¿Una elección difícil? Comparación de los ingresos fiscales que recaudarán los países en vías de desarrollo a partir de los regímenes del Monto A y del Artículo 12B de la Convención Modelo de las Naciones Unidas
Por Vladimir Starkov y Alexis Jin
En este documento de investigación, pretendemos calcular los ingresos tributarios que obtendrán (o perderán) los Estados miembros del South Centre y la Unión Africana con arreglo a los regímenes del Importe A y del Artículo 12B. En nuestro análisis hemos recurrido a fuentes de información disponibles para el personal investigador del sector privado, aunque no ha conllevado el examen de ninguno de los datos que los contribuyentes proporcionan a las autoridades fiscales. Nuestra investigación demuestra que los efectos comparativos en los ingresos obtenidos con los regímenes fiscales del Importe A y el Artículo 12B dependen en gran medida de a) los detalles de diseño del régimen del Artículo 12B; b) si el país es sede de empresas multinacionales que puedan estar dentro del ámbito de aplicación de los regímenes fiscales del Importe A o del Artículo 12B; y c) la desgravación a partir de la doble tributación, de haberla, que conceda el país a los contribuyentes nacionales sujetos al pago de tributos en virtud del régimen del Importe A o del Artículo 12B.
The Progress Report on Amount A, the latest version of the OECD’s proposed solution for taxation of the digitalized economy, makes it clear that the revenues expected for developing countries will dwindle even further than estimated by CODA and the South Centre.
With each successive update of the rules, the proposed solution is becoming increasingly less appealing to the developing countries. The OECD must, at a minimum, release revenue estimates for the 141 jurisdictions of the Inclusive Framework such that each can take an informed decision in the national interest. As an organization that sets ‘transparency’ standards, OECD must itself be transparent and provide countries with the essential information needed for making what may become a historic decision for the international taxation regime.
The Human Right to Science: From Fragmentation to Comprehensive Implementation?
By Peter Bille Larsen and Marjorie Pamintuan
In times when the role of science in society is more debated than ever in polarized, politicized and partial terms, what is the role for the human right to science and rights-based approaches? The right to science remains poorly understood and neglected in both national and global human rights processes. Beyond defending the freedom of scientific expression, upholding the right to science is arguably fundamental to resolving key sustainability challenges of our times from climate change and the biodiversity crisis to global health and pandemics. The global COVID-19 pandemic has revealed persistent global inequalities not least in terms of how the privatization of science and current intellectual property regimes hinder just and equitable responses to access science and its benefits. This prompts the need for a shift from single-issue approaches to comprehensive and systematic treatment of the right to science as a bundle of human rights across multiple arenas to counter fragmentation and silo-tendencies.
The Proposed Standing Multilateral Mechanism and Its Potential Relationship with the Existing Universe of Investor – State Dispute Settlement
by Danish and Daniel Uribe
The reform option on the Standing Multilateral Mechanism (SMM) currently under discussion at UNCITRAL’s Working Group III (WGIII) has raised a number of important, systemic concerns for the procedural reforms of investor-State dispute settlement. This paper first seeks to situate the discussions on the SMM within its historical and contemporary contexts. Then it considers UNCITRAL Working Paper 213 and the legal provisions it contains, which form the basis of ongoing discussions of this reform option at WGIII. Further, it explores the potential relationship of this proposed SMM with different facets of the existing international investment law regime. The paper concludes by providing some elements which require further consideration in this process, particularly for safeguarding the interests of developing countries.
The BEPS Monitoring Group submitted comments to the OECD on the consultation draft proposals to provide tax certainty for Amount A of Pillar One. Abdul Muheet Chowdhary, Senior Programme Officer of the South Centre Tax Initiative, was a contributor.
The BEPS Monitoring Group submitted comments to the OECD on the draft proposals for tax certainty on issues related to Amount A in Pillar One. Abdul Muheet Chowdhary, Senior Programme Officer of the South Centre Tax Initiative, was a contributor.
A Global Asset Registry to track hidden fortunes and for asset recovery
By Ricardo Martner
Financial opacity and offshore hidden wealth have become a major economic and political problem. Tax havens continue to exist and provide financial secrecy services that allow the richest individuals in the world to hide their wealth from national tax authorities. Implementing a Global Asset Registry could help tax authorities to identify, record and tax all wealth, regardless of where it is held. It would also be a critical tool in efforts to recover stolen assets of countries suffering from widespread corruption.
