Comments Off on South Centre Statement at the WHO’s Executive Board, 21 January 2014
Since the South Centre is taking the floor before the WHO’s Executive Board for the first time in its capacity as an observer, first of all we would like to thank the Member Countries for enabling the participation of the South Centre as an observer in the WHO’s governing bodies.
Attending the deliberations of the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly will help us in pursuing our aim of providing developing countries with technical assistance in the areas of health and development.
Since our remarks take place in the context of the current situation in South Africa as has been expressed by the Representative of this country in the Executive Board, we wish to express our strong support to the efforts made by the Government of South Africa to improve access to medicines, particularly to the ongoing work undertaken to review its intellectual property legislation in order to integrate public health concerns into pharmaceutical patent examination.
Fourteen years ago, in the Executive Board, developing countries and some developed countries supported the Government of South Africa when 39 pharmaceutical companies brought a court case against the South African Government over the terms of its Medicines Act. History seems to be repeating itself. Therefore, a message of support from this leading authority on health issues to the Government of South Africa on its ongoing reform to their Patents Act would be welcome.
The South Centre supports developing countries making use of their right to incorporate all the flexibilities contained in the WTO TRIPS Agreement in their intellectual property legislation and implement them in order to ensure the access of all peoples to necessary medicines.
Comments Off on Global Value Chains: Unpacking the Issues of Concern for Developing Countries
“Global Value Chains” is a concept that strongly emerged in recent years especially at the WTO. But there are big differences of views on what it means and what it should and should not imply. The article below provides views of developing countries, which were presented at a South Centre/Ecuador event last year.
By Kinda Mohamadieh
The Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the WTO in cooperation with the South Centre organized a discussion session on Global Value Chains (GVCs), on the side of the Fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade held at the WTO between 8 and 10 July 2013. The session addressed issues related to GVCs and to the future of the multilateral trading system from the perspective of developing countries.
Speakers in the session included Ambassador Miguel Carbo Benites, Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the WTO, Ambassador Faizel Ismail, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the WTO, Mr. Manuel Montes, Senior Advisor on Finance and Development at the South Centre, and Ms. Rashmi Banga from the Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes at UNCTAD. The session was moderated by Ms. Aileen Kwa, Coordinator of the Trade for Development Programme at the South Centre.
Statement by Aileen Kwa
Aileen Kwa commenced the session by noting that the new narrative on GVCs is one focused on liberalization. While most countries are involved in GVCs in one way or another, they are not all linked in the same way nor have an equal status vis a vis GVCs.
Kwa added that the current discourse on GVCs by key proponents and by the WTO Secretariat is that developing countries should liberalise – in goods and services, and conclude a trade facilitation agreement. Some have also suggested that any restrictions on exports should be eliminated (e.g. export taxes on raw materials), Kwa added. According to this discourse, Kwa explained, these strategies would help developing countries more deeply integrate into GVCs as they can import more cheaply and thus export more competitively.
Kwa alerted participants that the picture on closer examination is not so simple. Not all players can equally gain from their participation in GVCs. Developing countries could become more integrated in GVCs, but the quality of their integration may not be of real benefit, Kwa explained.
Statement by Ambassador Miguel Carbo Benites
In his opening speech, Ambassador Miguel Carbo Benites of Ecuador underlined that “the GVCs-focused approach does not meet Ecuador´s main objective towards production transformation”. He explained that “GVCs tend to deepen the traditional scheme of international labor division”. While “transnational firms locate production in countries of origin of raw material or intermediate products as a way for them to achieve an efficient performance”, “this structure could hurt countries’ sovereign interests to manage their resources in an adequate way”, Benites added.
Ambassador Benites noted that countries with technologically advanced sectors take advantage of GVCs, while less developed countries such as Ecuador would less likely be able to benefit from these processes, and will be condemned to continue providing raw material. For this reason, he called for strengthening regional value chains “where the economic models have less economic and social asymmetries”. He added that regional value chains are a way to foster a region’s advantages from a complementary perspective in order to have a more dynamic integration between involved countries.
Ambassador Benites indicated that the Fourth Global Review of Aid for Trade presents GVCs as synonymous to growth and economic development, poverty reduction, capacity building, and global integration, regardless of the capabilities and constraints facing developing countries. Yet, he noted that “the analysis of market liberalization and value chains, does not consider the existing technological gaps between developed and developing countries”, which prevent the latter from effectively benefiting from the advantages of international trade. He explained that such propositions do not “provide an innovative framework for truly helping the economies of developing countries to develop and innovate beyond their current comparative advantage”.
Ecuador, like many developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) does not agree with the simple idea that free trade promotes growth and development, Ambassador Benites added, given that this approach does not reflect the economic, social, institutional, and structural differences among nations. It also does not reflect the principle of special and differential treatment that the WTO should uphold, he noted.
Ambassador Benites highlighted several points in regard to thinking about an alternative narrative for the multilateral trading system, including the need to support fair trade and trade capacity building, as well as ensuring good governance and better opportunities for participation within countries, and making international integration processes more participatory. In regard to aid-for-trade (AfT), he emphasized that Ecuador prioritizes the inclusion of traditionally excluded actors through supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with emphasis on food security and sovereignty, as well as market and export diversification.
Ambassador Benites concluded his remarks by noting that developing countries “need to adopt industrialization policies, support sustainable agricultural production and services’ development”. Accordingly, “the GVCs approach should be reconsidered in order to match with developing countries’ developmental needs”, and should contribute to more equitable participation for developing countries at the multilateral level by enabling value-added production.
Statement by Ambassador Faizel Ismail
Ambassador Faizel Ismail of South Africa commenced his presentation by noting the need to generate critical questions about the new trade narrative that is focused on GVCs. He highlighted that there are three main current approaches addressing GVCs; one is the technical approach that uses the narrative on GVCs as a way to update the methodology behind trade statistics; the second is the ideological perspective that situates the narrative on GVCs as basis for a ‘new Washington consensus’ and a new philosophy for framing research; while the third is a strategic approach with long term objectives.
On the technical front, international organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the WTO secretariat, and the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are already working on updating trade statistics. Ambassador Ismail highlighted the OECD-WTO joint initiative on measuring trade in value-added, which indicates imbalances in trade statistics. For example, the US trade deficit with respect to China is reduced by more than 30 per cent when trade is measured, as it should be, in value-added and not in gross commercial value.
On the ideological front, Ambassador Ismail explained that a view of the world is being promoted that holds a lot of parallels with the set of ideas behind the Washington Consensus of the late 1980s and 1990s. This analysis of globalization focuses on highlighting the fragmentation of production processes and increasing concentration of trade in intermediate goods (making up around 60 percent of world trade) and trade in services, Ismail added. This narrative promotes the reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including services regulations and other border regulatory barriers, he noted. It also claims that trade facilitation and reduction of NTBs would lead to six times more gains at the household level and in terms of employment, compared to that resulting from reduction of tariffs. Within such an approach, the main prescription focuses on promoting a trade facilitation agreement at the WTO, liberalization of trade in services, and reduction of NTBs, Ismail underlined.
Ambassador Ismail reminded the participants that the strategic approach to the GVCs narrative kicked off with the collapse of the WTO Ministerial meeting in July 2008. In an article released in the Foreign Affairs Journal during June 2011, the United States Trade Representation (USTR) then, Susan Schwab, had expressed frustration with the multilateral negotiations and declared the WTO Doha Round dead. This has been followed by a spate of articles carrying the same argument, claiming that the WTO Doha round of negotiations does not work and calling for a ‘new pathway’ forward. Ambassador Ismail explained that the ‘new pathway’ being called for would include several key elements among which is the call for a new role by ‘emerging markets’ or big developing country Members of the WTO, built on the claim that a deal with these countries based on the special and differential treatment principle would not work. Ambassador Ismail added that the ‘new pathway’ calls for a move away from the ‘single undertaking’ approach under the WTO. He explained that proponents of such calls claim that the round is too big and that there is a need to address each issue-by-issue commencing with those parties willing to move forward based on plurilateral negotiations. Such an approach had been the basis for negotiations in the area of financial services under the WTO.
Under the same token, the negotiations of the US-EU FTA have been launched, which would make-up almost half of global output and one third of global trade. Under this approach, Ambassador Ismail explained, the argument is made that like-minded countries should work together to set rules and standards outside the WTO, to which other WTO members would later be called to join. Ismail referred to Wilkinson and Scott (2012) who had indicated that plurilaterals are “a shift backwards to old exclusive approaches” that were dominant before the Doha and Uruguay Rounds.
Recalling the history of the GVCs-focused narrative, Ambassador Ismail noted that Under-secretary of commerce in the Bush Administration, Grant Aldonas, was the prime mover of the need to create a new narrative on trade. In 2009, Aldonas argued that “there was a lack of compelling narrative that explains the nature of the global economy” in light of the “eroding public support for further trade liberalization globally”. Aldonas added that globalization has deepened whereby an increasing percentage of world trade now takes place within global enterprises and the broader reach of their supply chains, and noted that what matters is reducing costs, limiting risks, and ensuring quality and innovation, while tariffs and subsidies are less relevant. Grant Aldonas had argued that “trade facilitation is in fact where the money is, because it bears a more direct relationship to the factors that drive the private sector’s sourcing and investment decision”.
Ismail pointed at a similar line of research that has been produced by several international organizations like the WTO, OECD, World Bank, and G20 to promote GVCs and further liberalization.
Ambassador Ismail underlined that the argumentation promoting GVCs, liberalization, and ‘new pathways’ reflect a new trade narrative that is similar to the ‘Washington Consensus’. He highlighted that in the G20 Trade Ministers’ meeting in Puerto Vallarta in Mexico (19th of April 2012), OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria made the argument for “better and more compelling case for open markets”. Gurria noted that the emergence of GVCs as a new reality of international trade where goods are no longer manufactured in one country but are made in the world and the large share of intermediate goods in exports provide a compelling reason for countries to have more open trade policies. Angel Gurria added that “there is increasing evidence that comprehensive market opening benefits all of us, wherever we are”.
Furthermore, Ismail noted that the US narrative on the need for ‘new pathways’ was reflected in January 2013 by the US Deputy National Security Advisor for international economic affairs then, Michael Froman. Froman had claimed that it is difficult to see how to move forward on the multilateral level as long as countries that are largely competitive with the industrial nations hold to their view that they be treated as developing countries. In the same line, Froman had added that the focus in Geneva should be on ‘fresh issues’ like trade facilitation. When addressing free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Froman had indicated the importance that these agreements set high standards that can eventually be extended to the multilateral level.
