

MC14 in Yaoundé: Mapping of Member Submissions on WTO Reform

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A Reference Note on Member and Group Submissions on WTO Reform, 19 March 2026

Introduction

This paper maps written submissions on WTO reform circulated to the General Council between May 2024 and March 2026. It is intended to assist Members and trade negotiators in understanding the views of other Members and negotiating groups ahead of the Fourteenth Ministerial Conference (MC14) in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

For each theme, the paper provides a table setting out the position of each Member or Group as stated in their submissions, followed by a table presenting different positions among Members on key issues.¹ Section 10 compares the two draft Ministerial Decision texts tabled by the EU and Paraguay. Section 11 provides a consolidated cross-cutting overview of where submissions converge and where they diverge across the issues covered. The paper does not express any view on the positions mapped. It is a factual reference tool based solely on the submissions listed below.

The positions mapped are drawn directly from the submissions listed. Any errors in their representation are the author's own.

Submissions Covered

Document	Title	Proponent	Date
WT/GC/W/932/Rev.1	Preserving the Current Practice of Consensus-Based Decision-Making in the WTO	ACP Group and African Group	May 2024
WT/GC/W/971	WTO Reform	African Group	October 2025
WT/GC/W/975	Fundamentals for WTO Reform	ACP Group	November 2025
WT/GC/W/979	LDC Group Priorities at the World Trade Organization	LDC Group	December 2025
WT/GC/W/982	Concerns on the Proposal Seeking Incorporation of the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement	India	December 2025
WT/GC/W/984	On WTO Reform	United States	December 2025
WT/GC/W/986	EU Submission on WTO Reform	European Union	January 2026
WT/GC/W/987	WTO Reform Considerations	Paraguay	February 2026
WT/GC/W/989	China's Position Paper on WTO Reform under the Current Circumstances	China	February 2026
WT/GC/W/992	WTO Reform: Development-Centred Priorities for a Balanced WTO	African Group	March 2026
WT/GC/W/993	More Relevant, More Flexible, More Accessible	United Kingdom	March 2026
RD/GC/49	WTO Reform (Draft Ministerial Decision)	Paraguay (Room Document)	March 2026

¹ The tables group positions as Position A, Position B and Middle Ground. These groupings are intended to ease comparison by showing the contrasts between different positions on particular issues. They do not imply any judgment of the positions presented.

1. Decision-Making and Consensus

The question of how the WTO makes decisions is addressed in several submissions. Some submissions argue that equating consensus with unanimity has produced paralysis and must be reformed. Other submissions insist that the Marrakesh Agreement provides for unqualified consensus that cannot be diluted, and that any modification would depart from existing treaty rights.

1.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975)	Strongly supports unqualified consensus. Reaffirms May 2024 ACP/African Group communication (WT/GC/W/932). Agenda-setting, identification of solutions and all decisions must be consensus-based. Warns against institutionalizing informal or selective participation.
ACP Group and African Group (WT/GC/W/932/Rev.1)	The Marrakesh Agreement provides for unqualified consensus, not 'responsible', 'constructive' or 'flexible' consensus. Consensus protects smallest and poorest Members from power dynamics. Any modification is a non-negotiable red line. Calls for trust-building instead of altering the status quo.
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	Consensus is a foundational feature of WTO legitimacy and the only safeguard against fragmentation. Opposes any proposal to introduce 'consensus minus one' or weighting criteria based on market share. Open to exploring structured deadlock-breaking tools such as mediation, facilitated discussions and escalation to capitals while preserving consensus. Requires full internal transparency in any small-group process.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement must be maintained. Decision-making must build on the success of consensus. LDCs must be included in agenda-setting and all decision-making. Improvements to notification and implementation obligations must not introduce punitive measures or burdens on LDCs.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	Supports the consensus principle. Open to agile decision-making at different speeds with 'balanced and inclusive guardrails'. Supports flexible plurilateral initiatives provided they respect consensus and include inclusive governance. Advocates a 'middle way' between moving all together and not moving at all.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	Equating consensus with unanimity has resulted in paralysis. Supports operationalizing 'responsible consensus', a distinction already reflected in Art. IX of the Marrakesh Agreement. Proposes exploring constructive abstention, opt-outs, reservations and raising the political cost of blocking. Supports differentiated procedures for day-to-day activities versus substantive decisions. Proposes a smaller steering body under the General Council.

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	Consensus is being conflated with unanimity and is being abused to block progress. Supports exploring opt-outs, silence procedures and escalation to Ministers. Supports examining rules requiring consensus on administrative matters such as appointment of committee chairs. Will not accept unjustifiable blocking of plurilateral progress.
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	No obligation should be imposed without a Member's consent. However, Members that are willing to consent to new obligations must be able to forge agreements among themselves. Blocking of the plurilateral path is a serious problem for WTO viability. Multilateral agreements on substantive new issues are very unlikely; the plurilateral path may be the only viable negotiating future for the WTO.
Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987)	Consensus gives decisions legitimacy and authority. Voting models from other international organizations would not necessarily produce better results at the WTO. Cautions against non-binding instruments that deviate from the member-driven model. Supports greater transparency and constructive dialogue.
India (WT/GC/W/982)	Consensus is foundational. The WTO's built-in objective of an 'integrated' system requires any deviation to take place only with the consensus of the Membership. Uses the IFD/plurilateral case to argue that Joint Statement Initiatives without a multilateral mandate violate the consensus principle and fragment the system.

