Social justice, energy transition and climate change on the eve of the COP-21
Below is a piece by the South Centre’s Special Advisor on Sustainable Development, Youba Sokona, on the need to link social justice, energy transition and climate change in the debates for equity and to achieve sustainable development. He also outlines the challenges which need to be overcome. Lastly, he emphasises the COP—21 that will be held in Paris in December 2015 as one of the last opportunities to reach an agreement.
By Youba Sokona
The current debate in France on Social justice, energy transition and climate change could not be more timely, coming as it does in the run-up to the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Paris, 2015). This subject is one of the most complex, and extends far beyond issues pertaining to France. Indeed, the way in which the French and/or Europeans will manage their energy transition will depend on what happens worldwide; at the same time, what happens around the world will depend in part on how France and Europe fulfil their commitments for the implementation of the UNFCCC.
Climate change being a global challenge, can only be dealt within a context of justice, with a North/South dimension that has no doubt evolved but nevertheless remains the cornerstone of the international balance of power. We must remain sceptical in the face of moralizing, ineffective statements that heighten mistrust; the aim is not to make mistakes on the practical means of implementation in a context characterized from the outset by a very unequal situation on either side, one that cannot be changed by climate policies alone.
From this point of view, and at the risk of sounding critical, Europe’s attitude towards climate policy is strongly influenced by its internal tensions and, despite European assertions of leadership, Europe remains relatively deaf to “what is happening elsewhere”.
The recent work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that not only the human influence on the climate system is clear, but also the increasing level of greenhouse gas emissions will lead to further global warming and alter every component of the climate system. This will amplify the already visible effects on all continents and on the oceans. The first volume of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on physical science basis draws our attention to the fact that the global water cycle has changed, snow and ice cover is retreating ever more rapidly, average sea levels and ocean acidification are on the rise, and certain extreme climate events are occurring with growing frequency.
These most recent reports by the IPCC, like it’s earlier publications, issue a clear warning about the high cost of inaction to humanity as a whole.
While climate change deniers in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) continue to debate the point, in particular the scope of the consequences of climate change, African countries and certain regions of South-East Asia, China and Brazil are already experiencing those changes. The French, whether they are from Paris or the middle of the Ardèche, need scientific facts to be convinced of the reality of climate change, whereas inhabitants of above forty years old of Ségou (Mali), Tacloban (Philippines) or Watagouna (Mali) have already experienced or are confronted by this reality on the ground and are in despair. In brief, and this is truly an “injustice”, it is certain developing countries, in particular the poorest and most fragile among them, are currently paying the price of the controversy over the reality of anthropogenic climate change; this controversy is one of the biggest obstacles to the action required on the part of developed countries, and therefore worldwide.
The main greenhouse gas causing overall global temperature rise is carbon dioxide, which comes essentially from the combustion of fossil fuels. The IPCC’s work, like many other recent studies, indicates that to limit the rise in global temperature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, immediate and ambitious mitigation actions are required. Such actions go so far as to require carbon capture and sequestration, coupled with the massive deployment of bioenergy and reforestation, if, as appears increasingly likely, policies promoting energy efficiency and the use of renewables do not suffice on their own.
Climate stabilization requires urgent “decarbonization” of the economy and thus of energy supplies; in other words, an accelerated and profound global energy transition.
Hence the importance and timeliness of the debate on energy transition in the European Union (EU) and several of its Member States, even if, for an outside observer, that debate does not appear to be clearly anchored in discussion of climate issues. Examples are the disconnect between the affirmation of the need for ambitious decarbonization goals – Factor 4 – and sluggish action in the field of transport, or the recent and very real push to use coal and lignite in Europe.
As a result of this unavoidable requirement, not only will additional substantial financial means be mobilized, but energy system investments should also be redirected towards low- or zero-carbon options and energy efficiency. How is that challenge to be met at a time when households, especially the most fragile, are under acute pressure from the economic and financial crisis? How to cope in a context in which non-conventional fossil fuels are being developed – tar sands, shale gas, shale oil, deep-sea drilling, the re-emergence of coal, etc.?
