Climate Finance Withholding Mechanism: Exploring a potential solution for climate finance needs of the developing countries
By Radhakishan Rawal
The developed countries’ commitment to provide climate finance to the developing countries has remained unfulfilled. The Climate Finance Withholding Mechanism (CFWM) is a potential solution for addressing climate finance needs of the developing countries. The CFWM adopts the well settled “withholding mechanism” under the tax laws to provide a steady flow of funds to the developing countries.
Multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) tax residents of developed countries earn income from the developing countries and pay tax on such income in the developed countries. The CFWM requires retention in the developing country, of the amount of tax so payable by the MNE, towards climate finance commitments of the developed countries. The CFWM does not result in additional tax outflow for the MNEs and also does not adversely impact taxing rights of the developed countries. The CFWM results in application of tax revenue of the developed countries towards their climate finance commitments. The CFWM does not address all the issues related to the climate finance problem but only attempts to speed up the flow of funds to the developing countries from where the relevant income originates.
Taxing Big Tech: Policy Options for Developing Countries
By Abdul Muheet Chowdhary and Sébastien Babou Diasso
Even as the COVID-19 crisis wreaked havoc on the global economy, it gave rise to a small set of winners, namely Big Tech. The increasing prevalence of remote work and an acceleration of the digitalization of the economy allowed Big Tech companies to raise enormous revenues during the pandemic, which in some cases dwarfed the gross domestic product (GDP) of several countries. This policy brief explores the rising untaxed profits of Big Tech in particular, and the digitalized economy in general, and explains why the existing rules are insufficient. It also critically examines the solution that has been devised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental organization of developed countries. Finally, it outlines alternative policy options that are more suitable for developing countries to tax the profits of Big Tech.
Revenue Effects of the Global Minimum Corporate Tax Rate for African Economies
By Seydou Coulibaly
This policy brief provides the first piece of empirical evidence on the revenue implications of the recent global minimum tax rate reform agreement for African economies. We implement a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the effect of having an effective corporate tax rate of at least 15% on tax revenue collection for a panel of 28 African economies over the period 2000-2020.
The estimation results indicate that the implementation of the global minimum effective corporate tax rate of 15% proposed under Pillar II of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Two Pillar Solution has a positive but not statistically significant likely impact on corporate tax revenue and total tax revenue at the conventional significance levels. This suggests that the global minimum tax deal is unlikely to increase tax revenue for African economies. These findings exhort the Inclusive Framework and all the stakeholders of the global tax reform negotiations to consider revising the global minimum tax rate rules to ensure that the agreement will effectively benefit African countries through better tax revenue collection.
UN Model Tax Convention: Selective Territoriality – The Specter of Privileged Player in a Rigged Game
By Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed
This paper lays out the chessboard on which taxes on international incomes from immovables are contested, bargained, and harvested as per pre-determined rules that are starkly tilted in favor of developed countries. This embedded and pronounced bias in the international taxes regime in favor of developed countries makes them a privileged player. The developed countries then make maneuvers to optimize on their economic gains at the expense of developing nations rendering it a rigged game setting. The paper derives its rationale from an exceptionally selective choice of territoriality on incomes from immovables, which was astonishingly not aligned with the expected reverse capital movement, that is, from developing to developed countries. The genesis and evolution of selective territoriality are traced through its various institutional development phases – League of Nations (LN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and United Nations (UN). An overwhelming international consensus on selective territoriality on incomes from immovables notwithstanding, the UN’s role is brought into spotlight to argue that the developing countries may have suffered massively over the past one hundred years by instinctively believing in the UN Model Tax Convention’s (MTC) efficacy and blindly pursuing Article 6 in their bilateral double taxation conventions (DTCs). The inimical implications of herd-mentality on part of developing countries got galvanized in the particular wake of developed countries employing innovative optimization tools – citizenship/residence by investment programs, tax havenry, manipulable ownership structures, beneficial ownership legislations, and porous exchange of information regime – to maximize on the economic gains. The paper undertakes both normative and structuralist evaluation of selective territoriality to sum up that this is an unjust principle of distribution of fiscal rights at the international level particularly in asymmetric economic relationships, and can hold its ground only until developing countries attain full cognition of the reality and start raising their vocal chords in unison to dismantle it.
A Global Asset Registry to track hidden fortunes and for asset recovery
By Ricardo Martner
Financial opacity and offshore hidden wealth have become a major economic and political problem. Tax havens continue to exist and provide financial secrecy services that allow the richest individuals in the world to hide their wealth from national tax authorities. Implementing a Global Asset Registry could help tax authorities to identify, record and tax all wealth, regardless of where it is held. It would also be a critical tool in efforts to recover stolen assets of countries suffering from widespread corruption.