1.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Definition of consensus	EU, UK, US: Equating consensus with unanimity is an abuse; responsible consensus and opt-outs are already permitted under Art. IX	ACP, African Group, India: The Marrakesh Agreement provides for unqualified consensus; any qualification departs from treaty rights	China, Paraguay: Support the consensus principle while acknowledging the need for tools to build convergence; cautious about formal changes to the treaty framework
Plurilateral path and blocking	US, UK, EU: The path to plurilaterals must be unblocked; IFD and e-commerce agreements should proceed; JSIs are a valid route	India, African Group, ACP: JSIs lack multilateral mandate; they erode the single undertaking, create a multi-tier system; Annex 4 addition requires full consensus under Art. X:9	China: Flexible plurilaterals with balanced, inclusive guardrails. Paraguay: Clearer rules needed on minimum membership thresholds and mechanisms for avoiding competing initiatives
Smaller consultative or steering body	EU: Proposes a smaller body with steering and consultative function to assist the General Council with bridge-building	Paraguay, African Group: Small groups with decision-making powers would undermine legitimacy and benefit only large delegations with capacity to participate	UK: Supports inclusive, transparent processes. LDC Group: Access to documents and listening rooms with simultaneous interpretation must be ensured in any smaller format
Silence procedures and opt-outs	EU, UK: Explore constructive abstention and opt-outs as tools to facilitate decision-making progress	ACP, African Group: Such mechanisms alter status-quo treaty rights and undermine the multilateral character of the WTO	China: Open to flexible approaches with guardrails. Paraguay: Trust must come first, through transparency and inclusive processes
SUMMARY	The ACP Group and African Group submissions oppose any qualification of consensus. The EU, UK and US submissions argue the plurilateral path must be unblocked, though they propose different mechanisms. China's submission supports flexible plurilateralism with inclusive guardrails. Paraguay's submission supports preserving consensus while remaining open to transparency improvements.		

2. Special and Differential Treatment

SDT is simultaneously a legal framework issue, a development instrument and a political battleground. The UK's submission states that over 75 per cent of Members have access to SDT, including some of the world's largest economies, and argues this has become a systemic distortion. The EU and US submissions make a similar argument without citing the same figure. Developing Members and LDCs defend SDT as a treaty-embedded right essential to their ability to industrialise and integrate into the global economy on their own terms.

2.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975)	SDT must be operationalized, not just best-endeavour clauses, but integral to every Agreement. Needs capacity building and Aid for Trade. Welcomes voluntary opt-out approach by those who do not need SDT, but opt-outs must not create a precedent or obligation for others. Objects to 'reverse SDT' for developed countries.
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	SDT is a treaty-embedded right to be strengthened, not diluted. Firmly rejects forced graduation based on arbitrary income criteria. Calls for resolving long-standing Agreement-Specific Proposals (ASPs). OECD membership and World Bank income measures are inadequate eligibility proxies as they do not reflect structural vulnerabilities. Advocates calibrated flexibilities for commodity-dependent economies.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	Fundamental LDC rules under Art. XI:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement must be preserved. Supports progress on outstanding ASPs covering SPS and TRIPS Art. 66.2. Calls for a permanent TRIPS non-violation moratorium. Smooth transition provisions for LDC graduates must be extended and strengthened. Notification and implementation obligations must not be punitive for LDCs.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	Supports more precise and effective implementation of SDT to facilitate developing-country integration. Open to voluntary opt-outs as one tool within that framework.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	SDT is a tool, not an objective in itself. It should be targeted, time-bound and aimed at an eventual path to common rules. Supports granular, needs-based approaches and objective differentiation criteria. Lessons from the Trade Facilitation Agreement, linking implementation to assistance, should be applied more broadly. Open-ended exemptions can be counterproductive.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	Over 75 per cent of Members have access to SDT, including some of the world's largest economies. Calls for Members to voluntarily opt out of SDT and to make opt-outs legally binding, captured in a register. Supports a case-by-case, agreement-by-agreement approach to provide greater concessions for those who need them most.

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	SDT eligibility must be reformed for WTO credibility. It is substantively and politically unacceptable for large traders to benefit from preferential treatment in perpetuity. SDT should function as a transition tool toward the same rules for all Members in a timely manner. The past decade has seen too many proposals seeking broad exemptions.
Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987)	The current self-classification system without objective criteria makes consensus on new rules impossible. Widespread exclusions prevent multilateral progress. SDT must be needs-based, precise, effective and operational. The lack of granularity creates new inequalities between developing countries with very different capacities.

2.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Self-designation versus objective criteria	US, EU, UK, Paraguay: Objective and transparent criteria are needed; self-designation undermines credibility; large emerging economies should not self-designate as developing	African Group, ACP, LDC Group: Graduation based on arbitrary income criteria is unacceptable; structural vulnerabilities are not captured by income measures; SDT is a treaty-based right	China: Supports more precise and effective implementation; open to voluntary opt-outs as a practical path forward
Time-bound versus permanent SDT	EU, UK, US: SDT must be time-bound with a path to common rules; open-ended exemptions are counterproductive and reduce developing country leverage	African Group, ACP: SDT is a treaty-embedded right linked to development level; time-limits imposed without agreed graduation criteria are unacceptable	China, Paraguay: Effectiveness and operationalization need improvement; voluntary opt-outs offer a middle path without changing the treaty framework
Graduation and differentiation among developing countries	US, EU, UK: Differentiation between developing Members, for example between LDCs and large emerging economies, is necessary for the credibility of the system	African Group: Firmly rejects forced graduation; OECD or World Bank income criteria are inadequate proxies for trade-related development challenges	ACP: Supports voluntary opt-outs by those who determine they no longer need SDT, without creating a precedent for others. Paraguay: Granularity is needed but must be negotiated
Resolution of existing SDT Agreement-Specific Proposals	African Group, ACP, LDC Group: Long-standing ASPs must be resolved; they have been on the table for decades without result	Not explicitly opposed, but de facto stalled; no Member has formally blocked while none has moved to conclude	China: Resolving existing ASPs is part of the development pillar. LDC Group: Calls for progress at MC14 as a baseline
SUMMARY	The ACP Group submission welcomes voluntary opt-outs by Members who determine they no longer need SDT, provided this does not create a precedent or obligation for others. The LDC Group submission calls for the preservation of fundamental LDC-specific provisions under Art. XI:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement; no submission has formally challenged this position. The central area of disagreement is the treatment of large emerging economies and the criteria for differentiation among developing Members.		