Yet, the idea that self-regulating markets based on removing barriers and allowing free flow of goods and services create automatic rise in welfare have been often critiqued starting from the work of Raul Prebisch to Joseph Stiglitz, Ismail stressed. Ambassador Ismail pointed to the lack of empirical and historical evidence to support the claim behind self-regulating markets, whereby the experience of developed countries show how they used state intervention to develop their economies.
Ambassador Ismail explained that the issues related to GVCs have been long debated among developing countries with a focus on the need for trade and industrial policies in order to achieve growth, break away from the commodities and middle-income trap, and move up from the bottom end of the commodity chain.
Ismail underlined that even some developing countries that moved up the value chain are still mainly processing. He added that research shows that developed countries that are trapped in the low end of the value chain in some sectors actively use policies to address that. Within this context, the shaping of GVCs has been associated with high pressures on major companies towards increasing concentration of economic activity. Higher levels of concentration and mergers were undertaken throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, in the US and EU particularly. This trend was undertaken in almost every major industrial and services sector, such as electronics, telecommunication, and the auto sector, highlighted Ismail. These companies took control of the lead part of the production process including innovation, research, and patents. They subcontracted other parts of the business to small firms in low cost countries. Ambassador Ismail explained that this was the path to promote the concept of GVCs, which reflects the move towards the disintegrated multinational company (MNC). At the same time financialization was pushed through deregulation of the financial sector, whereby manufacturing was marginalized.
Ambassador Ismail cautioned that the proliferation of the narrative on GVCs is part of a narrative on globalization that projects a certain strategy on the way trade negotiations and agreements, as well as global governance, and a number of national policies should take place. This evolving trade narrative includes analyses of the global economy and deepening globalization, changing forms of production, investment and trade, innovation, climate change and its implications for the world economy, economic growth and its trade effects, the relevance of the negotiations in the WTO under the Doha round, the need for alternative forms of trade negotiations including plurilaterals, and the need to change the definition of development and developing countries and their responsibilities in the system. Ismail stressed that this narrative crowds out other research and narratives from the scope of discussion and analysis.
These ideas are clearly intended to influence the direction and strategy of the new WTO Director General (DG) and the future of the WTO in the period post the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Bali during December 2013. Ambassador Ismail noted that there has been a surge of interest in providing advice to the new WTO DG who took office in September 2013, not least by the past DG, Pascal Lamy, through the report entitled “The Future of Trade: The Challenges of Convergence” by the panel he convened to tackle defining the future of trade. Almost all the views expressed in this context argue that it is time to put the WTO Doha Round to rest and explore “new pathways”.
Ambassador Ismail concluded by highlighting that what is needed is an alternative vision that is based on fair trade, capacity building, balanced rules, and good governance that allows for opportunities to develop.
Statement by Manuel Montes
Manuel Montes of the South Centre reminded the participants that the current and seemingly sudden discovery of GVCs by the policy community is similar to the time when “big bang financial liberalization became all the rage in the mid-1980s and raged through the early 1990s, until the Asian financial crisis in 1997”. “As now for GVCs, financial liberalization was thought of as inevitable and a craze any developing country could not afford to miss” he added, despite the historical record of contagious international financial crises between the mid-19th century and early 20th century. Montes explained that then, as now for GVCs, leading policy institutions such as the OECD and the World Bank, argued for the potential benefits of financial liberalization based on a small set of studies (or theoretical models assuming full employment), supported by developed country governments and large multinational companies.
Montes noted that these prescriptions will unduly distort public policy priorities in developing countries. “What appears to be happening is that the set of standard policy prescriptions applying to trade liberalization are being resurrected on the occasion of the new discovery of GVCs. Because GVCs are by nature product, service, and even company specific there are very few general policy strategies to harness these for development interventions at the national level”, Montes added.
The 2013 World Investment report (UNCTAD 2013, p. xxiii) rhapsodizes on the development impact of GVCs on the basis of correlation noting that “there is a positive correlation between participation in GVCs and GDP per capita growth rates. Economies with the fastest growing GVC participation have GDP per capita growth rates some 2 percentage points above the average”. Montes stressed that “results from these kinds of correlation-based cross-country studies suffer from technical problems”, such as definition and measurement of variables, data heterogeneity across countries of vastly differing sizes, role of outliers and non-linearity. More important, Montes added, “often the direction of causation is reversed; that is, those already relatively successful and faster growing countries more easily snag parts of GVCs, instead of GVCs being an instrument of their development success”.
Montes explained that “while today’s GVCs could be more quantitatively sophisticated than the East India Company, the core of the economic policy issue then, as now, is the same: the distribution of value-added among the participants in the production process”. This distribution in turn determines the distribution of employment, economic growth and technological development among different territories, he added.
Montes noted that “while GVCs might be a new academic toy, the nature of their impact as an integrated production process has been seen before”. GVCs could be as exploitative within one country as they are across countries. He added that “national politics must contend with value chain inequities within national jurisdictions” and “we must ask whether the international system – such as the rules under the WTO or corporate codes of conduct or human rights treaties – are sufficiently equipped to deal with the inequitable aspects of GVCs”.
Within this context, the proper question should focus on how countries participate in GVCs, and not only on the choice between participating and not participating in value chains, Montes noted. It is thus very important to study the nature of GVCs, to understand their positive impacts and how these could be obtained, and their negative impacts and how these could be avoided, Montes underlined.
Montes added that the current effort to systematically gather data on value-added trade will intensify interest in the global distribution of value-added and the impacts of value chains. One example of a policy insight he raised is related to value-added in the interaction between aid-for-trade (A4T) and GVCs. Montes explained that “to the extent that A4T reduces the cost of international movement of goods and services, the gains could be mainly to the benefit of TNCs. Within GVCs, an intervention meant to support development could mainly be to the benefit of the private companies of the donor governments”.
For successfully participating in GVCs, Montes underlined three dimensions that developing countries must particularly monitor over time including: (1) export diversification, (2) value-added trends, and (3) GVC’s output and backward and forward linkages. Montes called for cautiousness of policy prescriptions supposedly inspired by the GVC’s literature, which claim that countries must (1) eschew investment measures, (2) renounce interest in infant industry protection, (3) liberalize imports including through rapid elimination of quantitative restrictions and lowering of import tariffs, (4) introduce iron-clad foreign investor protections, (5) accept international obligations on international sectoral liberalization, (6) liberalize services, and (7) embark on widespread trade facilitation efforts.
By nature, GVCs are not only organized around specific products, they are also led by a small set of easily identifiable international companies, Montes explained. “Because of these features, many of these policy prescriptions are at least unnecessary, and possibly harmful, if the object is to harness GVCs toward national development objectives”, Montes added. There are, of course, asymmetries in the bargaining power between developing country governments and transnational companies. Thus, while the standard policy prescriptions can facilitate the international operations of multinational companies, these suggestions are not traceable to the inherent nature of GVCs, Montes stressed.
Montes discussed the examples of import liberalization and trade facilitation.
In the context of discussing GVCs, the UNCTAD World Investment Report (2013, p. xxv) argues for import liberalization by underlining that: “protective trade policies can backfire if imports are crucial for export competitiveness”. Montes noted that this is actually an old argument previously used in structural adjustment programs, long before academics discovered GVCs. He added that there is nothing that will preclude a country from setting zero tariffs on critical imports to a GVC export. Governments could also consider subsidizing those other inputs into a GVC product whose domestic production they are promoting, in order to offset some of the cost effects of import tariffs. Montes underlined that countries must be able to set tariff rates to zero where imports are critical and be able to adjust them up or down in the sectors they seek to diversify.
Montes discussed trade facilitation, noting that it appears to be a tangential if not misplaced policy prescription of the GVC literature. He underlined that GVCs are product specific, and in the case of producer-led value chains, even brand and company specific. He highlighted that the UNCTAD World Investment Report (2013, p. xxv) uses the term “fine-sliced.” Thus, it is possible to accommodate the cost minimization needs of GVCs through export processing zones, special customs procedures or company-specific facilities (such as locating semiconductor assembly plants near the national airport), he explained.
Yet, “under trade facilitation a country facilitates all its trade, whether or not they sit in international value chains”, Montes added.
He added that a trade facilitation agreement constitutes a national obligation that would reshape the fiscal priorities of a country, since governments of all countries have limits on the size of their bureaucracies, for example. “A national trade facilitation strategy with the objective of snagging parts of value chains thus assumes away the product specific nature of GVCs”, added Montes. He referred to the case of the textile and clothing sector, noting that consolidation and concentration within the international textile and clothing value chain after the expiry of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing required for example facilitating trade for specific sectors and support services. In such a case, a national trade facilitation strategy is unnecessary.
Montes concluded by underlining that “it is very important to interpret the policy implications of GVCs based on what we know about the nature of GVCs and not to try to resurrect trade liberalization prescriptions not specifically related to GVCs”.
Statement by Rashmi Banga
Rashmi Banga from the Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes at UNCTAD pointed out that the economics behind GVCs is not new, but it reflects a new way of producing and trading. Banga added that “exports are no longer linked to higher value-addition or higher production; least developed and low income countries are either ‘locked-in’ at bottom of GVCs or ‘locked-out’”.
Banga explained that the share of manufacturing in GDP have decreased in various countries, while the share of manufacturing in total exports have increased. This trend was mainly seen in China. Such trends do not reflect an increase in industrialization and linkages to employment. It indicates that developing countries are either locked out of GVCs or locked at the bottom of GVCs.
Banga questioned why it is hard to gainfully link into GVCs and how to estimate and measure the gainful linkage in GVCs.
Banga highlighted that in May 2013, the OECD and WTO released new datasets on value-added in trade for the years 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008 and 2009, which covered 58 countries including 34 OECD countries, the 5 BRICS states of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, 8 newly industrialized Asian countries (NICs), and the category of the ‘rest of the world’ that comprises all developing countries excluding the BRICS and NICs. Banga explained that the share of total value-added created in GVCs is calculated through backward linkages – reflecting foreign value added in exports, and forward linkages – reflecting the value added in other countries’ exports.
