The WTO’s Special and Differential Treatment Negotiations (Paragraph 44)
Paragraph 44 of the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates the ‘strengthening’ of Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) provisions in the WTO Agreement, and making them ‘more precise, effective and operational’. This Note tracks the evolution of these negotiations from the start of the Doha Round in 2001 until the Nairobi Ministerial in December 2015. (more…)
Key Substantive and Process Issues Arising from the WTO’s Nairobi Ministerial Conference (MC10)
Despite concerted attempts by major trading partners to bury the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in Nairobi, they were unsuccessful. Part I of this paper provides a legal reading of the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration (NMD) as it pertains to the DDA, and also discusses other legal questions regarding the conclusion of the DDA. (more…)
Discussions in the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment (2001-2003)
This Note reviews Members’ submissions in the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment (WGTI) between 2001 – 2003.
The Singapore Ministerial Declaration established the WGTI to examine the relationship between trade and investment. Subsequently, the Doha Ministerial Declaration tasked the WGTI to focus on the clarification of seven elements of a possible future multilateral investment agreement, as well as some other issues: (more…)
WTO’s MC10: The Call for ‘New Issues’ at the WTO and Implications for Developing Countries
Narratives concerning enhancing the participation of developing countries in ‘Global Value Chains’ (GVCs) and supporting micro, small and medium enterprises have featured prominently in the WTO
and other international organizations. These have intensified in the run up towards the Ministerial Conference in Nairobi. These discourses on GVCs and MSMEs have often been linked to (more…)
When launched in 2001, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) had the objective of being a Development Round. However, substantive development concerns have often been sidelined in the course of the negotiations. Without the Doha mandate, developing countries have no guarantee that the important issues of disciplines on domestic supports, special safeguard in agriculture and cotton will feature in future negotiations on Agriculture. (more…)
WTO’s MC10: Agriculture Negotiations– Public Stockholding
Public stockholding programmes have over the past decades proven themselves to be very effective instruments for supporting domestic producers in agricultural production. Studies have shown that in
fact, countries that are still in the process of development, where markets are not well developed, need such public stockholding programmes to support their farmers.
Many developing countries do have these programmes. This non-exhaustive list (more…)
WTO’s MC10: Agriculture Negotiations – Special Safeguard in Agriculture for Developing Countries
The agricultural safeguard is important for developing countries. Most developed countries already have access to a special agricultural safeguard as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, and
some of them have actively utilised this Special Safeguard Provisions (SSG) through the past 20 years.
Developing countries require a similar instrument because of the many agricultural import surges taking place. (more…)
This note provides a brief on Export Competition and the four issues that it covers:
With respect to export subsidies, the EU, the Member with the largest export subsidy entitlements applies zero export subsidies under its Common Agricultural Policy 2014-2020. Commitments to bind export subsidies at zero are therefore a step in the right direction but the extent of its value is limited. The Green Box remains undisciplined (more…)
10 documents were distributed to WTO Members on 26 November 2013 at the last General Council meeting before the Bali Ministerial Conference (MC9). These documents are being transmitted to Bali. (more…)
WTO’s MC9: Analysis of the Food Security ‘Peace Clause’ Text
The Peace Clause is time-limited (4 years) and partial in coverage (no inclusion of the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures- ASCM). Countries can still be taken to dispute. It also has onerous and intrusive transparency and information requirements and conditions. (more…)