3. Dispute Settlement Reform

There is near-universal agreement among developing Members and most developed Members that restoring a fully functional two-tier dispute settlement system, including a functioning Appellate Body, is essential. The principal outlier is the United States, which has objections to the Appellate Body in its previous form and has effectively linked its non-restoration to broader concerns about non-market economic practices and the essential security exception. The EU's draft decision text includes a footnote conditioning resumption of dispute settlement discussions on progress in broader WTO reform.

3.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975)	Paralysis from the absent Appellate Body disproportionately harms developing countries that rely on international law to assert their rights. WTO reform must prioritise the restoration of an independent, fully functional, two-tier binding dispute settlement system accessible to all Members, especially those with limited resources.
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	Re-establishing a two-tier dispute settlement system with a functioning Appellate Body is a top MC14 priority. Without it, smaller economies are unprotected against unilateral actions by major powers. Reform must include strengthened deliberation, transparency and credible dispute settlement to address industrial policy and security-driven spillovers.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	A fully functional two-tier dispute settlement system accessible to all Members is a top priority. Recent trade turbulence exposed the vulnerability of LDCs to global power dynamics. Discussions have been at a standstill for a year. Calls for resumption post-MC14 with a Ministerial Mandate as soon as possible.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	Dispute settlement reform must restore a fully and well-functioning system accessible to all Members as an anchor for stability and predictability. Appellate Body paralysis is one of the WTO's three core problems. MFN abuse and security exceptions further erode the foundation of the rules-based system.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	A reformed WTO must be underpinned by fully functioning and effective dispute settlement. A robust dispute mechanism allows all Members regardless of size to challenge trade practices. The EU proposes linking dispute settlement reform discussions to progress on broader WTO reform.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	A fully functioning dispute settlement system is essential to enforce accountability. Without it the value of the WTO is fundamentally undermined. Calls for full restoration as part of the reform exercise.
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	The WTO Appellate Body inappropriately restricted Members' ability to counter non-market economic distortions. Disputes take years and harm is suffered long before resolution. Favours a self-judging essential security exception and

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
	objects to panels second-guessing sovereign security decisions. No timeline or commitment to restore the AB in its current form is offered.
Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987)	A binding dispute settlement system is essential. Without enforcement, formulating new regulations lacks real value. Calls for a well-functioning DSB accessible to all Members that provides the predictability necessary for effective compliance with WTO rules.

3.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Restoration of the Appellate Body	ACP, African Group, LDC Group, China, EU, UK, Paraguay: Strong convergence that a two-tier binding system must be restored; it is the top priority for most developing Members	US: No commitment to restore the AB in its current form; the AB overreached by constraining Members' ability to counter non-market economic practices	EU: Links progress on dispute settlement to broader reform progress; LDC Group: Calls for a Ministerial mandate to resume talks post-MC14 with a clear timeline
Essential security exception	US: Each country has the sovereign right to determine its own essential security actions; WTO panels must not second-guess those determinations	China, African Group: Abuse of security exceptions is eroding the MFN foundation; increasing use of national security provisions to justify protectionist measures must be strictly regulated by the multilateral system	UK: Recognises that live discussions are ongoing and seeks a way forward satisfactory to all Members
SUMMARY	The African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group submissions identify restoration of a two-tier dispute settlement system as a top priority for MC14. The US submission raises objections to the Appellate Body in its previous form and does not commit to its restoration. The EU draft decision includes a footnote conditioning resumption of dispute settlement discussions on progress in broader WTO reform.		

4. Level Playing Field and Fairness

Fairness is invoked by nearly every Member, but the concept is understood very differently. For developed Members, particularly the US, EU and UK, unfairness is primarily about non-market economic practices, subsidies and overcapacity attributed to a specific large trading economy. For developing Members and LDCs, the original unfairness lies in asymmetric Uruguay Round outcomes, particularly in agriculture, where developed countries secured the right to large-scale domestic support while developing countries' flexibility was constrained.

4.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	A level playing field cannot mean tightening disciplines on those with limited fiscal capacity while leaving intact the instruments and exceptions used by major economies. Demands a permanent solution for public stockholding for food security and an effective special safeguard mechanism. Agriculture is central and the imbalance between developed-country large-scale support and the narrower space available to developing countries must be corrected.
ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975)	Fairness means confronting structural imbalances dating from the Uruguay Round in agriculture subsidies, fisheries subsidies and industrial goods. Larger economies are expected to show greater responsibility given asymmetries in the membership. Calls for equity in Agreement on Agriculture obligations. Fairness must also encompass access to markets, technology and finance.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	Fairness is a broad concept that cannot be judged by one-sided narratives or measured by market share and trade balance alone. Domestic reform is necessary to unleash competitiveness; blaming foreign competition deflects from that need. Open to transparency improvements and updating the ASCM, but with due regard to development needs and policy space for industrial development.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	Negative spillovers from State interventions, overcapacity and non-commercial SOE behaviour are core problems. Calls for review and update of the ASCM covering transparency, stronger disciplines against the most distortive subsidies and more effective remedies. Supports a balance between rule effectiveness and policy space for industrialisation.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	The playing field is not level and rules on market-distorting practices have failed to keep pace. Calls for reform targeting harmful distorting practices, focusing on the negative external effects of government support, incentivising transparency and modernising trade remedy tools. Preserves MFN as a core principle but acknowledges pressure to revisit it in the level playing field context.
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	The MFN principle was designed for an era of converging economies and is now unsuitable. Single-country overcapacity and overconcentration in key sectors including steel and electronics represents the greatest systemic problem. WTO committees and dispute settlement have failed to address this. Calls for action inside and outside the

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
	WTO. The US goods trade deficit of USD 1.2 trillion in 2024 is described as absurd and unsustainable and as an amount that cannot reasonably be explained as the result of real comparative advantage.
Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987)	Agriculture reform is the main pending issue. Distorted measures prohibited in other sectors continue to be permitted in agriculture. Developed-country domestic support and high protection persist. Urgently calls for removing the most distorting domestic support and reducing tariff peaks, escalation, agricultural safeguards and TRQs. True fairness at the WTO is not possible without agriculture reform.

