Building a Mirage: The Effectiveness of Tax Carve-out Provisions in International Investment Agreements
By Daniel Uribe and Manuel F. Montes
The present policy brief analyses the language of taxation carve-out provisions incorporated in International Investment Agreements (IIAs), and its effectiveness with regards to restricting the protection and dispute settlement provisions of IIAs only to non-tax-related claims. It illustrates that even in cases where such carve-out provisions have been incorporated into IIAs, the broad language and lack of clarity in the drafting of such provisions have effectively allowed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) tribunals to scrutinize tax measures adopted by States, and even determine that such measures resulted in a breach of State’s obligations under the agreement. It makes recommendations on how States could effectively implement such carve-outs when negotiating, reforming or drafting new international investment agreements.
IP Licence, Trademarks and ISDS: Bridgestone v. Panama
By Pratyush Nath Upreti
Can an intellectual property right or a license authorizing its use be deemed an ‘investment’ under bilateral investment treaties? This policy brief discusses the arguments submitted by the parties in the Bridgestone Licensing Services, Inc. and Bridgestone Americas, Inc. v. Republic of Panama case on questions regarding a trademark license agreement. Bridgestone Licensing Services, Inc. (BSLS) and Bridgestone Americas, Inc. (BSAM) together initiated arbitration proceedings on the grounds that Panama’s Supreme Court decision was unjust and arbitrary, violated Panama’s obligations under the United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), expropriated their investments, and violated the requirement of fair and equitable treatment (FET) to BSLS’s and BSAM’s investments.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Anachronism Whose Time Has Gone
By Johannes Schwarzer
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) – a mechanism that allows foreign investors to bring claims against host governments to an international arbitral tribunal – is a relic that should be abolished. Its alleged benefits have not materialized and its costs – monetary and other – can represent a formidable obstacle to good economic governance. We recommend policymakers to terminate ISDS provisions in existing agreements and eschew them in future trade and investment treaties.
The Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) in the context of the discussions on the reform of the ISDS system
The Brazilian Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA) model establishes an alternative approach to dispute resolution. This does not mean, however, that the CFIA is silent with regards to possible disputes arising from breaches to the agreement and/or claims by investors. Based on the premise that the investment regime between two or more countries is a positive-sum game, in which all parties involved win, the CFIA presents an approach based on the prevention of disputes.
The investor-state dispute system, whereby foreign investors can sue the government in an international tribunal, is one of the issues being negotiated in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and other free trade agreements. (more…)
The investor-state dispute system, whereby foreign investors can sue the government in an international tribunal, is one of the issues being negotiated in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and other free trade agreements. In the recent public debate surrounding the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), an issue that seems to stand out is the investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS). It enables foreign investors of TPPA countries to directly sue the host government in an international tribunal. (more…)
