Determining the Upper Bound of the Scoping Criteria for Amount B in the OECD/G20 Two-Pillar Solution: A Policy Guide for Developing Jurisdictions
By Chetan Rao, Ruchika Sharma, and Dr. Vijit Patel
Amount B, a component of the OECD/G20 Two-Pillar Solution, has been designed to simplify transfer pricing for baseline distribution activities. With the aim of developing a practical policy guide for developing jurisdictions to fine tune the quantitative scoping criterion under Amount B, i.e., “annual operating expense to annual net revenue” ratio, this paper critically analyses various aspects of this criterion. The upper bound of this ratio is purported to help jurisdictions in identifying baseline distributors. It is currently set as a flexible range from 20% to 30%, with the choice available to each adopting jurisdiction deciding the exact point in the range for implementation of Amount B within its jurisdiction. Given the lack of any data-backed rationale in the Amount B report for development of this range, the authors suggest that the upper bound range might have been politically negotiated. For this very reason, developing countries need to tread carefully while setting the upper-bound and consider both its tax as well as policy implications. Through an empirical analysis of independent distributors in India, the paper highlights the link between the upper bound, functionality, and profitability, illustrating how these metrics impact developing countries with lower asset and expense intensities. The findings suggest that setting the upper bound at the higher end of the range could unintentionally bring above-baseline distributors into scope, thus foregoing long-term taxing rights for developing jurisdictions. Through this analysis, the paper offers practical insights and recommendations for jurisdictions, especially developing ones, for setting this upper bound to protect their taxing rights and minimize risks of misclassification of above-baseline distributors as baseline.
A Decade of the Indian Advance Pricing Agreement Programme: Achievements and Challenges
By Priyanka Mashelkar and Apoorv Tiwari
India’s Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) programme was introduced in 2012 with the objective of reducing transfer pricing disputes and providing certainty to taxpayers on their international transactions. In the last decade or so, the programme has proven to be a successful dispute mitigation and resolution mechanism. The authors use data and statistics from a recently released report by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) in India to highlight the success of the programme, while also acknowledging the challenges ahead, especially as taxpayers’ expectations from the programme continue to rise.
Digital taxation under the OECD Amount A and UN Article 12B mechanisms for market jurisdictions in Africa: a comparative analysis
By Erica Rakotonirina
This Policy Brief examines the need for the evolution and harmonization of international taxation in the face of the digitalization of economic transactions.
Between the OECD proposal for shared taxation of residual profits through the Amount A mechanism and the UN proposal of Article 12B for taxing income from Automated Digital Services on a gross basis through shared but capped taxation, with an optional variant of the taxation of net profits, African States need to make vital political and technical choices.
The strategic negotiations must include regulatory sustainability, the right balance and fiscal fairness between the divergent interests of residence states vs source states (which include almost all African countries), and MNEs in their quest for profit and expansion.
The Policy Brief carries out quantified evaluation of possible revenue estimates using a case study approach. However, such an exercise remains difficult for questions of accessibility and reliability of data relating to the activities of multinational companies.
To be realistic, the scope of the study was restricted to a reference company in the digital sector but targeted economies of different scales. The results of the revenue estimates represent an optimistic case of the impacts on tax revenues of the application of the OECD and UN measures on different types of economies.
The proposed OECD Pillar One and Two reforms mark a significant shift in the way large multinational enterprises are taxed on their global incomes. However, while considering the reform at the proposed scale tax administrators must be able to compare the revenue gains with alternatives. This paper uses open-source data to provide tentative estimates of the impact of Pillars One and Two. The methodology has been detailed so that administrators can replicate it for comparison. Further, the paper provides an assessment from the perspective of developing countries of some of the key design elements of the proposals so as to understand whether they are administrable and to foresee possible challenges.
The BEPS Monitoring Group submitted comments to the OECD on the consultation draft proposals to provide tax certainty for Amount A of Pillar One. Abdul Muheet Chowdhary, Senior Programme Officer of the South Centre Tax Initiative, was a contributor.