In 2009, 67% of the share of value-added created by GVCs went to OECD countries, while the rest of the world was marginalized, Banga noted. The structure of the global gross exports includes a limited 14% foreign value-added by manufacturing, she added. Banga explained that although the hype on GVCs is based on the calculation that 80% of trade is taking place within GVCs; yet, if foreign value-added is what is valuable in GVCs, then the value within GVCs would be much more limited.
Banga pointed out that the distribution of gains is asymmetrically biased towards the upper end of GVCs, which is controlled by developed countries that have competitive advantage in providing services like design, branding, and marketing. Banga added that “corporate control of the production process is far more profitable than the manufacturing activity itself”. “The longer the value chains, the higher are the rents for the lead firms”, she explained.
Rashmi Banga discussed the objective of aid-for-trade (AfT), indicating that it should focus on enhancing the participation of recipient countries in global trade and accordingly should focus on ‘net value-added’ from GVCs. This requires calculating how much value-added a country is exporting and importing, and the ratio of forward linkages to backward linkages (i.e. how much value-added goes into exports of other countries and how much value-added a country imports). Banga noted that while some studies focus on highlighting that doubling AfT increases exports by 3.5% (Laurent and Razzaque, 2011), however the objective of AfT needs to shift away from merely increasing trade and reducing trading costs to enhancing the competitiveness of the countries so that they can gain in ‘net value-added’ terms. Banga added that the focus should shift from exports and market access constraints to addressing policy related constraints.
Furthermore, Banga called for more attention by AfT interventions to the services sector, with a focus on providing training programmes and developing skills of the workforce in the recipient countries, including research and development (R&D) services, banking and financial services, branding, packaging, and marketing services. These could bring tangible gains to the recipient countries in regard to their participation in GVCs, she underlined.
The chain of required capacities in GVCs includes 6 factors as Banga explained, including informed producers, technical innovation and research and development, skill development, adequate infrastructure and finance, appropriate institutions and domestic regulations, as well as market orientation and market intelligence.
Besides this, Banga stressed the role of domestic policies in maximizing gains from linking into GVCs. She explained that success stories reveal that several domestic policies are critical for maximizing gains, including local content requirement, domestic linkages through joint ventures and presence of domestic firms, developing capacities in services linked to manufacturing like design studios, marketing skills, and branding, strengthening domestic private sector, and strong domestic institutions and regulations.
Banga concluded by underlining that low-income countries have not been able to gainfully link into GVCs. She called for focusing on ‘creating more’ value-addition and not ‘more trade’, and directing AfT towards developing capacities, skills and soft infrastructure rather than import facilitation.
After the presentations, participants in the session raised several related points.
Mr. Fernando Rosales Lozada from the Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the United Nations highlighted the importance of considering the role of intellectual property (IP) in the GVCs scheme, which could contribute to limiting the potential of developing countries in upgrading within the value chain due to limits on access to technology and innovation.
Mr. Nadir Merah, head of the trade division at the African Union Commission highlighted that developing countries are in a period of strategizing and establishing their own developmental vision. Within this context the focus is not on increasing trading but on increasing value-addition. He added that development necessitates considering the position and growth of SMEs, which are the fundamental economic actors in developing countries. This requires removing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) with a focus on providing incentives and a business friendly environment for SMEs. Mr. Merah stressed the need for better and deeper role of the main economic actors in developing countries, including the private sector and civil society. He highlighted the push back on the WTO Doha round of negotiations, and the importance of drawing the attention of the new WTO DG that this approach is not accepted by developing countries. He added that developing countries’ priorities are focused on development, capacity building, better role of private sector and civil society, and fair trading rules.
Mr. Richard Kozul-Wright of UNCTAD noted that UNCTAD’s research distinguished between ‘trading more’ and ‘earning more’. In studying the case of the East Asian economies, UNCTAD differentiated between the experience of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and that of Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand that followed. Both groups of countries participated in GVCs noted Kozul Wright; yet the important difference lies in the way in which they participated and the nature of the private sector’s role. Kozul-Wright explained that the reason for higher benefits accrued by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan compared to Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand lies in the active role of the state in using a series of instruments that disciplined their private sector and made sure upgrading, reinvestment, and technological spillover was actually taking place. The spillover from MNCs and the contribution of the private sector to a development project does not take place in an automatic manner; there is need for a lot of policy interventions to make sure the spillover is achieved.
The session was concluded by remarks from the panelists and the moderator. Aileen Kwa noted that facing the new narrative on liberalization by proponents of GVCs requires elaborating an alternative development narrative, focused on increasing productive capacities and value addition. Broadening productive capacities necessitates state intervention, Kwa stressed.
Kwa added that the developing countries need to focus the discussions at the WTO on technology transfer, needed changes to the IP system, trade policy flexibility, special and differential treatment and revisiting of the whole implementation agenda, including local content and infant industry policies. She called for cautiousness on the AfT discourse, including the objectives and interests it serves.
Ambassador Benites called for the continuation in the exchange of ideas on GVCs and AfT, within an overall strategic approach by developing countries to face the liberalization-focused agenda.
Ambassador Ismail called for deepening the analysis of the new forces of globalization and forms it is taking. The view on the world has been biased to the point of view of lead firms in control of GVCs. Developing countries need their own research and policy design to address the objectives of developing countries.
In the same line, Rashmi Banga called for scaling up research and analysis with respect to GVCs.
Kinda Mohamadieh is Researcher of the South Centre.
Comments Off on IPCC: How the Key Issues Were Resolved
The Stockholm meeting that adopted the IPCC’s report on climate science saw governments and scientists debating several key issues before coming to a conclusion. Meena Raman who was at the meeting provides an account of the discussion on some key issues and how they were finally resolved.
By Meena Raman
Prior to the approval by governments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s ‘Summary for Policymakers’ of Working Group I on the ‘Physical Science Basis’, intense debates took place on several key issues.
Among the issues which were deliberated during the meeting of Working Group 1 (WG1), which began on 23 September 2013 in Stockholm, Sweden, included: the “pause” in the warming trend for the 15-year period from 1998 to 2012; the lack of temperature data for the pre-industrial period from 1750; the evaluation of climate models and their reliability in reproducing observations; the emission cuts needed by 2050 relative to 1990; and the carbon budget remaining in relation to temperature limits.
Also addressed was the issue of ‘geo-engineering’.
Concerns raised by governments were in some cases referred to contact groups or informal consultations for resolution. The Summary for Policy Makers (SPM) was approved by governments on 27 September.
Below are highlights from some of the discussions.
‘Pause’ in warming
When the initial draft of the SPM (dated 7 June 2013) was made available to governments, a key issue of concern was reference to “the global mean surface temperature trends, where the rate of warming over the past 15 years (1998-2012) was smaller than the trend since 1951”. (This has been referred to in the media as a ‘pause’ in the warming).
“The mean rate of warming for the 15 years was 0.05 degree C compared to the mean rate per decade (1951-2012) of 0.12 degree C,” according to the SPM.
According to Thomas Stocker (Switzerland), who is the co-chair of WG1, concerns were raised by some governments regarding the scientific basis of looking at short term periods. He said that an equal number of governments felt that this (15 years) is an important period of time on which the IPCC has to make a statement on a scientific basis.
During the meeting, several governments including Germany, Switzerland and the United States said that it is important to discuss the 15 years as this is now in the public domain and explanation is needed.
Germany stressed that showing trends alone is misleading and there is need to also show the context. It said that the impression given is that warming is going to slow down or is halted. It wanted reflection of the trends for the following 15 years.
This was however not agreed to.
The US emphasised the need to address inter-annual variability. It also wanted the mention of 1998 being an El Nino event. The US said that the rate of warming since the late 1990s is very sensitive to choice of start dates.
(An El Nino event is a temporary change in the climate of the Pacific Ocean, in the region around the equator where effects are seen in both the ocean and atmosphere, generally in the Northern Hemisphere winter. Typically, the ocean surface warms up by a few degrees Celsius).
China said that it is important to reflect the temperature changes which are a fact and to also reflect the short term uncertainty.
Saudi Arabia stressed the need to state the internal climate variability.
The final paragraph agreed to is as follows: “In addition to robust multi-decadal warming, global mean surface temperature exhibits substantial decadal and inter-annual variability. Due to natural variability, trends based on short records are very sensitive to the beginning and end dates and do not in general reflect long-term climate trends. As one example, the rate of warming over the past 15 years (1998-2012; 0.05 [-0.05 to +0.15] degrees C per decade), which begins with a strong El Nino, is smaller than the rate calculated since 1951 (1951-2012; 0.12 [0.08 to 0.14] degrees C per decade).”
A footnote was added that reads: “Trends for 15-year periods starting in 1995, 1996, and 1997 are 0.13 [0.02 to 0.24], 0.14 [0.03 to 0.24], 0.07 [-0.02 to 0.18] degrees C per decade, respectively.”
Lack of temperature data for pre-industrial period
During the discussion on ‘observed changes to the climate system’ relating to the atmosphere, an issue which arose was the reference year used.
In the initial draft circulated to the governments in June, the paragraph of concern read as follows: “The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data show an increase of 0.89 [0.69 to 1.08] degrees C over the period 1901-2012. Over this period, almost the entire globe has experienced surface warming.”
The Netherlands said that the SPM did not make clear why 1901 was chosen, and asked why different sections used different reference years. It referred to negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where the reference year is 1990 and there is agreement to hold the increase in global average temperature to below 2 degrees C above pre-industrial levels. It suggested the use of the period 1850-2012.
This was supported by Norway, which added that it is important to peg the reference year to the pre-industrial level of 1850.
St. Lucia also agreed with the Netherlands that it is important to have a consistent reference period from 1850 for policymakers.
In response, the authors (who are scientists) said there are several reasons for choosing 1901 to 2012, as they wanted to highlight the long-term change and that before 1901, data coverage and quality was sparse, hence the focus on 1901. The other reason is that comparison with previous SPMs (of previous IPCC assessments) is now possible because they also start in 1901.
Stocker said that 1901 is a conscious choice because of the availability of the datasets.
The Netherlands insisted that for policymakers, 1850 is the relevant period for the 2 degrees C. Germany also said that the temperature estimate between 1850 to 1901 is important.
Stocker, in response, said the temperature figure for the period 1880-2012 could be given as this is the result from three datasets.
The United Kingdom also wanted a reference to the pre-industrial period as this is what is referred to in the Convention.