4.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Source of unfairness	US, EU, UK: Non-market practices, State-owned enterprises, subsidies and overcapacity by specific major economies are the core problem	African Group, ACP: Unfairness is rooted in historically asymmetric Uruguay Round outcomes, especially in agriculture. China: Fairness cannot be judged by market share or trade balance; blaming foreign competition deflects from domestic reform needs	Paraguay: Both dimensions are real; agriculture reform and industrial subsidy disciplines need to be addressed together rather than sequenced
Updating the ASCM and industrial policy disciplines	EU, UK, US: Updated rules are needed on transparency, disciplines against the most distortive subsidies, SOEs and effective remedies	China, African Group: Any new disciplines must respect development needs and policy space for industrialisation; African Group calls for calibrated flexibilities for strategic industries and SMEs	ACP: Developed countries should make voluntary commitments on trade-distorting subsidies while deliberations on new multilateral rules continue
Role of the MFN principle	US: MFN is unsuitable for an era of divergence; it prevents welfare-enhancing bilateral liberalisation; the Enabling Clause already set a precedent for differentiation among Members	China: MFN is the bedrock of the WTO and must remain so; 72 per cent of world goods trade still operates on MFN terms	UK: Preserves the core of MFN but is ready to engage on the level playing field discussion, including its relationship to the MFN principle
SUMMARY	The EU, UK and US submissions focus on non-market economic practices, subsidies and overcapacity as the core problem. The African Group, ACP Group and Paraguay submissions locate the original unfairness in asymmetric Uruguay Round outcomes, particularly in agriculture. The US submission does not identify agriculture as part of the fairness agenda.		

5. Agriculture

Agriculture remains the most politically loaded unfinished business from the Uruguay Round and is directly connected to food security, rural livelihoods and the credibility of the development bargain. Most developing Members and LDCs treat agriculture reform as a pre-condition for any credible level playing field outcome. Despite over two decades of mandated negotiations under Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, substantive progress has been elusive.

5.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	A permanent solution for public stockholding for food security (PSH) and an effective special safeguard mechanism (SSM) to protect African markets from abrupt increases in subsidised imports are essential. The imbalance between developed-country large-scale support and the narrower space available to developing countries to support subsistence farmers must be corrected. Tariff escalation reinforces commodity dependence and acts as a tax on Africa's industrialisation.
ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975)	Structural imbalances in agriculture subsidies and fisheries subsidies dating from the Uruguay Round must be confronted. It is imperative to correct the historical asymmetry whereby support instruments used extensively by developed countries during their industrialisation are now prohibited for developing countries. Reform must offer sufficient policy space for structural transformation.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	Agriculture and food security remain top priorities including cotton, the SSM, public stockholding and trade-distorting domestic support. Urges progress on agriculture negotiations and building on outcomes from previous Ministerial Conferences. Stresses the need to address food security concerns of net food-importing developing countries.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	Discussions on government support measures must maintain flexibility for development policy objectives including industrial development. Empirical approaches should inform rule design. Long-standing issues such as agriculture reform should not be overshadowed by new issues.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	Acknowledges agriculture as part of the overall balance of rights and obligations discussion. Recognises that further work on agriculture commitments was always anticipated as part of successive negotiating rounds.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	Agriculture rules have supported global trade growth but efforts to update them have stalled even as both longstanding and emerging issues are highlighted. Renewed momentum is needed. These discussions should proceed within existing agriculture reform negotiations and any other agreed forum as appropriate.

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	The US paper does not identify agriculture as a reform priority. Its focus is on non-market economic practices, overcapacity and overconcentration of production in manufacturing sectors.
Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987)	Agriculture reform is the single most pressing pending issue in the multilateral trading system. Agricultural markets remain among the most distorted in international trade. Measures found inconsistent with rules-based trade in other sectors continue to be permitted in agriculture. Urgent removal of the most distorting forms of domestic support and elimination of non-ad-valorem tariffs, tariff peaks, escalation, agricultural safeguards and TRQs is essential. True fairness at the WTO is not achievable without this reform.

5.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Permanent solution for public stockholding	African Group, ACP, LDC Group: A permanent PSH solution for food security purposes is a long-standing priority; the absence of a solution leaves developing countries exposed	Not formally opposed by any Member in these communications, but de facto unresolved for over a decade; developed Members have conditioned progress on broader agriculture negotiations	China: Supports development-oriented agriculture reform. UK, EU: Acknowledge agriculture as unfinished business but do not commit to specific outcomes on PSH
Trade-distorting domestic support	African Group, ACP, LDC Group, Paraguay: Developed-country domestic support causes direct harm to developing-country farmers; removal of the most distorting support is a pre-condition for a credible level playing field	US: Does not identify agriculture subsidies as a reform priority; focuses on industrial sector distortions attributed to non-market economies	EU, UK: Acknowledge that agriculture rules need updating; open to resumed negotiations but have not committed to specific reduction commitments
Special Safeguard Mechanism	African Group, LDC Group: An effective SSM is essential to protect developing-country markets from import surges of subsidised products	Not formally opposed, but consistently unresolved; large agricultural exporters have blocked progress in past negotiations	ACP: Calls for policy space and equity in agriculture obligations; links SSM directly to food security and rural livelihood concerns
SUMMARY	The US submission does not identify agriculture as a reform priority. The African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group submissions identify a permanent solution for public stockholding for food security and an effective special safeguard mechanism as specific and long-standing priorities. These asks are reflected in multiple submissions and have not been resolved in previous Ministerial Conferences.		

6. Development

Development sits at the centre of the reform debate for the Global South and is the primary lens through which the African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group assess every proposed reform element. The African Group's framing of development as capability expansion, encompassing industrialisation, diversification and integration into global value chains, represents a substantive agenda that goes beyond traditional SDT discussions.