Conceptualización de un Instrumento multilateral de la ONU
Por Radhakishan Rawal
Los cambios que ha sufrido recientemente la Convención Modelo de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Doble Tributación entre Países Desarrollados y Países en Desarrollo han dado lugar a disposiciones mas favorables a los países en desarrollo, al aumentar los ingresos fiscales a través de la imposición de tributos internacionales, por ejemplo, en la imposición de tributos a los ingresos procedentes del extranjero. En esta imposición se incluyen, entre otros, los impuestos sobre los ingresos procedentes de servicios digitales automatizados, pagos de programas informáticos y plusvalías. Normalmente, estos impuestos se incorporarían en convenios fiscales bilaterales a través de largas negociaciones. En cambio, un instrumento multilateral de las Naciones Unidas permitiria actualizar de una manera mas acelerada varios convenios tributatrios por medio de una sola negociación. Esto ayudará a los países en desarrollo a recaudar ingresos con mayor prontitud. En este informe sobre políticas se aborda la posible estructura de un instrumento multilateral de esa índole.
Taux Minimum d’Impôt Mondial : Détaché des réalités des pays en développement
Par Sébastien Babou Diasso
Sous la direction des pays du G20 et de l’organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economique (OCDE), le Cadre Inclusif sur la réforme de la fiscalité internationale a adopté le 8 octobre 2021 une solution à deux piliers visant à résoudre les défis auxquels sont confrontés les pays dans le système fiscal actuel au niveau international. Cependant, le moins que l’on puisse dire, c’est que ces solutions n’apportent pas de réponses aux préoccupations de nombreux pays en développement, en particulier le taux d’impôt minimum de 15%, dans un contexte où la plupart des pays en développement membres de Centre Sud et du G-77+Chine ont déjà des taux effectifs bien au-dessus de ce minimum. Cette note vise à informer sur les niveaux actuels des taux d’imposition effectifs dans les pays en développement, pour lesquels les données sont disponibles, et à montrer pourquoi il ne serait pas pertinent de prendre en compte le taux minimum adopté dans le cadre inclusif. Mobiliser plus de ressources fiscales des entreprises multinationales est important pour les pays en développement pour la réalisation des Objectifs de Développement Durable. Nous recommandons donc que les pays en développement ignorent simplement le pilier deux et maintiennent leurs taux d’imposition actuels, ou les augmentent à des niveaux plus adaptés à travers l’application de mesures unilatérales plutôt que d’accepter d’être soumis à la procédure indiquée dans le pilier deux s’ils décident de l’appliquer.
Global Minimum Tax Rate: Detached from Developing Country Realities
By Sebastien Babou Diasso
Under the umbrella of the G20 and the OECD, the Inclusive Framework adopted on 8 October 2021 a two-pillar solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy. However, these solutions do not respond to the needs of many developing countries, in particular the global tax minimum rate of 15%, in a context where most developing countries, defined as Member States of the South Centre and the G-77+China, have an average effective tax rate higher than the adopted rate. This policy brief provides information of the current effective tax rates in some developing countries, and highlights why the minimum rate of 15% in Pillar Two is insufficient for them. Tax revenue mobilization is important for developing countries to achieve the sustainable development goals. It is thereby recommended that developing countries simply ignore Pillar Two and maintain their current higher rate or increase their rate to an appropriate level and enforce it through unilateral measures rather than the rule order under Pillar Two, which they will have to follow if they decide to implement it.
Una carga molesta para naciones en vías de desarrollo: Cláusula de NMF en tratados impositivos
Por Deepak Kapoor, IRS
La cláusula de la nación más favorecida (“NMF”) de los convenios para evitar la doble tributación encarna el principio básico de no discriminación y tiene por objeto aportar paridad a las oportunidades empresariales y de inversión entre los países y las jurisdicciones partes en los tratados. La incorporación de disposiciones como las cláusulas de la NMF y de no discriminación en los tratados de tributación pretende promover la equidad entre las partes en los tratados. En el contexto de los tratados de tributación entre países desarrollados y en desarrollo, las cláusulas de la NMF también actúan como herramienta de negociación para contemplar mejores tipos impositivos en los tratados.
Sin embargo, últimamente, estas cláusulas han empezado a manifestar unos efectos negativos en los países de origen, que en su mayor parte son países en desarrollo. Por lo general, no parece que las cláusulas de la NMF estén creando posibles riesgos si son operativas entre dos países con el mismo grado de desarrollo, pero, cuando la relación se establece entre un país desarrollado y otro en desarrollo, donde una parte recibe de la otra más inversiones de las que hace, ese tipo de riesgo es inevitable. Recientemente, se han producido problemas a raíz de diversas interpretaciones de las cláusulas de la NMF por parte de los tribunales que han obligado a los países de origen a ampliar los beneficios de los tipos reducidos y el ámbito de aplicación restringido a los países parte en el tratado con arreglo a las normas de la NMF. Esa clase de interpretaciones beneficiosas han ido más allá del objetivo y el propósito básicos de las cláusulas de la NMF.
A tenor de causas judiciales que han tenido lugar recientemente en Sudáfrica y la India, parece que las cláusulas de la NMF están creando oportunidades de “reducción de impuestos” y están dando lugar a una erosión involuntaria de la base imponible de los países de origen. El problema también radica en la redacción y las formulaciones ambiguas de las cláusulas de la NMF, que finalmente provocan resultados negativos inesperados para los países que están obligados por compromisos futuros. Por consiguiente, en estos momentos, las jurisdicciones de origen necesitan con urgencia un examen exhaustivo de las cláusulas de la NMF existentes en los tratados de tributación, sus relaciones cruzadas y sus posibles efectos secundarios negativos en otros tratados.
