Comparison of Tax Revenue Effects of United Nations and OECD Subject to Tax Rule for G-24 and South Centre Member States
By Faith Amaro and Sol Picciotto
The Subject to Tax Rule (STTR) seeks to address the historical imbalance in the allocation of taxing rights under international tax treaties by introducing within existing treaties a new article which makes the restrictions on source taxation conditional on the residence jurisdiction imposing a minimum level of tax on foreign-derived income. This paper presents a methodology for analysing the respective benefits of the STTRs developed by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN). Applying this model to publicly available data for 2021, it also provides estimates of the possible revenue impact for the 65 Member States of the South Centre (SC) and the Intergovernmental Group of 24 (G-24). Our analysis indicates that the OECD STTR would have no impact on any OECD country treaty with a SC/G-24 Member State. Applying the prescribed 9% minimum rate to covered payments, only 100 treaties across 28 SC/G-24 Member States would qualify for improvement under the OECD STTR, with an estimated combined revenue gain of USD 55.6 million, 71% of which is concentrated in just five treaties. In contrast, the UN STTR, which does not specify a minimum rate, was modelled using rates of 9%, 10% and 15%. This resulted in estimated revenue gains of USD 212 million, USD 325 million, and USD 1,165 million across 171, 210 and 317 treaties, respectively. Given its complexity and restrictive scope, it seems pointless for any SC/G-24 Member State to join the OECD STTR. Instead, countries should focus on identifying treaties that cause unjustifiable revenue losses and consider revising them – either by adopting the simpler and broader UN STTR or implementing other measures such as active anti-abuse provisions to combat treaty shopping and tax avoidance.
Analysing the Impact of UN and OECD Subject to Tax Rule for G-24 and South Centre Member States
By Suranjali Tandon and Chetan Rao
The Subject to Tax Rule (STTR) is meant to address base erosion and profit shifting in cross –border transactions. The United Nations (UN) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Group of Twenty (G20) Inclusive Framework have developed models of the STTR that countries may choose to adopt in their treaties. This paper provides a review of these designs of two STTR models and proceeds to estimate the revenue gains for the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24) and South Centre Member States that may arise from a STTR that covers different kinds of payments. The OECD STTR is limited to related-party payments and imposes thresholds based on mark-up and materiality, reducing its applicability in practice. In contrast, the UN STTR offers broader coverage, applies to both related and unrelated parties, and does not impose restrictive thresholds, making it more administratively feasible for developing countries. Although the estimated gains from the OECD STTR appear modest due to its narrow scope, the UN STTR shows greater potential. The analysis also highlights data limitations and the need for access to microdata for accurate country-level assessments.
Determining the Upper Bound of the Scoping Criteria for Amount B in the OECD/G20 Two-Pillar Solution: A Policy Guide for Developing Jurisdictions
By Chetan Rao, Ruchika Sharma, and Dr. Vijit Patel
Amount B, a component of the OECD/G20 Two-Pillar Solution, has been designed to simplify transfer pricing for baseline distribution activities. With the aim of developing a practical policy guide for developing jurisdictions to fine tune the quantitative scoping criterion under Amount B, i.e., “annual operating expense to annual net revenue” ratio, this paper critically analyses various aspects of this criterion. The upper bound of this ratio is purported to help jurisdictions in identifying baseline distributors. It is currently set as a flexible range from 20% to 30%, with the choice available to each adopting jurisdiction deciding the exact point in the range for implementation of Amount B within its jurisdiction. Given the lack of any data-backed rationale in the Amount B report for development of this range, the authors suggest that the upper bound range might have been politically negotiated. For this very reason, developing countries need to tread carefully while setting the upper-bound and consider both its tax as well as policy implications. Through an empirical analysis of independent distributors in India, the paper highlights the link between the upper bound, functionality, and profitability, illustrating how these metrics impact developing countries with lower asset and expense intensities. The findings suggest that setting the upper bound at the higher end of the range could unintentionally bring above-baseline distributors into scope, thus foregoing long-term taxing rights for developing jurisdictions. Through this analysis, the paper offers practical insights and recommendations for jurisdictions, especially developing ones, for setting this upper bound to protect their taxing rights and minimize risks of misclassification of above-baseline distributors as baseline.
The Implications of Treaty Restrictions of Taxing Rights on Services, Especially for Developing Countries
By Faith Amaro, Veronica Grondona, Sol Picciotto
Taxation of cross-border services has been identified as a high priority issue in the United Nations (UN) negotiations to establish a new global framework for tax. This paper analyses the defects of international tax rules as applied to services, and their exploitation by multinational enterprises (MNEs), focusing on the impact on developing countries. Services have become increasingly important for economic development, but international tax rules favouring delivery by non-residents act as a disincentive to the growth of local services providers, particularly disadvantaging developing countries which are mainly hosts to MNEs. We analyse the restrictions on source taxation of services in tax treaties, particularly those based on the model of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and show that their spread has been accompanied by a widening deficit in services trade of developing countries, while the weakening of their attempts to protect their tax base through withholding taxes has resulted in increasing losses of tax revenue. The paper combines detailed qualitative analyses of tax treaties with quantitative estimates of their effects on trade and tax revenues for services of five developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Kenya and Nigeria. Our analysis suggests that a new approach is needed for taxation of services, breaking with the residence-source dichotomy, and adopting formulary apportionment. This could be based on the standards agreed in the Two Pillar Solution of the OECD/Group of Twenty (G20) project on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) and developed now through the UN.