6.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	Development must be framed as capability expansion covering diversification, value addition and integration into global value chains. Calls for a WTO Development Index integrated into the reform process to shape negotiations and assess Members' obligations. Calls for a review of industrial subsidy rules to enable support for emerging strategic industries and SMEs. Recognition of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a driver of multilateral integration. Technology transfer, including digital and green technologies, is essential.
ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975)	The Marrakesh Agreement recognises that Members are at different levels of development and that flexibilities to industrialise and diversify are essential. Developed countries should not benefit from 'reverse SDT'. Larger economies are expected to show more responsibility given asymmetries. Fairness must include access to markets, technology and finance.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	Aid for Trade flows are declining at a time of rising development needs; reversing this trend is vital. The Enhanced Integrated Framework is the only multilateral programme dedicated to LDCs and must be funded adequately. Calls for renewed, targeted assistance, capacity building and technology transfer. Climate measures must not restrict LDC market access or serve as disguised trade barriers.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	Development dimensions must be placed at the centre of WTO reform. Digital and green transitions are key opportunities for developing Members. Expanding trade in these areas requires new international rules that foster a conducive trading environment. SDT and policy space must be maintained as tools for development.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	Developing countries have had different experiences of global integration; a one-size-fits-all approach has limits. Fact-based, pragmatic approaches are needed. Developing country share of global exports doubled since 1995, showing the positive role of rules-based trade. Supports investment promotion as a development driver.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	LDCs and small developing countries must be prioritised. Calls for a strategic review of WTO technical assistance noting that Trust Funds are increasing in number while funding levels are declining. Supports building on 'reform by doing' initiatives for transparency and inclusivity throughout WTO processes.

6.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Development as a primary pillar versus a sub-topic	African Group, ACP, LDC Group: Development must be a primary, standalone pillar in any post-MC14 reform work programme, not a sub-item under fairness or any other track	EU: Frames development as one of three sub-topics under the 'Fairness' track in its proposed work programme	China: Supports development dimensions at the centre of reform. Paraguay: Does not pre-specify topics but its draft decision ensures developing country representation among co-facilitators
WTO Development Index	African Group: A WTO Development Index should be integrated into reform discussions as a legal and institutional tool to ensure trade-led development objectives are measurable and tracked	No formal opposition, but no other Member has endorsed this proposal in the communications reviewed	ACP: Supports evidence-based discussions on development outcomes. LDC Group: Calls for measurable results in Aid for Trade aligned with LDC priorities
Aid for Trade and capacity building	LDC Group, ACP, African Group: Adequate and predictable financing for technical assistance and capacity building is essential; current levels are declining while needs are rising	No formal opposition, but donor Members have not committed to increased Aid for Trade volumes in these communications	UK: Supports a strategic review of technical assistance. China: Capacity building and aid for trade are important tools alongside SDT
Technology transfer	African Group, LDC Group: Technology transfer provisions must be operationalised for digital and green technologies; the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology should be reinvigorated; progress should be submitted to Ministerial Conferences	Not explicitly opposed, but consistently undelivered; no concrete commitments in these communications from developed Members	China: Digital and green transitions require new international rules that support technology access for developing Members
SUMMARY	The African Group submission proposes a WTO Development Index to be integrated into the reform process. No other submission reviewed has formally responded to this proposal. The African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group submissions insist that development must be treated as a primary pillar in any post-MC14 work programme. The LDC Group submission notes that Aid for Trade flows are declining at a time of rising development needs.		

7. Emerging and New Issues

Emerging issues including digital trade, artificial intelligence, climate-related trade measures and economic security have become central to reform discussions. However, the manner in which they are introduced is as contested as the substance. For developing Members, these issues are welcome in principle but must not displace unresolved development priorities. For developed Members, particularly the EU and UK, the absence of multilateral rules in these areas is itself a driver of WTO irrelevance.

7.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	Emerging issues such as digital trade, AI and climate change must be approached through a development lens. They must not overshadow or divert attention from unresolved development priorities. Digital trade and AI must prioritise inclusion, technology access and policy space for Africa's industrialisation. Climate trade measures must avoid protectionism, reflect common but differentiated responsibilities and support green industrialisation. Carbon border adjustment mechanisms pose major new challenges to African exports without adequate technological or financial compensation. Africa risks digital marginalisation if e-commerce regulations do not guarantee data sovereignty.
ACP Group (WT/GC/W/975)	Unilateral climate policies such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms pose major challenges to developing-country exports. Addressing trade-related climate measures must be consistent with varying development levels and aligned with the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). All Members must be able to effectively participate in and benefit from sustainable trade practices.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	LDCs bear the heaviest impacts of the climate crisis despite contributing very little to global greenhouse gas emissions. Trade-related climate measures must not restrict LDC market access or serve as disguised barriers and must remain consistent with WTO rules and CBDR. Calls for a permanent e-commerce moratorium extension and continuation of the e-commerce work programme with attention to the development dimension. LDC own standards for bio-friendly and climate-friendly practices should be taken into account.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	Digital and green transitions are opportunities to unlock development potential and expanding trade in these areas requires new international rules. Supports the continued application of MFN disciplines in digital trade. New issues should be taken forward in a manner that builds mutual understanding and trust.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	Digital trade now accounts for approximately 25 per cent of global trade but there are no permanent multilateral rules. Climate-related measures with trade implications are rising; transparency principles and guidelines on interoperability

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
	are critical. Services trade has grown substantially since GATS was agreed. The EU submission calls for revisiting services commitments to reflect their central role in the global economy.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	Calls for a permanent e-commerce moratorium; incorporation of the Agreement on Electronic Commerce; the start of a second phase of e-commerce negotiations; and the creation of a dedicated Digital Committee. Multilateral trade must play a role in addressing climate change. Principles and guidelines on transparency of trade-related climate measures are critical. Acknowledges Members are divided on the urgency of these issues and the role of the WTO in tackling them.
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	The WTO has no competence on security matters including economic security. Discussions on economic security require trust, confidentiality and shared interests that cannot be achieved in a 166-member organisation. The WTO's longstanding bias toward trade liberalisation over resilience makes it unsuitable for supply chain work. The Secretariat's comments discouraging friend-shoring reflect that the organisation is out of its depth on security-related matters.