The debate on energy transition in France, as in other European countries and elsewhere, raises numerous issues, in particular of social justice, equity and ethics, of how to choose between current priorities, such as unemployment, precarity and the climate question. It is also at the heart of the debate on climate change, notwithstanding the absence of structured and ongoing dialogue between the stakeholders involved in the debates and decisions on climate change and on energy.
It is disconcerting to observe that even though everyone agrees that the energy question is at the heart of the climate question, discussion of both crucial issues is taking place in different forums. Indeed, the subject of “sustainable energy for all” is not discussed at climate change negotiations, where the questions of non-conventional oil and gas are to all intents and purposes absent as well. It is as though the “climate”, “energy” and “social” issues could be managed separately.
Of course, at the global level also it is difficult to concretely link energy transition, climate change and social justice in the discussions on the management of the common public good, because the energy transition issue is an integral part of climate change issues and, ultimately, of development concerns. Because of the nature of climate change – climate being a global public good – stronger, transparent and unambiguous international cooperation is required.
In fact, and contrary to what was decided in Rio in 1992, we have not managed to clearly articulate climate policies as an integral part of sustainable development. Indeed, the reference to sustainable development – and to common but differentiated responsibilities – was soon little more than a “non-committal” rhetorical flourish.
“Climate change” has usually been reduced to its environmental dimension, the debate limited to the efforts to be undertaken to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This has spawned numerous misunderstandings on justice and equity; indeed, by focusing on the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions independently of other factors, the discussion was locked into the “limited emissions budget to be shared” circle. Both economists and philosophers can engage in endless debate on how to share the burden fairly without noticing that the equation – when set in this manner – is impossible to solve. There is a sense of hypocrisy to the generous calls for North-South transfers in the name of equity, given the certainty that there is little hope that the developed countries, which are currently in crisis, will make the necessary transfers.
During the past 25 years of climate negotiations, neither the developed countries, nor Europe itself, have made the developing countries a credible offer to accelerate their energy transition. Yes, since Kyoto, Europe has willingly flaunted its energy virtues, adopting quantitatively ambitious emission reduction commitments. But when it comes to establishing an international fund based on small fees for “carbon exchange permits”, for example, it has agreed to the principle only to immediately limit it to the clean development mechanism alone, the only mechanism – no matter what its constraints are – that was “profitable for the countries of the South”. By the same token, Europe has never supported proposals such as that made by Brazil, for example, to establish a so-called “compliance” fund using penalties paid by countries not meeting their emission reduction objectives.
The question of the North’s responsibility for financing the transition to a low-carbon development mode remains crucial. In Copenhagen, Denmark, the principle of the Green Climate Fund was adopted, but the risk of mistrust may grow, given the fear that Industrialised Countries may not be able to provide sufficient funds for this mechanism in view of the strong constraints on public spending in Europe.
Justice, however, requires a transfer of funds: collective action will only be possible if climate policy constitutes a lever for redirecting the policies of the poorest and most fragile countries and allows them facilitated access to sustainable development. It is from this perspective that Decision 1 of the Cancun Agreements, which calls for “equitable access to sustainable development”, stands a chance of being implemented.
Not all countries are equal in the face of climate change: some have contributed more than others to the phenomenon; some suffer more heavily from the consequences. Some depend more heavily on fossil fuels, while others risk seeing their development hopes forever compromised. These considerations are indicative of the deep imbalances between countries, the combined outcome of development issues, energy policies and geographical, geopolitical and demographic constraints.
The result is an exceedingly complex equation where every element must be tackled, without exception. Isolated action by one country or group of countries will have little impact in the struggle against climate change; only concerted global action will lead to a significant reduction in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. Only by taking collective action with the greatest possible urgency and on very ambitious targets can the worst consequences of the planet’s increasingly rapid warming be averted. It is now widely agreed that the measures taken to date to fight climate change fall far short of what is required.
