⁸⁶ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 55.

¹⁸⁷ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 56.

¹⁸⁸ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 57. Aventis was selling the patented drug to the state at the rate of R680 for 20 mg and R2327 for 80mg while Cipla's generic version was being sold for R1000 and R3500 for 20 mg and 80 mg respectively.

¹⁸⁹ *Aventis v. Cipla* [2012], para 58.

4.3 India

In the case of *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.*,¹⁹⁰ the Delhi High Court refused to grant an injunction sought by Roche against Cipla for the latter's production of "Erloticip" (a generic version of Roche's patented anti-cancer drug known as "Erlotinib"). The Delhi High Court noted that:

[T]he Court cannot be unmindful of the right of the general public to access lifesaving drugs which are available and for which such access would be denied if the injunction were granted ... The degree of harm in such eventuality is absolute; the chances of improvement of life expectancy; even chances of recovery in some cases would be snuffed out altogether, if [an] injunction [were to be] granted ... Another way of viewing it is that if the injunction in the case of a lifesaving drug were to be granted, the Court would in effect be stifling Article 21 [of the Indian Constitution, which provides for the right to life and which forms the bedrock of the right to health in India] so far as those [who] would have or could have access to Erloticip are concerned.¹⁹¹

According to the Delhi High Court, "as between the two competing public interests, that is, the public interest in granting an injunction to affirm a patent during the pendency of an infringement action, as opposed to the public interest in access for people to a lifesaving drug, the balance has to be tilted in favor of the latter".¹⁹² The court observed that the damage that would be suffered by Roche (the patent owner) in this case can be assessed in monetary terms but the "injury to the public which would be deprived of the defendants product, which may lead to shortening of lives of several unknown persons, who are not parties to the suit, and which damage cannot be restituted in monetary terms, is not only uncompensatable, it is irreparable".¹⁹³

The decision of the Delhi High Court in this case was upheld on appeal by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.¹⁹⁴ In concurring with the trial court, the Division Bench held that:

[I]n a country like India where [the] question of general public access to life saving drugs assumes great significance, the adverse impact on such access which the grant of [an] injunction in a case like the instant one is likely to have, would have to be accounted for. [Erloticip] is the Indian equivalent produced by the defendant in India as a generic drug manufacturer. It is priced at Rs. 1600 per tablet. Even if this does not make it inexpensive, the question of [the] greater availability of such [a] drug in the market assumes significance.¹⁹⁵

The case of *Natco v. Bayer*¹⁹⁶ is the first case in India in the post-TRIPS Agreement era where an applicant invoked the relevant provisions of the Indian Patents Act to seek the grant of a compulsory license. The patentee in this case, Bayer, invented a drug called "Sorafenib" and obtained an Indian patent for the drug in 2008. The drug is sold under the trade name "Nexavar", and it is used for the treatment of kidney cancer and liver cancer. The applicant, Natco, an Indian generic drug manufacturer, had initially requested for a voluntary license from Bayer to sell the drug at a cheaper price. Bayer did not grant this request and Natco subsequently applied for a compulsory license. In granting Natco's request for a compulsory license, one of the issues considered by the Indian Controller of Patents was the price at which

¹⁹⁰ *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.*, I.A. 642/2008 in CS(OS) 89/2008 (Delhi High Court, 19 March 2008).

¹⁹¹ *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.*, para 85.

¹⁹² *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.*, para 86.

¹⁹³ *Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.*, para 86.

¹⁹⁴ See, *Roche v. Cipla*, FAO (OS) 188/2008 (Delhi High Court Division Bench, 24 April 2008).

¹⁹⁵ *Roche v. Cipla*, FAO (OS) 188/2008 (Delhi High Court Division Bench, 24 April 2008) para 81.

¹⁹⁶ *Natco v. Bayer*, Compulsory License Application No.1 of 2011, (Decision of the Indian Controller of Patents, 9 March 2012).

the drug was being sold in India. According to section 84(1)(b) of the Indian Patents Act of 2005, one of the grounds for the grant of a compulsory license is that “the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price”.

Natco argued that the price of the drug was “too high and simply unaffordable by the common man making the product inaccessible and out of reach”.¹⁹⁷ According to Natco, a drug that costs Rs. 280,000 per month “will push a large proportion of the population into poverty”.¹⁹⁸ In response, Bayer argued, *inter alia*, that “reasonable” price must mean “reasonable” to the public and the patentee as well, and that “the cost of R&D and the cost of manufacture, both have to be taken into account while determining ‘reasonable affordable price’”.¹⁹⁹ Interestingly, in its arguments, Bayer differentiated between the various categories of people that can constitute the “public”. According to Bayer, the term “public” denotes different sections of the public, i.e., the “rich class”, the “middle class” and the “poor class”.²⁰⁰ Bayer further contended that a blanket compulsory license cannot be granted to sell its drug to all sections of the “public” at the same price.²⁰¹ It can be inferred from Bayer’s arguments that it was cognizant of the fact that the application of differential pricing to the sale of Nexavar within India would ensure that members of the public, especially those who were in the “poor class”, would have access to the drug. However, Bayer did not adopt a system of differential pricing in its sale of Nexavar.