Germany referred to the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report (AR4) where the total temperature increase was from 1850-1999 and from 2001-2005. It wanted the authors to provide figures that allow for direct comparability.
India said that it would be appropriate to give the same period and give direct comparison with AR4 time periods. If there are data limitations, qualifying statements about the limitations of that figure should be provided.
Stocker also clarified that on the use of the term ‘pre-industrial’, that term is used to refer to the period that goes back to 1750. So, the period from 1850 is what we would call as early instrumental period, and then from 1900, is the period with instrumental observations.
The authors reiterated that the datasets on a global scale go back only to 1850; there are sparse observations that go back to 1750 on a global scale.
The UK said that there must be some way of addressing the issue of the ‘pre-industrial’ period. Germany said that there could be text to say “pre-industrial, approximated by 1850-1900”.
Brazil said that the pre-industrial period refers back to 1750, and it did not think one can use 1850 as an approximation for that as there is a difference of 100 years.
Given the lack of consensus in this regard, an informal consultation group was formed to discuss the issue.
Following the informal consultation, what was finally agreed to is as follows: “The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 to 1.06] degrees C, over the period 1880-2012, when multiple independently produced datasets exist. The total increase between the average of the 1850-1900 period and the 2003-2012 period is 0.78 [0.72 to 0.85] degrees C, based on the single longest dataset available.”
A footnote was added at the end of the paragraph which reads: “Both methods presented in this bullet were also used in AR4. The first calculates the difference using a best fit linear trend of all points between 1880 and 2012. The second calculates the difference between averages for the two periods 1850 to 1900 and 2003 to 2012. Therefore, the resulting values and their 90% uncertainty intervals are not directly comparable.”
Evaluation of climate models
The SPM which was approved states that “understanding recent changes in the climate system results from combining observations, studies of feedback processes, and model simulations. Evaluation of the ability of climate models to simulate recent changes requires consideration of the state of all modelled climate system components at the start of the simulation and the natural and anthropogenic forcing used to drive the models. Compared to AR4, more detailed and longer observations and improved climate models now enable the attribution of a human contribution to detected changes in more climate system components”.
In the SPM, under the section on ‘understanding recent changes in the climate system’, one aspect relates to the ‘evaluation of climate models’.
In this regard, in the June version of the draft of the SPM, there was a statement that “there is very high confidence that models reproduce the more rapid warming in the second half of the 20th century and cooling immediately following large volcanic eruptions. Models do not generally reproduce the observed reduction in surface warming trend over the last 10-15 years. There is medium confidence that this difference between models and observations is to a substantial degree caused by unpredictable climate variability, with possible contributions from inadequacies in the solar, volcanic, and aerosol forcings used by the models and, in some models, from too strong a response to increasing green-house gas forcing.”
Following comments by various governments prior to the meeting in Stockholm, the authors amended the above paragraph to read as follows: “The long-term climate model simulations show a trend in global-mean surface temperature from 1951-2012 that agrees with the observed trend, despite differences between simulated and observed trends over the past 10-15 years (very high confidence).”
“The observed reduction in surface warming trend over the period 1998-2012 as compared to the period 1951-2012, is due in roughly equal measure to a reduced trend in radiative forcing and a cooling contribution from internal variability, which includes a possible redistribution of heat within the ocean (medium confidence). The reduced trend in radiative forcing is primarily due to volcanic eruptions and the timing of the downward phase of the 11-year solar cycle. However, there is low confidence in quantifying the role of changes in radiative forcing in causing the reduced warming trend. There is medium confidence that internal decadal variability causes to a substantial degree the difference between observations and the simulations; the latter are not expected to reproduce the timing of internal variability.”
(Levels of confidence is the IPCC indicator for the robustness of conclusions drawn from the data and literature that is assessed.)
Venezuela sought clarification over the ‘very high confidence’ judgement by the authors while China said that the paragraphs above were new and are supposed to be an evaluation of the climate models. It wanted to know the advantages and disadvantages of the models and said the June version of the SPM draft had this.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Saudi Arabia.
The United States said the paragraphs did relate to the evaluation of the models and it is about observations in a broader context and not just 10 to 15 years. Switzerland said that one could not test models in 15 years.
Saudi Arabia, referring to the Technical Summary of WG1, wanted the following sentence added: “Most, though not all, models overestimate the observed warming trend in the tropical troposphere over the last 30 years, and tend to underestimate the long-term lower-stratospheric cooling trend.”
(The Technical Summary is drawn from the full report of the Working Group.)
Following consultations with the authors, the following compromise was reached at around 2 am on Thursday, 26 September: “The long-term climate model simulations show a trend in global-mean surface temperature from 1951 to 2012 that agrees with the observed trend (very high confidence). There are, however, differences between simulated and observed trends over periods as short as 10 to 15 years (e.g., 1998 to 2012).”
“The observed reduction in surface warming trend over the period 1998-2012 as compared to the period 1951-2012, is due in roughly equal measure to a reduced trend in radiative forcing and a cooling contribution from internal variability, which includes a possible redistribution of heat within the ocean (medium confidence). The reduced trend in radiative forcing is primarily due to volcanic eruptions and the timing of the downward phase of the 11-year solar cycle. However, there is low confidence in quantifying the role of changes in radiative forcing in causing the reduced warming trend. There is medium confidence that internal decadal variability causes to a substantial degree the difference between observations and the simulations; the latter are not expected to reproduce the timing of internal variability. There may also be a contribution from forcing inadequacies and, in some models, an overestimate of the response to increasing greenhouse gas and other anthropogenic forcing (dominated by the effects of aerosols).”
When the meeting resumed on the final day at around 8 am, Germany requested a reconsideration of the last sentence in the paragraph above as it had concerns.
Since agreement on the above paragraph had been gavelled, Stocker did not want a re-opening of the agreed text.
Emission reductions required by 2050
Under the discussion on ‘Future global and regional climate change’, the SPM which was approved states that: “Projections of changes in the climate system are made using a hierarchy of climate models… These models simulate changes based on a set of scenarios of anthropogenic forcings. A new set of scenarios, the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), was used for the new climate model simulations… In all RCPs, atmospheric CO2 concentrations are higher in 2100 relative to present day as a result of a further increase of cumulative emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere during the 21st century.”
(The four RCPs used are RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, and RCP8.5, and named after a possible range of radiative forcing values in the year 2100).
One aspect that was discussed in this regard related to ‘carbon and other biogeochemical cycles’.
Member States were asked to consider the following statement: “Based on Earth System Models, following RCP2.6 requires by 2050 an average emission reduction of 50% (range 14% to 96%) relative to 1990 emissions, and requires, about as likely as not, sustained net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere by the end of the 21st century.”
Germany wanted additional information on the emissions pathway beyond 2050 and asked for a figure for emissions reduction in 2080.
China expressed concerns as to how one single figure is obtained and asked how the 50% figure was obtained when this is not what the ranges indicate. It also said that no information has been provided from other scenarios and that only one scenario in RCP2.6 is considered.
Saudi Arabia said that members are talking about projections that would resonate with policymakers. It can be misleading to talk about a range from 14% to 96%. It wanted the entire paragraph deleted. Russia also had similar concerns.
A contact group was formed to address this issue. Following the discussions, the following paragraph was agreed to: “By 2050, annual CO2 emissions derived from Earth System Models following RCP2.6 are smaller than 1990 emissions (by 14% to 96%)… By the end of the 21st century, about half of the models infer emissions slightly above zero, while the other half infers a net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere.”
Carbon budget
In the discussion on ‘climate stabilisation’, Member States were asked to consider the following paragraph: “Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone to likely less than 2 degrees C relative to pre-industrial, will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources to stay below about 1000 GtC since the beginning of the industrial era. This amount is reduced to about 800 GtC when accounting for non-CO2 forcings as in RCP2.6. An amount of 545 [460 to 630] GtC, was already emitted by 2011.”
China raised concerns that the cumulative reductions required to stay below 2 degrees C are not consistent with the figures in the underlying assessment report of WG1 which reflect that emission reductions should be in the range of 800-2500 GtC between 1750 to 2100.
The US said that the IPCC is supposed to be policy neutral and the information needs to be presented in a neutral way.
Informal consultations were held in this regard and the text which was agreed is as follows: “Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone with a probability of >33%, >50%, and >66% to less than 2 degrees C since the period 1861-1880, will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources to stay between 0 and about 1560 GtC, 0 and about 1210 GtC, and 0 and about 1000 GtC since that period respectively. These upper amounts are reduced to about 880 GtC, 840 GtC, and 800 GtC respectively, when accounting for non-CO2 forcings as in RCP2.6. An amount of 531 [446 to 616] GtC, was already emitted by 2011.”
Geo-engineering
Another issue in the SPM concerns ‘geo-engineering’.
Member States were asked to consider the following statement: “Methods that aim to deliberately alter the climate system to counter climate change, termed geo-engineering, have been proposed. Limited evidence precludes a comprehensive quantitative assessment of both Solar Radiation Management (SRM) and Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and their impact on the climate system. CDR methods have biogeochemical and technological limitations to their potential on a global scale. There is insufficient knowledge to quantify how much CO2 emissions could be partially offset by CDR on a century timescale. Modelling indicates that SRM methods, if realizable, have the potential to substantially offset a global temperature rise, but they would also modify the global water cycle, and would not reduce ocean acidification. If SRM were terminated for any reason, there is high confidence that global surface temperatures would rise very rapidly to values consistent with the greenhouse gas forcing. CDR and SRM methods carry unintended side effects and long-term consequences on a global scale.”
The US raised concerns over the last sentence, as it felt that it overstated the state of science in that the side effects are known and that they were unintended. It wanted reflection of the uncertainties in understanding.
The authors responded that there is evidence of the side effects but were prepared to delete the word ‘unintended’ from the last sentence. This led to agreement of the text.
Comments Off on IPCC Report: Main Points and Analysis
The following are the main points (and their significance) of the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The author, Meena Raman, followed the discussions in Stockholm as an observer.
By Meena Raman
At the break of dawn just past 5 am on Friday, 27 September 2013, member governments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) approved the ‘Summary for Policymakers’ of the assessment report of its Working Group I on ‘Climate Change 2013: the Physical Science Basis’.
