Notification and Transparency Issues in the WTO and the US’ November 2018 Communication
Various WTO Members submitted a Communication to the WTO in November 2018 which, if accepted, would affect the implementation of Members’ transparency and notification obligations at the WTO. It would strengthen the already burdensome notification obligations and introduce new punitive administrative measures should obligations not be complied with. This paper provides information about WTO Members’ current notification obligations and their level of compliance; looks at the history of discussions on notifications, particularly in the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures which took place in 1995 – 1996; and provides an analysis of the Communication. The analysis focuses on the extent to which the elements are consistent with or go beyond the current WTO disciplines. It concludes that non-compliance with notification obligations is real. However, rather than expanding obligations and introducing punitive measures, constructive and effective solutions should be based on nuancing of obligations in the context of a Special and Differential Treatment approach and through the use of incentives. It also acknowledges that countries with a chronic lack of capacities will continue to struggle with the WTO’s complex notification obligations and requirements until they attain higher levels of development and, thus, improved institutional capacities.
Why the US Proposals on Development will Affect all Developing Countries and Undermine WTO
US submitted two highly problematic proposals to the WTO in January and February 2019, undermining the place of Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) for developing countries at the WTO. In the first paper (WT/GC/757), US criticises the practice of self-declared development status by developing countries arguing that the North-South construct no longer makes sense due to “great development strides”. The second paper (WT/GC/764) – a proposed Decision for the General Council – provides a way to operationalise what was in the first paper. It gave criteria that would exclude 34 Members or 53.6 percent of global population from S&D treatment in “current and future WTO negotiations”. This fundamentally changes S&D from an unconditional right for all developing countries to a concession that may or may not be provided. Even for those developing countries that are not part of the 34 excluded Members, the US notes that in sector-specific negotiations, other Members could also be “ineligible for special and differential treatment.” This paper critiques the US approach on Special and Differential Treatment and concludes that these papers by the US cannot be the basis for any further discussions. All developing countries must be able to decide the pace of their adjustment to trade rules.
US’ Section 301 Actions: Why They are Illegitimate and Misguided
This research paper examines the US’ Section 301 unilateral actions against China, stemming from the US’ concerns over China’s ambitious industrial policies and its rapid technological advancements. It outlines the accusations of the US regarding China’s conditions for technology transfer and what the US sees as overly intrusive Chinese government involvement in investments. It looks in detail at why the US’ actions are in fact illegitimate and misguided. (more…)
The WTO’s Special and Differential Treatment Negotiations (Paragraph 44)
Paragraph 44 of the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates the ‘strengthening’ of Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) provisions in the WTO Agreement, and making them ‘more precise, effective and operational’. This Note tracks the evolution of these negotiations from the start of the Doha Round in 2001 until the Nairobi Ministerial in December 2015. (more…)
The WTO has a 1998 Work Programme on E-commerce. This Work Programme provides for the discussion of trade-related issues relating to electronic commerce to take place in the relevant WTO bodies: the Council for Trade in Services; the Council for Trade in Goods; the Council for TRIPS; and the Committee for Trade and Development. The General Council was envisaged to play a review or oversight role. (more…)
Analysis Of Draft Waiver Decision On Services And Services Suppliers Of LDCs.
This Note is an analysis of the draft waiver decision submitted by the Chairman of the CTS to Ministers for adoption at the 8th Ministerial Conference. This is essentially a waiver from the most-favoured nation treatment clause (Article II. 1) in GATS to allow Members to provide preferential and more favourable treatment to services and services suppliers of LDCs. (more…)
Domestic Regulation of Services Sectors: Analysis of the Draft Negotiation Texts.
This document provides a paragraph by paragraph analysis of the draft domestic regulation texts which are currently being discussed at the WTO’s Working Party on Domestic Regulation (services negotiations).
Legal Analysis of Services and Investment in the Cariforum-EC EPA: Lessons for other Developing Countries.
This Research Paper is a legal analysis of the EC-Cariforum Services and Investment Chapter. It demystifies the many complex technical details in the EPA text and illustrates where this services and investment template goes beyond the WTO’s GATS. The paper highlights implications for other developing countries embarking on similar negotiations with the EU. (more…)
Analysis of the Doha Negotiations and the Functioning Of the World Trade Organization.
This paper discusses the principles and scope of activities of the world trade organization, addresses the imbalances in the existing rules and the problems faced by developing countries. Then it elaborated on various specific issues such as, the “Singapore issues”, labour and environmental standards, the “development issues”, market access negotiations and, at last, its functioning in decision-making system.