7.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
E-commerce and digital trade	EU, UK: Permanent rules are urgently needed; the Agreement on Electronic Commerce and a moratorium on customs duties should be formalised; a Digital Committee should be created	African Group, LDC Group: Digital trade rules must guarantee data sovereignty, overcome the digital divide and include a robust development dimension; new rules must not disadvantage developing Members	China: Digital transition is an opportunity; new international rules should foster a conducive trading environment. ACP: CBDR-RC principles must apply to digital trade governance
Climate measures and the WTO	EU, UK: Transparency principles and guidelines on interoperability for trade-related climate measures are critical; the WTO has an important role in facilitating the net-zero transition	African Group, ACP, LDC Group: Unilateral climate policies such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms damage developing-country exports; measures must reflect CBDR-RC and must not serve as disguised protectionism	China: Climate challenges should be managed through multilateral cooperation, not unilateralism; any disciplines must respect Members' distinct development stages
Economic security and supply chain resilience	US: These are sovereign matters requiring trust and confidentiality unsuitable for a 166-member forum; the WTO cannot address them	African Group: The growing resort to national security measures creates asymmetry and must be regulated by the multilateral system to prevent arbitrary protectionist decisions	UK: Acknowledges live discussions on WTO security exceptions; seeks a way forward satisfactory to all Members. China: Abuse of security exceptions must not be allowed to erode MFN disciplines
SUMMARY	The EU and UK submissions call for permanent rules on digital trade and incorporation of the Agreement on Electronic Commerce. The African Group and LDC Group submissions raise concerns about the development dimension of digital trade governance including data sovereignty and the digital divide. The African Group and ACP Group submissions identify carbon border adjustment mechanisms as a concern for developing-country exports. The US submission states that economic security and supply chain resilience are outside WTO competence.		

8. Transparency and Notifications

Transparency and notification compliance are areas where there is shared diagnosis but sharp disagreement on remedies. All Members acknowledge that notification compliance is poor and that this undermines the committee-based monitoring function of the WTO. The divide is between those who want accountability measures and incentive structures, including consequences for chronic non-compliers, and those who insist that capacity constraints must be addressed before any punitive approach is considered.

8.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	Transparency rules and notification obligations must be observed and respected. Reforms to notification and monitoring systems should avoid placing undue additional obligations on developing and LDC Members. Any improvements to governance must institutionalise inclusivity and enhance transparency so all Members participate equally.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	Many WTO documents are restricted without compelling reason, creating challenges for access within LDC governments. Existing procedures for circulation and derestriction of documents agreed by the General Council in 2002 need to be updated. Improvements to notification and implementation obligations must not introduce punitive measures or additional burdens for LDCs. Listening rooms with simultaneous interpretation must be set up for meetings limited in delegation size.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	More transparency and better notification compliance are needed, including through updated ASCM transparency provisions. Transparency must build mutual understanding and trust rather than serve as a tool for pressure. Supports member-led dialogues as part of 'reform by action'.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	Compliance with existing notification obligations is poor and the current transparency regime contains too few incentives to notify. Notified measures should enjoy better treatment than non-notified measures. The WTO's monitoring and transparency functions through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and committee work are critical. Reform should provide real incentives for compliance.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	The WTO's track record on notifications is poor; the latest reports from September 2025 show that 113 Members had yet to submit 2025 subsidy notifications. Revamping Trade Policy Reviews could hold Members to account through increased scrutiny. The Secretariat has a role in assisting Members to fulfil their transparency and notification obligations.
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	Transparency is critical but chronic and widespread non-compliance with notification obligations undermines trust. The US has proposed administrative measures to hold accountable those Members that chronically do not adhere to notification obligations without capacity constraints. Counter-notifications in committees have had no discernible impact

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
	on certain Members' lack of transparency. The Secretariat's role must be strictly administrative and neutral; it must not influence agendas or advocate for specific outcomes.
Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987)	The neutrality and impartiality of the Secretariat must be ensured through institutional safeguards. The Secretariat's external relations with other agencies, the private sector and stakeholders must not be independent of Member scrutiny. Institutional improvements in the functioning of regular bodies facilitate Members' access to information, especially those with limited human resources.

8.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Notification compliance and accountability measures	US, EU, UK: Stronger incentives and accountability measures for notification compliance are needed; preferential treatment for notified measures; administrative consequences for chronic non-compliance	African Group, LDC Group: Improvements to notification obligations must not impose punitive measures or additional burdens on LDCs and developing countries with limited capacity	China: Transparency improvements must build mutual understanding and trust. Paraguay: Members with limited resources must be enabled to access information and participate effectively
Role and remit of the WTO Secretariat	US: The Secretariat's role is strictly administrative; it must not influence the agenda, advocate for specific outcomes or conduct research beyond Member authorisation. Paraguay: Institutional safeguards and budget reform are needed to ensure Member control over Secretariat activities	No Member formally defends expanded Secretariat autonomy, but several communications rely on Secretariat expertise and support for facilitating discussions	UK: Supports an empowered and agile Secretariat guided by a Member-agreed agenda. EU: Monitoring and deliberative functions of WTO bodies are critical and should be enhanced
Document access and derestriction	LDC Group: Restricted documents without compelling reason create access challenges within LDC governments; procedures must be updated. African Group: Full internal transparency in all processes is essential	No formal opposition, but reform of document classification has not been prioritised in the communications of developed Members	ACP: Calls for timely and clear sharing of deliberations, processes and documentation to allow all Members to engage effectively
SUMMARY	The US submission contains the most detailed proposal on notification compliance, including administrative consequences for chronic non-compliance among Members with no capacity constraints. This proposal has not attracted consensus support. The US and Paraguay submissions also raise questions about the role and remit of the Secretariat, framing these as governance issues that extend beyond notification compliance.		