The formal approval in Stockholm, Sweden of the ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (SPM) at the 36th session of the IPCC was preceded by the 12th session of Working Group I (WG1). The WG1 meeting, which began on Monday, 23 September to consider the report, was to have ended on Thursday, 26 September.
However, it spilled over till the following day when agreement was finally reached past 4.30 am, and was greeted with wide applause and relief by delegates who were exhausted from working round the clock almost two nights in a row.
The meeting was attended by member governments of the IPCC, scientists who authored the report and observers.
The SPM presents a stark and dire warning about climate change science, stressing that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.”
It also states that “limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.”
It further warns that “cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond. Most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO2 are stopped. This represents a substantial multi-century climate change commitment created by past, present and future emissions of CO2.” (See further details below.)
Among some issues which saw intense discussions included: the “pause” in the warming trend for the 15-year period from 1998 to 2012; the lack of temperature data for the pre-industrial period from 1750; the evaluation of climate models and their reliability in reproducing observations; the emission reduction cuts required by 2050 relative to 1990 level; and the carbon budget remaining in relation to temperature limits.
The SPM was adopted after it was commented on extensively by governments, which proposed several amendments to the draft.
The report integrates and condenses a vast body of scientific literature from an underlying report on the physical science basis of climate change, which took six years to produce. The underlying report was released on 30 September 2013 by the IPCC.
WG1 on the ‘physical science basis’ is one of three Working Groups contributing to the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR5). WGII assesses ‘impacts, adaptation and vulnerability’, while WGIII assesses ‘options for mitigating climate change’. The latter two WG reports will be released this year.
The rigorous scrutiny by governments of the SPM was expected, given the AR5’s significance for on-going negotiations for a new agreement under the Durban Platform in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The draft SPM report of WG1 was closely examined by member governments on a line-by-line basis, which saw long and sometimes intense exchanges among governments themselves and with its authors. Several difficult issues had to be resolved through contact groups or informal small groups, which at times took many long hours to reach consensus.
Among the governments who often intervened are Brazil, China, Saudi Arabia, Fiji, St. Lucia, Kenya, Mali, Venezuela, India, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and the European Union. These interventions led to many changes to the draft document.
The WG1 meeting in Stockholm was co-chaired by Qin Dahe (China) and Thomas Stocker (Switzerland), who are Co-Chairs of WG1.
The SPM is 36 pages long and contains four main sections: ‘Observed changes in the climate system’; ‘Drivers of climate change’; ‘Understanding the climate system and its recent changes’; and ‘Future global and regional climate change’.
Among the main headline statements of the SPM are:
Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850. In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983-2012 was likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years (medium confidence).
Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system, accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 2010 (high confidence). It is virtually certain that the upper ocean (0-700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it likely warmed between the 1870s and 1971.
Over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass, glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide, and Arctic sea ice and Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover have continued to decrease in extent (high confidence).
The rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia (high confidence). Over the period 1901-2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m.
The atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, and nitrous oxide have increased to levels unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. CO2 concentrations have increased by 40% since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and secondarily from net land use change emissions. The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon dioxide, causing ocean acidification.
Total radiative forcing is positive, and has led to an uptake of energy by the climate system. The largest contribution to total radiative forcing is caused by the increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1750. (‘Radiative forcing’ is the difference of radiant energy received by the earth and energy radiated back to space).
Human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes. This evidence for human influence has grown since AR4 (the 4th IPCC Asessment Report). It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate system.
Global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century is likely to exceed 1.5 degrees C relative to 1850 to 1900 for all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6. It is likely to exceed 2 degrees C for RCP6.0 and RCP8.5, and more likely than not to exceed 2 degrees C for RCP4.5.
[RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) are four greenhouse gas concentration (not emissions) trajectories adopted by the IPCC for the AR5. They describe four possible climate futures, all of which are considered possible depending on how much greenhouse gases are emitted in the years to come. The four RCPs are RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, and RCP8.5, and named after a possible range of radiative forcing values in the year 2100.]
Changes in the global water cycle in response to the warming over the 21st century will not be uniform. The contrast in precipitation between wet and dry regions and between wet and dry seasons will increase, although there may be regional exceptions.
The global ocean will continue to warm during the 21st century. Heat will penetrate from the surface to the deep ocean and affect ocean circulation.
It is very likely that the Arctic sea ice cover will continue to shrink and thin and that Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover will decrease during the 21st century as global mean surface temperature rises. Global glacier volume will further decrease.
Global mean sea level will continue to rise during the 21st century. Under all RCP scenarios, the rate of sea level rise will very likely exceed that observed during 1971-2010 due to increased ocean warming and increased loss of mass from glaciers and ice sheets.
Climate change will affect carbon cycle processes in a way that will exacerbate the increase of CO2 in the atmosphere (high confidence). Further uptake of carbon by the ocean will increase ocean acidification.
The WGII contribution on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability will be considered by the IPCC in Yokohama, Japan, on 25-29 March 2014, while the WGIII contribution on mitigation options for climate change will be considered in Berlin on 7-11 April 2014.
The AR5 will be completed with the Synthesis Report that will be considered by the IPCC in Copenhagen on 27-31 October 2014.
Meena Raman is Legal Advisor of the Third World Network.
Comments Off on Brazil’s President Dilma Attacks Internet Spying at UN General Assembly Speech
The annual UN General Assembly summit opened on Tuesday, 24 September 2013. The atmosphere was electrifying when the first speaker among political leaders, President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil, strongly criticised the internet spying activities of the United States that have been recently revealed in the global media.
The Brazilian President described the internet spying as “a situation of grave violation of human rights and of civil liberties; of invasion and capture of confidential information concerning corporate activities, and especially of disrespect to national sovereignty”.
She also called for the creation of “multilateral mechanisms for the worldwide network” and proposed five principles for the multilateral governance of the internet.
President Obama of the United States spoke directly after President Dilma, but did not make any reference to her speech.
Below is an excerpt of President Dilma Rousseff’s speech at the General Assembly that pertains to the internet spying issue and global internet governance.
“Mr. President,
I would like to bring to the consideration of delegations a matter of great importance and gravity.
Recent revelations concerning the activities of a global network of electronic espionage have caused indignation and repudiation in public opinion around the world.
In Brazil, the situation was even more serious, as it emerged that we were targeted by this intrusion. Personal data of citizens was intercepted indiscriminately. Corporate information – often of high economic and even strategic value – was at the center of espionage activity. Also, Brazilian diplomatic missions, among them the Permanent Mission to the United Nations and the Office of the President of the Republic itself, had their communications intercepted.
Tampering in such a manner in the affairs of other countries is a breach of International Law and is an affront to the principles that must guide the relations among them, especially among friendly nations. A sovereign nation can never establish itself to the detriment of another sovereign nation. The right to safety of citizens of one country can never be guaranteed by violating fundamental human rights of citizens of another country.
The arguments that the illegal interception of information and data aims at protecting nations against terrorism cannot be sustained.
Brazil, Mr. President, knows how to protect itself. We reject, fight and do not harbor terrorist groups.
We are a democratic country surrounded by nations that are democratic, pacific and respectful of International Law. We have lived in peace with our neighbors for more than 140 years.
As many other Latin Americans, I fought against authoritarianism and censorship, and I cannot but defend, in an uncompromising fashion, the right to privacy of individuals and the sovereignty of my country. In the absence of the right to privacy, there can be no true freedom of expression and opinion, and therefore no effective democracy. In the absence of the respect for sovereignty, there is no basis for the relationship among Nations.
We face, Mr. President, a situation of grave violation of human rights and of civil liberties; of invasion and capture of confidential information concerning corporate activities, and especially of disrespect to national sovereignty.
We expressed to the Government of the United States our disapproval, and demanded explanations, apologies and guarantees that such procedures will never be repeated. Friendly governments and societies that seek to build a true strategic partnership, as in our case, cannot allow recurring illegal actions to take place as if they were normal. They are unacceptable.
Brazil, Mr. President, will redouble its efforts to adopt legislation, technologies and mechanisms to protect us from the illegal interception of communications and data.
My Government will do everything within its reach to defend the human rights of all Brazilians and to protect the fruits borne from the ingenuity of our workers and our companies.
The problem, however, goes beyond a bilateral relationship. It affects the international community itself and demands a response from it. Information and telecommunication technologies cannot be the new battlefield between States. Time is ripe to create the conditions to prevent cyberspace from being used as a weapon of war, through espionage, sabotage, and attacks against systems and infrastructure of other countries.
The United Nations must play a leading role in the effort to regulate the conduct of States with regard to these technologies.
For this reason, Brazil will present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet and to ensure the effective protection of data that travels through the web.
We need to create multilateral mechanisms for the worldwide network that are capable of ensuring principles such as:
1 – Freedom of expression, privacy of the individual and respect for human rights.
2 – Open, multilateral and democratic governance, carried out with transparency by stimulating collective creativity and the participation of society, Governments and the private sector.
3 – Universality that ensures the social and human development and the construction of inclusive and non-discriminatory societies.
4 – Cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, customs and values.
5 – Neutrality of the network, guided only by technical and ethical criteria, rendering it inadmissible to restrict it for political, commercial, religious or any other purposes.
Harnessing the full potential of the Internet requires, therefore, responsible regulation, which ensures at the same time freedom of expression, security and respect for human rights”.
Comments Off on G77 Statement at Inaugural Meeting of High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
The afternoon of 24 September 2013 saw the launching of the new High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) at the United Nations in New York as part of the series of General Assembly meetings.
Many political leaders at level of heads of governments and states were present at this inaugural meeting, and spoke.
The HLPF was created through the Rio+20 summit on sustainable development in June 2012. It is replacing the 20-year-old Commission on Sustainable Development, which held its last meeting on 20 September.
The Prime Minister of Fiji Mr. J.V. Bainimarama presented a statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the HLPF inaugural meeting. His speech is reproduced below.
Last Friday, at the 20th and final session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, we celebrated the legacy of the Commission. While we reflected on the lessons learned from twenty years of the work of the Commission, we also look forward to the rise of the High-level Political Forum, which we firmly believe should be a more vibrant and robust platform, with high-level political visibility, for sustainable development.
We all agree that the lessons learned from the Commission of Sustainable Development should be the starting point for giving shape and content to the High-level Political Forum. We must now commit our collective political weight at the highest levels, to give the necessary political guidance to the High-level Political Forum in ensuring its central role within a strengthened institutional framework for sustainable development. The Forum should therefore provide a leadership role to complement the functions and roles of UN bodies, including the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in the field of sustainable development. In this regard, coherence among relevant bodies will be an essential prerequisite.