Poverty eradication and development – or rather making development more sustainable – are legitimate aspirations held by many countries. Together with climate change, they form the challenges to which appropriate responses must be found as quickly as possible at the beginning of this third millennium. It is both timely and imperative to rise to the challenge of poverty eradication as part of a sustainable development vision, not for altruistic reasons, but because the shared goal of humanity’s survival requires it.
The central question here is how to translate the hopes of the poorest people, the aspirations of developing countries and the good intentions often voiced at major international meetings into reality. Poverty eradication is a complex challenge that often appears simple. It is complex because poverty manifests itself in many ways. In its most concrete sense, poverty is the lack of basic capacity to function effectively in society. It means not having adequate shelter, not being able to access health services in case of illness, not having access to education and not being able to read, the death of a child as a result of a sickness caused by unsafe water, lack of sanitary facilities, and so on. Poverty is often described as an economic condition, and yet income is not the only factor influencing quality of life. Some societies have improved standards of living with relatively low average income levels. In others, however, even if incomes are sometimes relatively high, the result is not an improvement in collective well-being, as might have been expected.
There is a well-established correlation between access to energy and socio-economic development level. The fact that most Africans lack access to basic modern energy services, for example, is a major obstacle to the continent’s development and, above all, to poverty eradication. It means that neither schools nor health centres can function properly. It also means that access to clean drinking water and sanitation is constrained, to the detriment of the health of citizens. It means that the productive economic activities that could enable people to work their way out of poverty are seriously compromised. In short, we all know that improved access to energy for the poor and the marginalized would make a significant contribution to poverty eradication efforts.
Development in Africa will remain a pipedream so long as energy consumption levels are too low to meet the most basic survival needs of the majority of people. It is a startling fact that the 20 million inhabitants of New York City consume more energy than the entire population of Africa, i.e. nearly one billion people. The point is not, of course, for the average energy consumption levels of Africans to attain those of the residents of Manhattan. Indeed, it would be simply unrealistic, in the planet’s current conditions, for the 9 billion individuals making up humanity to have the energy consumption levels of the OECD countries. A development of that kind would probably require economic capacity to increase by a factor of 15 by 2050, and of 40 by the end of the century. This leads to an important observation and a recommendation. The observation is clear: the carrying capacity of the planet can in no way bear that burden. And the recommendation is not an easy one for Europeans to accept: for greenhouse gas emissions to fall in the developed countries, growth in energy consumption should be curbed and in some cases reversed, as energy systems are decarbonized. This has to be done to allow energy consumption to increase in countries that have to develop and improve the basic living conditions of their people. Steps have to be taken to ensure that our common future is built on solid foundations – ethics, equity, justice and solidarity – and to avoid the cannibalization of the planet and its resources.
The realism of lowering energy consumption in developed countries, of degrowth, of energy sobriety, is not easy for populations severely affected by the economic crisis to understand. Mainstreaming control of energy consumption into sustainable development considerations is a matter of concern to both the developed and the developing countries, because unless the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is perceived among both the former and the latter as a lever of access to a genuine development model – other than that of the boom years – there will be no true climate policy.
Let us consider the question of equitable access to sustainable development with control of greenhouse gas emissions using Africa as an example. It is this aspect, too, that gives rise to hope for the climate change negotiations to be held in Paris in 2015. In such a context, how to give shape to the energy transition, or transitions, in Africa?
Africa has to solve, as soon as possible, the nagging issue of firewood, and mobilize and develop all the continent’s available energy resources and potentials so as to further its development. Is the “development first” requirement for sub-Saharan Africa compatible with the need for full participation in the fight against global warming? Is there any option to implement energy transition in sub-Saharan Africa that does not involve a massive increase in the use of fossil fuels and modern bioenergy?