In deciding to grant the compulsory license, the Controller agreed that the drug, being sold at a price of Rs. 280,000 per month, was not reasonably affordable to members of the public.²⁰² The Controller disagreed with Bayer’s argument that “reasonably affordable price” should be construed with reference to both the public and the patentee and held that it has to be construed predominantly with reference to the public.²⁰³ The Controller questioned why Bayer had not engaged in differential pricing based on its argument that the term “public” should be construed as different sections of the public. According to the Controller,

[The] Patentee also submitted that affordable to [the] public is required to be considered as affordable to different classes/sections of [the] public. On this point, I fully agree with the Patentee. I only wonder why the Patentee did not execute this concept by offering differential pricing for different classes/sections of [the] public in India.²⁰⁴

Bayer subsequently lodged an appeal against the decision of the Controller at the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). In March 2013, IPAB issued its final judgment and it dismissed Bayer’s appeal against the grant of the compulsory license.²⁰⁵ IPAB upheld the order of the Controller of Patents though it increased the rate of royalty to be paid by Natco to Bayer from 6 per cent to 7 per cent.²⁰⁶ In its final judgment, IPAB referred to section 83 of the Indian Patents Act which contains the general principles applicable to the working of patented inventions in India. Specifically, section 83(d) provides that patents should not impede the protection of public health. Section 83(g) further states that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the public. IPAB noted that it could not “ignore these markers” in its decision.²⁰⁷

¹⁹⁷ *Natco v. Bayer*, para.11.

¹⁹⁸ *Natco v. Bayer*, *ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Natco v. Bayer*, *ibid.*

²⁰⁰ *Natco v. Bayer*, *ibid.*

²⁰¹ *Natco v. Bayer*, *ibid.*

²⁰² *Natco v. Bayer*, *ibid.*

²⁰³ *Natco v. Bayer*, *ibid.*

²⁰⁴ *Natco v. Bayer*, *ibid.*

²⁰⁵ See, *Bayer v. Union of India & Others*, OA/35/2012/PT/MUM, decision of the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board, (4 March 2013).

²⁰⁶ *Bayer v. Union of India* (2013) para 54.

²⁰⁷ *Bayer v. Union of India* (2013) para 22.

The final decision of IPAB in this case indicates that it was mindful of the need to protect the right to health and the right to have access to medicines. In its judgment, reference was made to the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001.²⁰⁸ The Doha Declaration provides, *inter alia*, that the TRIPS Agreement “does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health ... [and] that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”.²⁰⁹ Importantly, IPAB noted that, under the Doha Declaration, countries “affirmed their full right to use the TRIPS flexibilities ... especially in connection with [their] right to protect public health and in particular, to promote access to medicines for all”.²¹⁰ This led IPAB to the conclusion that the running theme is “public health and access to medicine, a facet of [the] right to life”.²¹¹ IPAB statement, that public health and access to medicine is a facet of the right to life, definitely implies an awareness on the part of IPAB that it was dealing with a matter that involved the right to health.

IPAB therefore held that “the reasonably affordable price necessarily has to be fixed from the view point of the public and the word, ‘afford’ itself indicates whether the public can afford to buy the drug ... and the price definitely is the factor that will determine whether the public will reach out for a particular invention”.²¹² IPAB further held that “the Controller was right in holding that the sales of the drug by the appellant at the price of about [Rs.] 280,000 ... considering the purchasing capacity of the public ... was not reasonably affordable to the public”.²¹³

²⁰⁸ WTO Ministerial Conference, “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2, (14 November 2001).

²⁰⁹ The Doha Declaration, *Ibid.* para.4.

²¹⁰ *Bayer v. Union of India* (2013), para 20.

²¹¹ *Bayer v. Union of India* (2013), para 20.

²¹² *Bayer v. Union of India* (2013), para 40.

²¹³ *Bayer v. Union of India* (2013), para 44. The decision of IPAB in this case was affirmed by the Bombay High Court in 2014. See, *Bayer Corporation v. Union of India and Ors.*, Writ Petition No. 1323 of 2013 (Decision of the Bombay High Court, 15 July 2014). Bayer’s subsequent petition to the Indian Supreme Court for a special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court was dismissed by the Supreme Court. See, *Bayer Corporation v. Union of India & Ors.*, Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) NO(S). 30145/2014 (Decision of the Indian Supreme Court, 12 December 2014).

5 CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that the courts in Kenya, South Africa, and India have interpreted the right to health to include an obligation on the state to provide/facilitate access to medicines. By incorporating the right to health into the adjudication of patent disputes, national courts in developing countries can play a crucial role in improving access to medicines at affordable prices. The incorporation of the right to health into the adjudication of disputes involving pharmaceutical patents does not necessarily imply that patent rights will no longer be recognized and respected, it only means that courts should not permit patent rights to be exercised and enforced in a manner that impedes access to medicines and the enjoyment of the right to health

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S **OUTH** **CENTRE**

International Environment House 2
Chemin de Balexert 7-9
POB 228, 1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland

Telephone: (41) 022 791 8050
E-mail: south@southcentre.int

Website:
<http://www.southcentre.int>

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