The Group of 77 and China holds the view that the High-level Political Forum should provide political leadership to further enhance international cooperation on sustainable development. The Forum should address sustainable development challenges from the prism of poverty eradication as its overarching objective. It should comprehensively implement the Rio+20 mandates and follow-up on the fulfillment of commitments, especially those related to the means of implementation: finance, technology and capacity building. Moreover, the Forum should also coordinate and contribute to the enhanced integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development in a holistic and cross-sectoral manner at all levels.
Building on the strength of its universal character, the High-level Political Forum should take a leading role in designing the United Nations development agenda, including in particular the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda. It is also essential for the High-level Political Forum to be adequately financed to carry out the functions mandated for it by paragraph 85 of the outcome document of the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in all the three dimensions of sustainable development.
An important lesson to be retained from the Commission of Sustainable Development experience is for the High-level Political Forum to continue the Commission’s openness towards the participation of major groups. Multi-stakeholder dialogues should reflect geographical balance, including think tanks and research institutions from the South, such as the South Centre and the Third World Network, or newly established regional organizations from the developing world such as the Pacific Islands Development Forum. This participatory and inclusive approach to the implementation of sustainable development will make the Forum more effective in advancing the sustainable development agenda. The High-level Political Forum should serve as a conduit for all those voices who wish to be heard, whose perspectives and contributions matter as much as those of policy makers.
Going forward, we wish to stress the importance for all High-level Political Forum meetings, when convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, to operate under the rules of procedure of the main committees of the General Assembly, as stipulated in resolution 67/290. Adherence to these rules is critical in maintaining the Forum’s universal character, which ensures the full and effective participation of all Member States of the United Nations and the States Members of specialised agencies.
Today, we bear witness to a historical event. The inaugural meeting of the High-level Political Forum gives us a sense of hope that we will begin anew and embark on a path that would allow us to work together for a better future, one that is free from suffering, poverty and hunger. I trust that today’s deliberations will provide a solid base for future sessions of the High-level Political Forum to build on.
Comments Off on G77 on Post-2015 Development Agenda Launching
Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Mr. J. V. Bainimarama, Prime Minister of the Republic of Fiji, Chair of the Group of 77, at the Special Event towards achieving the MDGs (New York, 25 September 2013).
While recent assessments indicate progress has been made towards achieving several targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), we are cognizant of the implementation gaps and unevenness in advancing these goals. Poverty eradication is at the heart of the global development agenda. It is recognised and affirmed at the Rio+20 Summit last year that poverty remains the greatest global challenge and an indispensible requirement for sustainable development.
We are conscious of the special development challenges of developing countries especially those who have been marginalized and left furthest behind. It is imperative for us, as Heads of State and Government, to use this historical opportunity to reaffirm our collective political commitment and redouble our efforts to accelerate the achievement of the MDGs with a sense of urgency and determination.
The Group of 77 and China reiterates its strong call to address the key implementation gaps of the MDGs and the poverty agenda over the next two years as we elaborate a roadmap towards a post-2015 development agenda. We call for concrete measures towards those countries which need the most of our help to achieve the MDGs. Central to this renewed effort is the urgent need to leverage an enhanced and strong global partnership, building on MDG 8, to accelerate MDG implementation. Our efforts to tackle poverty as a priority must be infused with a spirit of genuine global partnership which recognises the critical importance of the effective means of implementation in developing countries. In this regard, we call on countries to urgently fulfill the ODA commitments they have made, individually and collectively, including the implementation of all commitments made under the global partnership for development to overcome the gaps identified in the MDG Gap Task Force report in 2013.
The Group of 77 and China welcomes the adoption of a negotiated outcome document for this Special Event on the MDGs. This inter-governmentally negotiated outcome document underscores the importance we placed on this high-level meeting of world leaders. It conveys the aspirational message to the world that all States are working together in a collaborative manner with the UN system and other stakeholders to seriously address the implementation gaps of the MDGs. The outcome document also acknowledges the various processes mandated in the Rio+20 Summit that are currently underway, in particular the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals and the inter-governmental committee of experts on financing for development, as well as the process to establish a technology facilitation mechanism to promote the development, transfer and dissemination of clean and environmentally sound technologies. Significantly, this outcome document provides a roadmap for the UN development agenda beyond 2015 while ensuring the primary role of the inter-governmental process in the formulation of this new global development agenda.
As we take the work beyond 2015 and set the stage for an inclusive inter-governmental process, it is important for us to reaffirm our resolve that the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda continue to be guided by the principles and values enshrined in the Millennium Declaration, the outcome document of Rio+20, and the outcomes of all the major UN conferences and summits in the economic, social and environmental fields. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) is of paramount importance as a guiding principle in crafting the future development agenda as it takes into account and respects the differing national circumstances and development priorities of developing countries.
This Special Event avails us a unique opportunity to call for real transformative changes to the way we address global development challenges. It is time to set the stage and usher in a new era in international development and cooperation. It is time to tell our citizens that we mean business to make the world a better place for everyone. Let us continue to shape the world together through our collective demonstration to safeguard and accelerate the achievements of the MDGs. Let us commit ourselves to build a better future we want!
Comments Off on UN General Assembly Special Event on MDGs: Outcome Document
The following is the full Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly’s MDGs Special Event, which has four sections: General introduction; Accelerating Progress in the MDGs; Global Partnership for Development; and the Post-2015 Development Agenda.
We, the Heads of State and Government and heads of delegation, have gathered at the United Nations Headquarters in New York at the Special Event convened by the President of the General Assembly, to review progress made towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and to chart the way forward. Our deliberations have taken account of the voices of people worldwide, and the concerns and priorities they conveyed.
We gather with a sense of urgency and determination, with less than 850 days remaining for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. We renew our commitment to the Goals and resolve to intensify all efforts for their achievement by 2015.
We welcome what has been achieved so far. The Millennium Development Goals have provided a common vision and contributed to remarkable progress. Significant and substantial advances have been made in meeting several of the targets.
However, we are concerned at the unevenness and gaps in achievement and at the immense challenges that remain. The MDGs are critical for meeting the basic needs of people in developing countries; as we approach the 2015 deadline, unrelenting efforts are required to accelerate progress across all the Goals.
Among and within developing countries, those who have been left furthest behind require our most urgent attention and support. We are conscious of the special challenges and needs of the least-developed countries; the fact that, despite some impressive progress, most African countries remain off-track in meeting the Goals; and that conflict and post conflict countries are the most challenged in achieving any of the Goals by 2015.
We also recognise the special challenges and needs of SIDS and the LLDCs, many of which are not on track to achieve the MDGs by 2015. We recognise the special challenges to meeting the MDGs faced by people living under foreign occupation. We acknowledge also the challenges to meeting the MDGs for people living in areas affected by complex humanitarian emergencies and in areas affected by terrorism. We also recognise the specific challenges which many middle-income countries face.
Accelerating Progress
We reaffirm our commitment to the outcome document of the High Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on the MDGs held in 2010.The annual Millennium Development Goals reports provide updated assessments of where our efforts are most needed, and will assist us in framing our approach and priorities.
We resolve to particularly target the most off-track MDGs and those where progress has stalled: including those relating to poverty and hunger, universal access to primary education, child mortality, universal access to reproductive health, including maternal health, environmental sustainability and access to water and sanitation. In each of these areas, we are determined to take the purposeful and coordinated action required. We will scale up proven interventions, fulfil the pledges we have made; and strengthen our support for the range of valuable initiatives under way, including international support for the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development.
Across all our acceleration efforts, we will emphasise inclusivity and accessibility for all, and will place a particular focus on those who are most vulnerable and disadvantaged. We will, for example, seek to build the resilience of the poorest in combating hunger, to improve support for women giving birth in areas of greatest deprivation, and to improve educational opportunity and learning outcomes for the most vulnerable children.
Where efforts are broadly on track, and a momentum exists, we will do everything possible to sustain and reinforce it: for example, in combating HIV/AIDS, we will step up efforts to meet the goal of universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support services by 2015.We will sustain and build on the remarkable gains in the fight against malaria and tuberculosis.
We will place a strong emphasis on all approaches that have a cross-cutting and multiplier effect. In particular, we recognise that promoting gender equality, and empowering women and girls, underpins and advances progress across all the Goals. We will resolutely promote gender equality and eliminate the range of barriers to women’s and girls’ empowerment in our societies.
Global Partnership for Development
We underline the central role of a strengthened global partnership for development. We recognise the importance of national ownership, and emphasise that if the MDGs are to be achieved by 2015, national efforts need to be assisted by international support and an enabling international environment. The mobilisation and effective use of all resources, public and private, domestic and international, will be vital.
We reaffirm the importance of promoting human rights, good governance, the rule of law, transparency and accountability at all levels.
We call for the urgent implementation of all commitments under the global partnership for development so as to overcome the gaps identified in the MDG Gap Taskforce Reports. We emphasise the need to accelerate progress towards the target of 0.7% of GNI as ODA by 2015, including 0.15% to 0.20% for least developed countries. We call on developed countries to urgently fulfil the ODA commitments they have made, individually and collectively.
We underline the need for the business sector to engage in responsible business practices.
Post-2015 Development Agenda
In parallel with intensification of efforts to accelerate achievement of the MDGs, we are determined to craft a strong post-2015 development agenda, which will build on the foundations laid by the MDGs, complete the unfinished business and respond to new challenges.
As we take the work forward, we reaffirm our commitment to the Millennium Declaration, the outcome document of Rio+20, the Monterrey Consensus, the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development and the outcomes of all the major UN conferences and summits in the economic, social, and environmental fields. We will continue to be guided by the values and principles enshrined in these texts.
We reaffirm all the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 thereof.
We are resolved that the post-2015 development agenda should reinforce the international community’s commitment to poverty eradication and sustainable development. We underscore the central imperative of poverty eradication and are committed to freeing humanity from poverty and hunger as a matter of urgency. Recognising the intrinsic interlinkage between poverty eradication and promotion of sustainable development, we underline the need for a coherent approach which integrates in a balanced manner the three dimensions of sustainable development. This coherent approach involves working towards a single framework and set of Goals –universal in nature and applicable to all countries, while taking account of differing national circumstances and respecting national policies and priorities. It should also promote peace and security, democratic governance, the rule of law, gender equality and human rights for all.