9. Institutional Reform

Institutional reform encompasses the architecture of post-MC14 discussions as well as the longer-term governance structure of the WTO. Questions about the size of deliberative bodies, the role of the Secretariat, the design of work plans and the scheduling of ministerial check-ins all reflect deeper disagreements about who should drive the reform process and in whose interests.

9.1 Member Positions

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
African Group (WT/GC/W/971 and /992)	Procedural reforms must institutionalise inclusivity, enhance transparency and ensure all Members participate equally regardless of power or influence. Processes must guarantee complete internal transparency to avoid small-group meetings that exclude African countries. Overlapping meetings should be avoided to facilitate the participation of smaller delegations.
LDC Group (WT/GC/W/979)	LDCs must be included in agenda-setting and decision-making. For plenaries and small group meetings, listening rooms with simultaneous interpretation in WTO working languages must be provided. Reasonable time must be allotted before adoption of texts for Members to review and consult with capitals. Group Coordinators must be allowed time to consult members and synthesise positions. Accession processes should be faster and fairer for LDCs.
China (WT/GC/W/989)	A work plan for WTO reform should be adopted at MC14. Member-led dialogues and initiatives embodying 'reform by action' should continue and deepen. A structured, progressive and member-driven approach is necessary. The reform should not be limited to a work plan but should also deliver tangible results step by step.
European Union (WT/GC/W/986)	The WTO's institutional set-up derived from the GATT era is ill-equipped for today's large and diverse Membership. Supports developing options for a smaller body with a steering or consultative function to assist the General Council, balancing representativeness, geographical balance and efficiency. Differentiated decision-making practices for procedural aspects from other international organisations offer useful lessons.
United Kingdom (WT/GC/W/993)	A biennial Ministerial Conference is insufficient to drive reform progress. Supports an inclusive and transparent halfway checkpoint for Ministers on WTO reform between MC14 and MC15. The Secretariat should be more empowered and agile, guided by a Member-agreed agenda. Improved coordination with the World Bank, IMF and other international bodies is needed.
United States (WT/GC/W/984)	The Secretariat has overstepped its role by seeking to influence the agenda, advocating for specific outcomes, issuing communications that step beyond neutral administration and conducting research not authorised by Members. The

Member / Group	Position and Key Asks
	Secretariat must be transparent, objective, neutral, fiscally disciplined and guided by Members. These concerns must be addressed as part of any serious reform effort.
Paraguay (WT/GC/W/987)	Creating new structures with decision-making powers that limit Member participation would undermine the legitimacy of any process and would only benefit large delegations. This has been observed in other international organisations. Small groups may be useful for consultation provided adequate transparency mechanisms are in place for all Members to follow discussions. Four co-facilitators representing different development levels should lead post-MC14 reform discussions under the General Council.

9.2 Positions on Key Issues

Issue	Position A	Position B	Middle Ground / Nuanced Positions
Smaller steering body or consultative group under the General Council	EU: A smaller body would improve bridge-building and outcome-oriented decision-making; similar bodies in other organisations offer useful models	Paraguay, African Group, LDC Group: New structures with decision-making powers limit participation and legitimacy; only large delegations with resources can effectively access such spaces; this has failed in other international organisations	UK: Supports political check-ins between Ministerials. China: Supports structured, member-driven processes with tangible step-by-step results
Secretariat role and neutrality	US, Paraguay: The Secretariat must be strictly administrative and neutral; institutional safeguards and Member oversight of Secretariat activities are needed	Not formally opposed, but several Members rely on Secretariat support and technical expertise as an enabler of reform discussions	UK: Supports an empowered but Member-guided Secretariat. EU: Monitoring and deliberative functions should be enhanced within the existing mandate
MC14 work plan design	EU, UK: A concrete, substantive work plan with named topics and tracks should be adopted at MC14 to provide direction and ambition	Paraguay, African Group, ACP: A work plan should not pre-specify topics on which there is no consensus; topics must be identified through Member submissions after MC14	China: Supports a structured, progressive and member-driven work plan adopted at MC14. LDC Group: Development and SDT principles must not be undermined in any work plan design
SUMMARY	The Paraguay draft decision proposes four co-facilitators representing different development levels and open-ended working groups whose topics are determined by Members after MC14. The EU draft decision proposes dedicated facilitators per track appointed by the GC Chair, with pre-specified thematic areas. Submissions from the African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group indicate that pre-specification of topics and facilitator appointment processes are substantive decisions that require consensus among Members.		

10. Comparison of Draft Ministerial Decision Texts

Two Members have tabled draft Ministerial Decision texts ahead of MC14. The European Union tabled a text as an Annex to WT/GC/W/986, and Paraguay tabled a text as an Annex to WT/GC/W/987, with a revised version circulated as informal room document RD/GC/49. These represent the most concrete attempts to articulate a post-MC14 reform mandate and provide the clearest indication of where the key architectural choices lie. The table below maps the key elements of each text against the positions of other Members.

Element	EU Draft (WT/GC/W/986 Annex)	Paraguay Draft (WT/GC/W/987 Annex / RD/GC/49)	Alignment with Other Members
Framing and purpose	Deep and comprehensive reform; MC14 is a 'Reform Ministerial' and a stepping stone. The work programme is explicitly scoped across three tracks: Fairness, Flexibility and additional topics.	Reform the WTO to ensure it continues contributing to its foundational objectives and principles; mandate to continue work. Does not pre-specify topics in the operative text.	ACP and African Group support a holistic approach. Most developing Members are concerned that pre-specifying topics reflects developed-country priorities before consensus on scope is reached.
Scope of topics	Explicit work plan with three tracks covering balance of rights and obligations, level playing field and industrial policy, development and SDT, governance and decision-making, and variable geometry.	Topics to be identified by Members through submissions during the first six months post-MC14. Consensus-based identification. Avoids pre-specifying contentious areas.	Paraguay's approach has broader support from developing Members who consider that topic pre-specification is itself a substantive decision that requires consensus.
Process and governance	Dedicated facilitators per track chosen by the GC Chair. Reports every six months. Senior Officials meeting in November 2027. GC reports recommendations to MC15.	Four co-facilitators representing different development levels appointed by the GC. Open-ended working groups at expert level. Senior Officials meetings at three checkpoints. GC reports to MC15.	Both support a facilitator-led process. African Group insists on complete internal transparency. LDC Group calls for listening rooms and simultaneous interpretation in all smaller meetings.
Decision-making rules within the reform process	Silent on the consensus requirement within the reform process itself; implies facilitator-led discussion with Members deciding.	Explicit: at all times, discussions shall be led by Members and decisions taken by consensus.	ACP, African Group, India: Consensus within the reform process is non-negotiable. Paraguay's explicit language is more aligned with the positions of most developing Members.