Two Pillar Solution for Taxing the Digitalized Economy: Policy Implications and Guidance for the Global South
by Irene Ovonji-Odida, Veronica Grondona, Abdul Muheet Chowdhary
The taxation of the digitalized economy is the single most important topic in international tax negotiations today. The OECD has devised a “Two Pillar solution” to the problem. Pillar One is focusing on a reallocation of taxing rights to market jurisdictions, which are largely expected to be developing countries, and Pillar Two is instituting a global minimum tax. The Pillar One solution, known as Amount A, will be codified into a Multilateral Convention (MLC) and is expected to be placed before countries for signature in early 2023. The solution ushers in a new paradigm in the taxation of multinational enterprises but has immense complexity and likely minimal revenue gains for most developing countries. It will also require them to give up the right of unilateral tax measures on all out-of-scope companies, meaning they will only be able to tax the fewer than 100 companies likely to be in-scope, if at all. The decision to sign or not is thus a historic one, as it will lock developing countries into a constricted new framework, at a time when revenue needs are especially critical to recover the economies from COVID-19 in the context of a turbulent state of the global economy.
However, the United Nations too has a solution, known as Article 12B. This operates in a different manner and is a minor modification to the existing decentralized international tax system which is based on bilateral tax treaties, and which developing countries are more familiar with. It is also likely to generate far higher revenues than Amount A, and does not restrict any of their sovereign taxing rights. This Research Paper assesses the various implications for developing countries from adopting the OECD’s or the United Nations’s respective solutions and concludes with a possible global South response to the Two Pillar solution.
Outcomes and Recommendations of the CoDA-South Centre Dialogue Series on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs): Comparing Tax Revenues to Be Raised by Developing Countries from the OECD and UN Solutions for Taxing the Digital Economy
Movement Forward on ABS for the Convention on Biological Diversity: Bounded Openness Over Natural Information
by Joseph Henry Vogel, Manuel Ruiz Muller, Klaus Angerer, and Christopher May
“Access to genetic resources” and “fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising [from their] utilization” is the third objective of the 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The expression is included in the full title of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol (NP). Neither agreement defined “material” in the phrase “genetic material” which resulted in misinterpretation that the object of access for R&D is tangible. Unfairness ensues: competition among provider Parties leads to the elimination of economic rents, which is desirable for tangibles but undesirable for intangibles. Once interpreted as natural information, the economics of information justifies a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism (GMBSM) (Article 10 NP) which collects and distributes rents on value added to genetic resources. “Bounded openness over natural information” is the modality proposed for the GMBSM. The Executive Secretary of the United Nations Secretariat of the CBD recognized the argument in the 2021 Note “Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources”.
Reaping the Fruits of Research on Microorganisms: Prospects and Challenges for R&D and Industry in Sri Lanka
by Ruwan Fernando
When the Intellectual Property Bill designed to secure compliance with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) was challenged in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, the Court determined that the patenting of naturally occurring microorganisms by right holders would result in the increase of the prices of diagnoses and cures. The Supreme Court found that in the absence in the Bill of mitigatory measures -as allowed by the TRIPS Agreement- and of a working definition of the term “microorganism”, there was a violation of the right to equal protection under Article 12 (1) of the Constitution. In the circumstance, the patent protection for microorganisms was narrowed down to transgenic microorganisms.
The policy makers do not appear to have disregarded the positive impact of the Supreme Court determination by making the necessary statutory provisions and policy changes to facilitate the patent applications on transgenic microorganisms, while ensuring that local researchers are not restrained from gaining access to naturally occurring microorganisms for research and development.
Comparaison des recettes fiscales à engranger par les pays en développement au titre des régimes du Montant A et de l’Article 12B du Modèle de convention des Nations Unies
Par Vladimir Starkov et Alexis Jin
Le présent document de recherche se propose d’estimer le montant des recettes fiscales qui seraient engrangé (ou perdu) par les pays membres du Centre Sud et de l’Union africaine dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du Montant A et de l’Article 12B. Notre analyse s’appuie sur des sources d’information accessibles aux chercheurs du secteur privé et non sur les informations communiquées par les contribuables aux autorités fiscales. Elle démontre que les effets comparatifs sur les recettes de la mise en œuvre du Montant A et de l’article 12B dépendent en grande partie (a) des détails de conception du régime mis en place par l’article 12B, (b) du fait que le pays accueille ou non le siège d’entreprises multinationales susceptibles d’être imposées au titre du montant A ou de l’article 12B, et (c) de l’allégement éventuel de la double imposition qui sera accordé par le pays aux contribuables nationaux imposés au titre du Montant A ou de l’article 12B.