Energy transition is a slow process that can be held back or accelerated by the policies in place. It is taking place everywhere, at different paces and in different ways, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The issue of climate change and energy transition raises at least three different types of challenge that must be met in the shortest possible time:
1. Political will based on a clear vision shared by all countries. It is clear that justice, an ethical principle, also requires intellectual and scientific rigour. In this respect, the contribution of Working Group III to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report is fairly symptomatic. In that contribution, there is a large gap between the reference to sustainable development and the virtual absence of sustainable development dimensions in the forward-looking economic studies used. The IPCC as such is not to blame; it reflects existing intellectual and scientific mindsets. What is needed are studies looking to 2050 and beyond, not on how to set the transition in motion by integrating short-term constraints. A moment ago I mentioned firewood. This aspect is practically ignored by existing forward-looking models. This is where justice starts, but not only in the form of a “cheque” for the poor; justice is pursued by the quality of academic cooperation in these fields, and my experience allows me to say that little progress has been made so far.
There can be no shared vision without a truly common intelligence, in which everyone listens to themselves without first transferring their own schemas. Research and scientific cooperation arrangements are decisive in this regard, as is an instrument such as the IPCC. Priority must be given to making sure their mode of operation allies excellence in research and training, so that the training is truly guided by the issues emerging “from the field”, in order to avert a situation in which the discussion is of, for example, global carbon market arrangements that apply only to virtual realities.
2. A reorientation of institutions or institutional innovation, so that institutions are able to take on this vision and translate it into concrete action. It is difficult for me to be specific here, not only for lack of time but also because the issues are highly complex and I cannot claim to have the solutions. What is true is that we are functioning within a framework of institutional models conceived in the years after the Second World War, or during the 1960s and 1970s. This leaves us unable to deal with cross-cutting problems such as those in front of us today. In this area, the most urgent need is for the courage to rethink cooperation and to mobilize the necessary human resources to that end: making too many statements on justice is the same as asking for charity. Economists have contributed to this, saying, for example, that the best solution to the problem of climate change is a single carbon price and that it would suffice to compensate the losers, for example the Indians, who would see the price of the cement they use for construction double. By getting tangled up in this kind of debate, we divert attention from the central question, namely, what has to be reformed? Who has to be upset so that we can at long last move forward and reap the benefits of North-South cooperation using a climate-compatible development model?
3. Finance structure reform, so that short- and long-term imperatives can be tackled simultaneously. How, then, to avoid the risk of distrust if the pledges taken in Copenhagen are not met? At the same time, what are the chances those pledges will be met, given the financial crisis? The size of the amounts to be redirected to the transition to a low-carbon model and to development exceeds what the Green Climate Fund (GCF) could mobilize. A massive re-orientation of savings, in other words a massive transformation of the world of finance is therefore needed. The carbon market cannot be relegated to the sidelines if decarbonization is to serve development: investment in key sectors such as energy, transportation, housing, agriculture and rural development will have to be reoriented. This cannot be done without reforming the institutions regulating those sectors and without radical changes in the heart of the financial system. Several ideas have been put forward in recent years (including reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issuing a carbon currency and the creation of project-based bonds). The financial system created 20 or 30 years ago facilitated the emergence of rentier economics and speculative earnings, but it discouraged the orientation of savings towards long-term investments. If it remains unchanged, there can be no justice.
It would have been absolutely possible to stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions in order to limit average global temperature increases to 2°C if action had been taken in the 1990s; today achieving that goal is highly uncertain, and soon it will be stabilization at 3°C or even 4°C that will be impossible. Paris 2015 must be seen, not as just another conference, but as one of the last opportunities to avoid having no choice but to adapt to profound changes that have become unavoidable.
Youba Sokona is the Special Advisor on Sustainable Development of the South Centre. He is also Co-Chair of the Working Group on Mitigation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