Element	EU Draft (WT/GC/W/986 Annex)	Paraguay Draft (WT/GC/W/987 Annex / RD/GC/49)	Alignment with Other Members
Development and SDT	Development is one sub-topic under the 'Fairness' track. The task includes exploring time-bound, targeted SDT and objective differentiation criteria among developing countries.	Development is not separately labelled but the mandate covers all functions of the Organisation. Developing country representation is ensured through the co-facilitator structure.	African Group, ACP, LDC Group: Development must be a primary pillar, not a sub-topic. The framing of SDT as subject to graduation or time-limits is strongly opposed.
Dispute settlement	A footnote states that dispute settlement reform discussions should resume when progress is made on WTO reform and when conditions are right. This effectively de-links and delays the issue.	Does not address dispute settlement separately in the draft decision text.	ACP, African Group, LDC Group, China: Dispute settlement restoration is a top priority and must not be de-linked or treated as an afterthought to other reform tracks.
Timeline to MC15	Work commences April 2026. Senior Officials meeting November 2027. MC15 receives recommendations.	April to September 2026: appoint facilitators and identify topics. October 2026 to April 2027: working group discussions. May to September 2027: draft decision. December 2027: Senior Officials finalise text.	Timelines are broadly comparable. UK calls for a biennial Ministerial or mid-cycle checkpoint. China supports a structured and progressive work plan with a clear timeline adopted at MC14.
SUMMARY	The Paraguay draft decision does not pre-specify reform topics, explicitly requires decisions to be taken by consensus throughout the reform process, and does not address dispute settlement separately. The EU draft decision pre-specifies thematic tracks, does not include an explicit consensus requirement within the reform process itself, and includes a footnote conditioning resumption of dispute settlement discussions on progress in broader reform. Submissions from the African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group indicate a preference for the approach reflected in the Paraguay draft on these three points.		

11. Cross-Cutting Observations

This section draws together the key areas of convergence and divergence across all submissions reviewed. It does not introduce new analysis but summarises the state of play on each issue as reflected in the submissions.

Issue	Where Submissions Converge	Where Submissions Diverge
Dispute settlement restoration	All submissions except the US identify restoration of a fully functional two-tier binding dispute settlement system as a priority.	The US submission raises objections to the Appellate Body in its previous form and offers no commitment to its restoration. The EU draft decision conditions resumption of dispute settlement discussions on progress in broader WTO reform.
Consensus and decision-making	All submissions affirm that no obligation should be imposed on a Members without its consent.	ACP Group, African Group and India treat consensus as an unqualified treaty right. EU, UK and US treat the current practice as equivalent to unanimity and argue it requires reform.
Plurilateral agreements	No convergence identified across submissions.	EU, UK and US argue the plurilateral path must be unblocked and that non-participants should not be able to block willing Members. India argues specifically that JSIs lack a multilateral mandate and that Annex 4 additions require full consensus under Art. X:9 of the Marrakesh Agreement. African Group and ACP Group oppose JSIs on broader grounds, including that they fragment multilateralism, create a multi-tier system and divert negotiating resources from developing country priorities.
Special and Differential Treatment	Submissions across all groups acknowledge that SDT implementation has not been fully effective, though they differ on the reasons.	EU, UK and US argue SDT must be time-bound, targeted and subject to objective graduation criteria. African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group defend SDT as a permanent treaty-embedded right that must be strengthened, not conditioned.
Agriculture reform	All submissions that address agriculture acknowledge it remains unfinished business.	African Group, ACP Group, LDC Group and Paraguay treat agriculture as central to any credible fairness outcome and identify specific asks including PSH, SSM and removal of trade-distorting domestic support. The US submission does not identify agriculture as a reform priority.
Development in the reform architecture	All submissions recognise that development is an objective of the WTO under the Marrakesh Agreement.	African Group, ACP Group and LDC Group insist development must be a primary standalone pillar in the post-MC14 work programme. The EU draft decision places it as a sub-topic under the Fairness track.
Post-MC14 work programme design	All submissions support a structured post-MC14 process with a work plan and regular reporting to Members.	The EU draft decision pre-specifies thematic tracks and topics. The Paraguay draft decision leaves topic identification to a consensus-based process among Members after MC14. Most developing

		Member submissions are closer to the Paraguay approach.
Transparency and notifications	All submissions acknowledge that notification compliance is poor and must be improved.	EU, UK and US support accountability measures including consequences for chronic non-compliance. African Group and LDC Group insist improvements must not impose punitive measures or additional burdens on Members with limited capacity.
Economic security and national security exceptions	No convergence identified across submissions.	The US submission states that economic security and supply chain resilience are outside WTO competence and that each Member has the sovereign right to determine its essential security actions. The African Group submission treats the unconstrained use of national security exceptions as a systemic problem requiring multilateral disciplines. China's submission states that abuse of security exceptions must not be allowed to erode MFN disciplines. The UK submission acknowledges live discussions on security exceptions and seeks a way forward satisfactory to all Members
Capacity building, technical assistance and technology transfer	All submissions from developing Members and LDCs identify these as priorities that must be maintained and strengthened as part of any reform outcome.	Submissions from developed Members acknowledge the importance of technical assistance but have not committed to increased financing. The LDC Group notes that Aid for Trade flows are declining while development needs are rising.

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