The BEPS Monitoring Group submitted comments to the OECD on the draft proposals for tax certainty on issues related to Amount A in Pillar One. Abdul Muheet Chowdhary, Senior Programme Officer of the South Centre Tax Initiative, was a contributor.
South Centre Comments on Tax Certainty Framework for Issues Related to Amount A
The South Centre offers its comments to the OECD Inclusive Framework’s Task Force on Digital Economy (TFDE) on the Tax Certainty Framework for Issues Related to Amount A.
South Centre Comments on Tax Certainty Framework for Amount A
The South Centre offers its comments to the OECD Inclusive Framework’s Task Force on Digital Economy (TFDE) on the Tax Certainty Framework for Amount A.
Mejora la regla del nexo para una distribución justa de derechos fiscales a países en vías de desarrollo
Por Radhakishan Rawal
Uno de los problemas abiertos para Pilar Uno en el debate de la tributación de la economía digital es el umbral del Nexo, que determinaría qué Empresas multinacionales (MNE) tienen una presencia tributable. Las economías muy desarrolladas o las economías más pequeñas en vías de desarrollo pueden verse privadas de derechos fiscales como resultado de umbrales de nexo como son descritos en la propuesta de Pilar Uno. Asimismo, inclusive cuando se adoptan umbrales más pequeños, a algunos países aún se les puede denegar derechos fiscales. El umbral financiero nunca fue un parámetro de distribución de derechos fiscales entre los países. Un ligero ajuste del proceso de certeza impositiva podría abordar el problema.
Este artículo recomienda otorgar el derecho fiscal por Monto A de Pilar Uno, que abarca la porción principal de ganancias tributables de la economía digital, a todas las jurisdicciones del mercado, pero otorgar derechos relacionados con las jurisdicciones impositivas afectadas solo a aquellos países que cumplen con los umbrales de Nexo. Este enfoque resultará en una distribución justa de derechos fiscales y también garantizará que no haya una carga adicional en el proceso de certeza impositiva, que será más sencillo para países en vías de desarrollo.
Améliorer des règles du nexus pour une répartition équitable des droits d’imposition pour les pays en développement
Par Radhakishan Rawal
L’une des questions posées dans le Premier Pilier sur les discussions sur l’imposition de l’économie numérique est le seuil du nexus, c’est-à-dire le lien de rattachement au pays, qui déterminerait quelles entreprises multinationales (EMN) ont une présence imposable. Les grandes économies développées ainsi que les petites économies en développement peuvent être privées de droits d’imposition en raison des seuils des nexus tels que décrits actuellement dans la proposition du Premier Pilier. De plus, même si des seuils plus petits sont adoptés, certains pays peuvent encore se voir refuser des droits d’imposition. Un seuil financier n’a jamais été un paramètre de répartition des droits d’imposition entre les pays. Un ajustement mineur dans le processus de certitude fiscale pourrait résoudre le problème.
Cet article préconise d’accorder le droit d’imposition sur le montant A du Premier Pilier, qui couvre la portion principale des bénéfices imposables de l’économie numérique, à toutes les juridictions du marché, mais d’accorder les droits destinés aux juridictions fiscales concernées uniquement aux pays atteignant les seuils du nexus. Cette approche se traduira par une répartition équitable des droits d’imposition et garantira également qu’il n’y ait pas de charge supplémentaire dans le processus de la certitude fiscale, ce qui sera plus facile pour les pays en développement.
The South Centre welcomes the UN Tax Committee’s invitation of public comments into its draft agenda and four-year work plan. By engaging the public in preparing the work plan, the UN Tax Committee’s work can be more responsive to the needs of developing countries, and of UN Member States as a whole. By stating that “the goal to ensure that the Committee’s agenda is practical and relevant to developing countries and includes the most pressing challenges they face in tax policy and administration” the Committee has shown a laudable intent which is also in line with its mandate, which is to give special attention to developing countries. The South Centre offers its written comments on the three topics on which inputs have been requested. These have been prepared based on consultation with the South Centre’s Member States, which are exclusively developing countries.