We decide today to launch a process of intergovernmental negotiations at the beginning of the 69th session of UNGA which will lead to the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda.
We acknowledge with appreciation the processes mandated in the Rio + 20 outcome document that are now underway, in particular the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals and the inter-governmental committee of experts on Sustainable Development Financing, as well as the process to develop options for a technology facilitation mechanism. We urge that these processes should complete their work in a comprehensive, balanced and expeditious manner by September 2014.
The report submitted by the Secretary General in advance of today’s meeting, which draws on inputs from the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons, United Nations Development Group consultations, the United Nations Global Compact, and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, is a useful input to our deliberations.
Over the coming year, preparation of the post-2015 development agenda will benefit from the General Assembly events to be convened by the President of the General Assembly under the theme “The Post-2015 Development Agenda – Setting the Stage”.
In arriving at an inclusive and people-centred post-2015 development agenda, we look forward to a transparent intergovernmental process which will include inputs from all stakeholders including civil society, scientific and knowledge institutions, parliaments, local authorities, and the private sector.
We count on the strong support of the UN system throughout all our work. As an input to the intergovernmental negotiations to be launched at the beginning of the 69th session of UNGA, we call on the Secretary General to synthesise the full range of inputs then available and to present a synthesis report before the end of 2014.
The final phase of the intergovernmental work will culminate in a Summit at HoSG level in September 2015 for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda. We request the President of the General Assembly to convene, in a timely manner, intergovernmental consultations to achieve agreement on organisational modalities for the Summit.
Comments Off on UN Development Summit in September 2015, Post-2015 Development Agenda Negotiations to Start September 2014
The UN will hold a Development Summit in September 2015 to adopt a Post-2015 Development Agenda. Negotiations among governments will start in September 2014 towards an outcome for the Summit. This was decided at a special event on the MDGs held under the General Assembly in New York on 25 September 2013.
By Martin Khor
A Summit of political leaders will be held in September 2015 to adopt the United Nations’ Post-2015 Development Agenda.
This was decided on 25 September 2013 at a special event to review the Millennium Development Goals held at the UN in New York, as part of the General Assembly events.
To prepare for the Summit and its outcome, an inter-governmental process will be launched in September 2014, at the beginning of the 69th session of the UN General Assembly.
“The final phase of the intergovernmental work will culminate in a Summit at heads of states and governments level in September 2015 for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda,” states an “outcome document” adopted during the special MDGs event on 25 September.
“We request the President of the General Assembly to convene, in a timely manner, intergovernmental consultations to achieve agreement on organisational modalities for the Summit.”
The special event on the follow up on efforts to achieve the MDGs was convened by the President of the General Assembly, Ambassador John Ashe, as part of the General Assembly events taking place in New York.
The 25 September event included speeches by political leaders of governments and states at the opening session and in four subsequent roundtables. Other speakers included ministers, business leaders and civil society representatives. The participants adopted the outcome document at the end of the event.
The timing of the start of the inter-governmental negotiations for the Development Agenda (i.e. only in September 2014, rather than straightaway) seems to have been decided on to take into account the present work of three other processes in the follow-up to the Rio+20 Summit of 2012.
The outcome document acknowledged the Rio+20 follow-up processes now underway at the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, the intergovernmental committee of experts on Sustainable Development Financing, as well as the process to develop options for a technology facilitation mechanism.
“We urge that these processes should complete their work in a comprehensive, balanced and expeditious manner by September 2014,” states the outcome document.
The sequencing implied is that these three processes (SDGs, financing and technology) complete their work in September 2014, and that the negotiations for the post-2015 Development Agenda would then begin its work also in September 2014.
The intention seems to be to avoid the overlap of the two processes (i.e. the post Rio+20 and the Development Agenda) in the year of October 2013 to September 2014.
Of course there is nothing to prevent governments and their groupings to hold their own preparatory and informal meetings on the Development Agenda already in the coming 12 months. However the formal negotiating process for the Development Agenda is mandated to begin only in or after September 2014.
Several government delegates have voiced concern (and impatience) that whilst the UN secretariat and UN agencies, as well as many NGOs and research institutions have already embarked on a lot of work on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, the governments have yet to begin work or negotiations on this at the multilateral UN level.
It seems they have to wait for another year, until September 2014, for the formal negotiating process to start.
A decision on even this did not come easily. According to diplomatic sources, the developing countries under the umbrella of the Group of 77 and China had to fight hard to have a negotiated and agreed outcome for the MDGs Special Event of 25 September. Many developed countries reportedly only wanted a “Chairman’s summary” which would carry much less weight in the UN and may not have mandated an intergovernmental process for the Development Agenda, nor a Summit.
Because an “outcome document” was agreed to for the 25 September event, the developing countries could then put forward their view that the post-2015 Development Agenda should have an intergovernmental negotiating process, which means there would be an outcome document to be agreed to by all UN Member States.
Additionally and importantly a Summit will now be convened in September 2015 for political leaders to discuss and adopt the outcome document of the post-2015 Development Agenda.
This of course gives a high profile and a high political weight to the Development Agenda and the negotiating process leading to its adoption.
In terms of the substantive terms of reference or framework for the Post 2015 Development Agenda and its negotiations, the following elements were agreed to in the 25 September outcome document:
It will be in parallel with intensification of efforts to accelerate achievement of the MDGs.
It will build on the foundations laid by the MDGs, complete the unfinished business and respond to new challenges.
Reaffirmation of commitment to the Millennium Declaration, the outcome document of Rio+20, the Monterrey Consensus, the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development and the outcomes of all the major UN conferences and summits in the economic, social, and environmental fields. “We will continue to be guided by the values and principles enshrined in these texts,” says the outcome document.
Reaffirmation of all the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including, inter alia, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as set out in principle 7 thereof.
It should reinforce the international community’s commitment to poverty eradication and sustainable development.
The central imperative of poverty eradication, commitment to freeing humanity from poverty and hunger as a matter of urgency.
It recognises the intrinsic inter-linkage between poverty eradication and promotion of sustainable development, and stresses the need for a coherent approach which integrates in a balanced manner the three dimensions of sustainable development.
This involves working towards a single framework and set of Goals, universal in nature and applicable to all countries, while taking account of differing national circumstances and respecting national policies and priorities.
It should also promote peace and security, democratic governance, the rule of law, gender equality and human rights for all.
In terms of the process towards the Post-2015 Development Agenda, the outcome document of 25 September contains these elements:
Acknowledging the Rio+20 processes, especially the SDGs working group, the sustainable development financing experts committee and the options for technology facilitation mechanism.
An inclusive and people-centred post-2015 development agenda, through a transparent intergovernmental process which will include inputs from all stakeholders including civil society, scientific and knowledge institutions, parliaments, local authorities, and the private sector.
Over the coming year, the President of the General Assembly will convene events under the theme “The Post-2015 Development Agenda – Setting the Stage”.
The support of the UN system and the Secretary General to synthesise the full range of inputs then available and to present a synthesis report before the end of 2014.
The President of the General Assembly to convene intergovernmental consultations to achieve agreement on organisational modalities for the Summit.
The process will culminate in a Summit at Heads of State and Government level in September 2015 for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda.
Comments Off on South Centre Statement at the COP19 in Warsaw
We meet today at a new era of extreme damage from extreme weather events. The typhoon that swept through Central Philippines and other parts of Asia is the most recent example. The cost in lives and property of these events is very high. Hurricane Sandy in the US caused damages requiring $60 billion for repair and rehabilitation.
Last year the world public hailed COP18 in Doha for agreeing to establish by COP19 institutional arrangements for loss and damage, including an international mechanism.
Meeting this deadline would be a visible sign of success in COP19. Missing it would expose us to the charge of being heartless and uncaring to the most urgent needs of poor and ordinary people already suffering the horrors of climate change effects.
COP19 has been called the Finance COP by developing countries. What they expect is a concrete plan and roadmap on the way from now to the agreed goal of $100 billion in 2020. Many developing countries have asked for a decision here for milestones such as $70 billion by 2016.
Also, Climate financing must be new and additional to normal ODA.
Unfortunately, we have reports from the OECD that ODA has fallen by a total of 6% in real terms in 2011 and 2012, the first decline since 1997. We don’t want climate financing to displace other worthwhile causes like poverty reduction, health and education. Thus there must be a reversal of ODA decline together with a tremendous rise in real climate financing, starting with a first round of funding to the Green Climate Fund next year.
If these two goals of loss and damage and financing are met in COP19, it will open the gates to greater confidence among Parties and to progress in negotiations towards the 2015 landmark. That is because equity is at the centre of any successful and sustainable agreement in mitigation. Loss and damage and finance are building blocks together with adaptation and technology transfer. Together they support the mitigation efforts of developing countries.
The South Centre will remain actively engaged in the UNFCCC which is the home of the global negotiation for our collective actions.
We hope COP19 will end successfully and make progress for the road ahead.
Comments Off on Loss and Damage Mechanism Set Up for Climate Change – Outcome of UN Climate Conference in Warsaw (COP19)
Below is an overview of the outcomes of the UN Climate Conference that took place in Warsaw (known as COP19 of the UNFCCC) for two weeks, ending on 23 November 2013. The noteworthy outcome was the decision establishing a Loss and Damage international mechanism—a victory for the developing countries.
By Martin Khor
The UN Climate Conference held in Warsaw has set up a new international mechanism to help developing countries affected by loss and damage from climate change, such as the Philippines typhoon.
The setting up of a loss and damage international mechanism was the major achievement of the 19th Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP19) that ended on Saturday, 23 November 2013 evening, a full day after its scheduled conclusion.
Other major outcomes of the Conference was a decision on how to proceed with negotiations on the Durban Platform, and seven decisions on climate finance. On the latter issue, the developing countries were deeply disappointed that what they termed as the Finance COP yielded hardly any concrete results except a topping up of funds for the depleted Adaptation Fund.
The new loss and damage mechanism to help victims of typhoons, floods, drought and other effects of climate change was set up after many days of negotiations. The landmark decision will open the road to international coordination of efforts to assist countries affected by extreme weather events and slow onslaught events.