Artículo 12B: una solución del tratado tributario del Comité sobre Cooperación Internacional en Cuestiones de Tributación de la ONU para la tributación de ingresos digitales
Por Rajat Bansal
La tributación sobre los ingresos de las empresas multinacionales dedicadas a actividades digitales por las jurisdicciones de origen y las de mercado es actualmente el desafío más importante para la comunidad tributaria internacional. El actual conjunto de miembros del Comité en cuestiones de tributación de las Naciones Unidas finalizó, en abril de 2021, una medida de tratados tributarios para abordar este desafío. Este informe explica la justificación para la solución particular de agregar un nuevo artículo a la Convención Modelo de las Naciones Unidas, sus méritos y cómo esto puede ser beneficioso para todos los países, especialmente los en desarrollo.
Global Minimum Corporate Tax: Interaction of Income Inclusion Rule with Controlled Foreign Corporation and Tax-sparing Provisions
By Kuldeep Sharma, ADIT (CIOT,UK), FTI (Australia), Insolvency Professional (IBBI)
The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS (the Inclusive Framework) agreed on 8 October 2021 to the Statement on the Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy. The Two-Pillar Solution will ensure that MNEs will be subject to a minimum tax rate of 15%, and will re-allocate profit of the largest and most profitable MNEs to countries worldwide. Under these recommendations, inter alia, Pillar Two consists of two interlocking domestic rules (together the Global Anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE)), which includes an Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) to impose a top-up tax on a parent entity in respect of the low taxed income of a constituent entity. The IIR shall be incorporated in domestic laws of opting jurisdictions, and seems to have profound interaction with the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and tax-sparing provisions. The IIR operates in a way that is closely comparable to a CFC rule and raises the same treaty questions as raised by CFC rules, although there are a number of differences between the IIR and the CFC rules. In the context of IIR, there may be a case when the Ultimate Parent Entity (UPE) is taxed on the Constituent Entities’ (CEs) income and the spared tax is not considered as covered taxes for calculating the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) of the CE. This generates a situation for developing countries in which they have to shore up their ETR by overhauling their tax incentive regimes and retooling domestic legal framework for more effective taxation of MNEs to avoid losing a significant portion of their tax right/base to a developed country. Adoption of IIR (which is an extension of CFC rules) under Pillar Two is therefore going to create conflict with the tax-sparing rules. From the perspective of developing countries, the adoption of GloBE implies losing tax incentives as a tax policy instrument to attract foreign direct investment. This is why every country involved, but especially developing countries, should undertake a thorough examination to determine whether such measures are convenient for their interests in the long run.
Un albatros autour du cou des pays en développement – Clause NPF dans les conventions fiscales
Par Deepak Kapoor, IRS
L’inclusion dans les conventions en matière de double imposition d’une clause de la nation la plus favorisée (« NPF ») est une incarnation du principe fondamental de la non-discrimination et vise à permettre aux pays signataires de tirer également parti des perspectives en matière de commerce et d’investissement. L’objectif de dispositions telles que les clauses NPF et de non-discrimination dans les conventions fiscales est de favoriser l’équité entre les différents pays signataires. Dans les conventions fiscales conclues entre pays développés et pays en développement, les clauses NPF servent également d’outils de négociation pour obtenir de meilleurs taux d’imposition.
Cependant ces clauses ont aujourd’hui des effets négatifs pour les pays de source des revenus, qui sont pour la plupart des pays en développement. Lorsqu’elles sont appliquées entre deux pays également développés, les clauses NPF ne constituent pas, généralement, une source de danger potentielle, mais lorsque la convention est conclue entre un pays développé et un pays en développement, où l’un des pays reçoit plus d’investissements de l’autre qu’il n’en réalise, le danger est réel. De fait, des difficultés sont apparues récemment en raison d’interprétations divergentes de ces clauses par les tribunaux, qui ont contraint les pays source à appliquer, sur la base des termes contenus dans la clause NPF, un taux d’imposition plus avantageux que celui prévu dans la convention fiscale et à modifier son champ d’application, remettant en cause l’objectif et l’utilité même des clauses NPF.
Il ressort des procédures judiciaires intentées en Afrique du Sud et en Inde que les clauses NPF peuvent aboutir à une réduction de la fiscalité et entrainer une érosion involontaire de la base d’imposition des pays de source des revenus. Le problème réside également dans la rédaction et la formulation ambiguë des clauses NPF, qui entrainent des répercussions négatives inattendues pour les pays ayant pris des engagements dans le cadre de ces conventions. Il est aujourd’hui urgent pour les pays source de procéder à un examen approfondi des clauses NPF figurant dans les conventions fiscales existantes, de la manière dont elles s’articulent entre elles et des retombées négatives qu’elles pourraient avoir sur d’autres conventions.