The over 6,000 deaths and devastation to homes and towns in the Philippines caused by Typhoon Haiyan just as the conference started were a grim backdrop that helped spur the delegates as they worked to create the mechanism to deal with “loss and damage”, in the parlance of the UN talks.
The new mechanism is tasked to provide countries with technical support, to facilitate actions and improve coordination of work inside the UN Climate Convention as well as with other organisations.
Most importantly, it will also mobilise and secure funds, technology and capacity building activities to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.
There are already official UN humanitarian and disaster-related agencies as well as voluntary groups such as the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam that spring into action whenever a disaster such as the Philippine typhoon, the Asian tsunami of 2004, or the Haiti earthquake takes place.
But funds have to be raised when these events take place and that takes time and are not enough. Also, countries that are hit are often too devastated or poor to respond quickly.
It took many days before the victims of the Philippines typhoon or the tsunami in Aceh could be reached or helped with food, health care and shelter. And it will take years, if ever, for shattered houses, cities and farmlands to be rebuilt.
The loss and damage mechanism is meant to fill in the organisational and financial gaps within the UN Climate Convention, which is the world’s premier body dealing with climate change.
The UNFCCC presently mobilises funds for mitigation (reduction of emissions) and adaptation (preparing for the effects of climate change such as building sea-walls and drainage systems) but until now it did not have the clear mandate for helping countries recover from loss and damage.
With the new mechanism, a burst of pent-up energy and organisational efforts can be expected at least from developing countries which will also request for funding for this newly accepted issue of loss and damage inside the framework of the Climate Convention, and to complement the work of other agencies.
Damage caused by natural disasters has risen from about US$200 billion a year a decade ago to around US$300-400 billion annually in recent years. Climate scientists say that climate change is exacerbating the incidence and strength of extreme weather events.
Delegates from developing as well as developed countries at the Convention hall were in a jubilant mood when the decision to set up the “Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts” was gavelled after a last minute hitch in the negotiations.
Developing countries, led by the G77 and China and supported by several groups including the LDCs, Africa and AOSIS and individual countries like the Philippines and Bolivia, made an impassioned plea to amend the text that the loss and damage mechanism would be “under the Cancun Adaptation Framework”.
In the long days of negotiations, the developing countries made clear they wanted the loss and damage issue to be separate from adaptation because conceptually and operationally it should be treated on its own. As such, they did not want the implication of the mechanism being “under” the adaptation framework.
All developed countries except the United States had agreed that a different term than “under” be used instead, and a long time in the COP plenary on the loss and damage issue was spent in developing countries arguing the case for a different term than “under”, which was a proxy for a fight for an independent treatment in the Convention for the loss and damage concept and mechanism.
After a prolonged “huddle” between the US, the G77 and China and other developing and developed country delegations, a compromise was worked out that included three components: (i) adoption of a new preambular paragraph, (ii) the acceptance of the term “under” the adaptation framework but subject to a review of this in three years at COP22 in December 2016, and (iii) specific reference to a review on the structure, mandate and effectiveness in para 15, with an understanding (read out at the COP plenary by the Secretariat prior to the adoption of the decision) that the issue of structure would include the placement of the loss and damage mechanism.
An interpretative statement by the Philippines clarified its view that the review referred to in Para 15 includes a review of the mechanism’s institutional placement vis-à-vis the Cancun Adaptation Framework.
The important new preambular paragraph, emerging from the “huddle” and adopted by the COP, is as follows: “Also acknowledging that loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some cases involves more than, that which can be reduced by adaptation.” For developing countries, this means that the “loss and damage” concept and issue can go and does go beyond the adaptation issue in the Convention.
Up to now, the Convention recognises the two major elements of mitigation and adaptation. That loss and damage in some cases involves “more than adaptation” is a significant acknowledgement by the COP decision.
The final text adopted by the COP in its important operational para 1 is as follows: “Establishes the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage, under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, subject to review at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties (November–December 2016) pursuant to paragraph 15 below, to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change (hereinafter referred to as the Warsaw international mechanism), and in line with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2-15 below.”
The decision also in Para 2 established an executive committee of the Warsaw international mechanism, which shall function under the guidance of, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties, and to guide the implementation of functions.
As an interim measure, the executive committee shall consist of two representatives from each of the following bodies under the Convention; ensuring that there is a balanced representation between developed and developing country Parties: the Adaptation Committee, the LDCs Expert Group, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Technology Executive Committee and the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from non Annex I Parties.
The Warsaw international mechanism is given many functions, including (a) Enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including slow onset impacts; (b) Strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholders; and (c) Enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and capacity building, to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, so as to enable countries to undertake actions.
This decision on loss and damage lifted the general gloom that had been prevalent during most of the two-week negotiations at the annual UN climate convention.
There were two other pieces of good news—the adoption of a work programme for results based financing for reducing emissions from forest-related activities (known as REDD-plus) and pledges from developed countries to meet the goal of having US$100 million for the Adaptation Fund whose resources had dried up after the drastic fall in carbon prices.
Climate Financing Issues
The gloom was caused mainly by the lack of progress on the main issues of finance—how to mobilise funds up to the already pledged US$100 billion a year by 2020, to help developing countries take climate actions. So far there has only been a trickle of funds and no road map between now and the 2020 deadline.
The developing countries had persisted in asking that milestones on a roadmap be established, mentioning $70 billion by 2016, on the way to the $100 billion by 2020 target. This was not accepted by developed countries that did not agree to any roadmap or milestone. This gave rise to wide expressions of disappointment and frustration by many developing countries and their groupings. The G77 coordinator for finance mentioned this lack of figures and commitments as a “great failure” in what is supposed to be a Finance COP.
Some developed countries were even at one point not agreeing to continuing with a work programme on long-term finance. Eventually a decision was adopted on continuing deliberations on long-term finance which includes in-session workshops on scaling up long-term finance; a biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance starting in 2014 and ending in 2020; and a request to developed countries to provide biennial submissions on their updated approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020 including elements of a pathway.
In fact a major test of climate finance will be the developments in the Green Climate Fund in the next one to two years, as the GCF is supposed to become the major climate finance entity, and so far it has not received any substantial contributions.
Durban Platform Negotiations
A lot of the energy of COP19 was focused on discussion on how to take forward the talks in the next two years (dubbed the Durban Platform) that will lead to a new climate change agreement in December 2015.
Some of the rich countries were determined to break the differences in mitigation obligations between developed and developing countries. On the other hand, many developing countries were fighting to retain the “firewall” between the commitments of developed countries (which carry a higher legal obligation) and the enhanced actions of developing countries (which are to be supported by finance and technology).
The inability to agree on a crucial paragraph of the decision on this issue almost led to a collapse in the talks on the Durban Platform.
At the last minute, the countries agreed on neutral language on how all countries would put forward details of their “contributions” (rather than their “commitments”) for the future discussions on the details of the obligations or actions that Parties are asked to put forward to prepare for the outcome of the Durban Platform negotiations expected in December 2015 at the COP21 in Paris.
The term to describe the nature of the obligations is seen as very significant to the major political issue of whether there will be a continued difference (often called a “firewall”) between the developed and developing countries.
Many developing counties have long maintained that under article 4 of the Climate Convention there is a clear difference between the legal commitments in mitigation of developed countries and the mitigation actions of developing countries supported by finance and technology transfers.
Developed countries argue that in the Durban Platform decision (adopted in Durban in December 2011), the difference had disappeared. Most developing countries maintain that since the decision is “under the Convention”, the differentiated responsibilities remain.
At the COP18 in Doha in December 2012, more than a day was spent by delegates wrangling over the description of the obligations, with developed countries led by the US insisting on describing this simply as commitments (implying this applies to all Parties) while many developing countries led by China were proposing the terms “commitments and actions” (implying the continuation of the difference between developed and developing countries).
Eventually it was agreed in Doha that the neutral term “enhanced actions” be used, a term that is also in the title of the decision establishing the Durban Platform.
The battle over terms resumed in Warsaw in the consultations on the ADP (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action). The BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) Ministers made it known through their negotiators that they could accept the term “commitments” only if it was accompanied by “in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention”.
A Co-Chairs’ text dated 5.45 am of 22 November led to a whole-day discussion on Friday, 22 November, with para 2(b) still being the main bone of contention.
The Co-Chairs issued their final text on Saturday, 23 November, and the final plenary of the ADP debated it, with many developing countries expressing deep concerns with its para 2(b): “To invite all Parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined commitments in the context of adopting a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to Parties towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2 and to communicate them well in advance of the 21st session of the COP (by the first quarter of 2015 by those Parties ready to do so) in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended commitments.” It was clear that the text was not going to be accepted, and a crisis was imminent.
The Co-Chairs called for a break and invited interested Parties to meet in a “huddle” (the “new normal” method of trying to resolve differences). The “huddle” involved the delegations of developed countries and many developing countries, with 30-50 taking part within the conference room itself.
After about an hour, when the plenary resumed, the Indian delegation announced that the “huddle” had produced a result, with a new para 2(b) as follows: “To invite all Parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, in the context of adopting a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties toward achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its article 2 and to communicate them well in advance of the 21st session of the COP (by the first quarter of 2015 by those parties ready to do so) in a manner that facilitates the clarity, transparency and understanding of the intended contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions.”
Eventually the ADP plenary (and then the COP plenary) adopted this sub-paragraph, as well as the rest of the decision, to applause by the hall of relieved and exhausted delegates.
Two other sub-paras related to this were also adopted:
Para 2c. To request the ADP to identify, by the 20th session of the COP, the information that parties would provide when putting forward their contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions, referred to in para 2b above.
Para 2d. To urge and request developed country Parties, the operating entities of the financial mechanism, and any other organisations in a position to do so, to provide support for the related activities referred to in para 2b and 2c above as early as possible in 2014. The use of the neutral term “contributions” to replace the loaded term “commitments” has provided for a more level playing field for the future negotiations on whether there is a difference or “firewall” between the responsibilities of developed and developing countries.
The battle on how various countries will have to “contribute” their efforts to addressing mitigation and adaptation activities, especially whether there is to be differentiation and if so what type of differentiation, and the issue of securing the support of financing and technology for developing countries, will be the subject of very intense talks this year. The ADP is scheduled to meet in 10-14 March this year, as well as June and December, with possibly an extra session.
Martin Khor is Executive Director of the South Centre. Contact at: director@southcentre.int .