Statement by the South Centre on the Adoption of the Draft Terms of Reference for a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation
August 2024
The South Centre welcomes the adoption of the draft Terms of Reference for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNFCITC). The UNFCITC can establish a fair and equitable international tax system for developing countries.
As globalisation has pushed through complex inter-State trade in goods and services, in parallel there is a growing complexity in determining the taxation of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in an increasingly digitalized economy. This report reviews existing bilateral tax treaties between South Centre’s Member States and States where most digitalised MNEs are headquartered, using a threshold of EUR 750 million in annual turnover to limit the number of in-scope MNEs in the study. This analysis produced primary data on South Centre Member States’ source taxing rights scores and the implications of this on tax treaty negotiations to enable effective taxation in the digital economy through the inclusion of the United Nations (UN) solution for digital taxation, Article 12B of the UN Model Tax Convention. Further, the study sought to identify ‘weak’ tax treaties with low source taxing rights which merited a comprehensive renegotiation beyond the inclusion of Article 12B. Furthermore, the reports examined the treatment of “Computer Software” in the tax treaties under study, and concluded with recommendations going forward.
By Sol Picciotto, Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, Alex Cobham, Rasmi Ranjan Das, Emmanuel Eze, Bob Michel
This paper puts forward an alternative to the proposed multilateral convention under Pillar One of the BEPS project, by building on and going beyond the progress made so far. A new direction was signalled in 2019 by the G-24 paper proposing a taxable nexus based on significant economic presence, combined with fractional apportionment. The resulting measures agreed under the two Pillars entail acceptance in principle of this approach, and also provide detailed technical standards for its implementation. These include: (i) a taxable nexus based on a quantitative threshold of sales revenues; (ii) a methodology for defining the global consolidated profits of MNEs for tax purposes, and (iii) detailed technical standards for defining and quantifying the factors that reflect the real activities of MNEs in a jurisdiction (sales, assets and employees).
The time is now right to take up the roadmap outlined by the G-24. The work done shows that technical obstacles can be overcome, the challenge is essentially political. This paper aims to provide a blueprint for immediate measures that States can take, while engaging in deliberation at national, regional and international levels for a global drive towards practical and equitable reforms. Unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is the only fair and effective way to ensure taxation of MNEs where economic activities occur, as mandated by the G20. It can ensure that MNE profits are taxed once and only once, provide stability and certainty for business, and establish a basis for international tax rules fit for the 21st century.
* Also available in French, Spanish, Portuguese and Arabic.
Enforcing Secondary Taxing Rights: Subject to Tax Rule in the UN Model Tax Convention
By Abdul Muheet Chowdhary and Sebastien Babou Diasso
The Global Anti Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules under OECD’s Pillar Two recommendations, with a minimum effective tax rate of 15%, are expected to play a significant role to end the ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate taxation, which is one of the main drivers of profit shifting. However, the thrust of these rules is designed in a manner to give priority to the developed countries. In this light, the Subject to Tax Rule (STTR), which is a treaty-based rule that allows source jurisdictions to impose limited source taxation on certain payments that are taxed below a minimum rate in the country of residence, is of extreme significance for the developing countries. Under Pillar Two, application of STTR is restricted to base eroding payments or mobile income between related parties only, which does not address Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) concerns in an entirety. That apart, the withholding tax rate of 9% proposed by the OECD may not result in generation of significant resources for the developing countries. In this light, developing countries keenly expect that the UN Tax Committee should devise an STTR that is simple to operate, has a broad scope covering all payments in a tax treaty and imposes a higher withholding tax closer to 15% to bring meaningful revenues for them. Also, developing countries desire that STTR provisions may be introduced at the earliest so as to speedily implement them through the UN Multilateral Instrument under contemplation. This Policy Brief also examines existing average withholding tax rates on interest and royalty payments in existing tax treaties of 48 South Centre and 52 G-77+China Member States and finds that out of a total of 100 developing countries, only 25 would stand to benefit from the STTR in its restricted form in Pillar Two, further strengthening the need for an improved version formulated by the United Nations.
Climate Finance Withholding Mechanism: Exploring a potential solution for climate finance needs of the developing countries
By Radhakishan Rawal
The developed countries’ commitment to provide climate finance to the developing countries has remained unfulfilled. The Climate Finance Withholding Mechanism (CFWM) is a potential solution for addressing climate finance needs of the developing countries. The CFWM adopts the well settled “withholding mechanism” under the tax laws to provide a steady flow of funds to the developing countries.
Multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) tax residents of developed countries earn income from the developing countries and pay tax on such income in the developed countries. The CFWM requires retention in the developing country, of the amount of tax so payable by the MNE, towards climate finance commitments of the developed countries. The CFWM does not result in additional tax outflow for the MNEs and also does not adversely impact taxing rights of the developed countries. The CFWM results in application of tax revenue of the developed countries towards their climate finance commitments. The CFWM does not address all the issues related to the climate finance problem but only attempts to speed up the flow of funds to the developing countries from where the relevant income originates.
The proposed OECD Pillar One and Two reforms mark a significant shift in the way large multinational enterprises are taxed on their global incomes. However, while considering the reform at the proposed scale tax administrators must be able to compare the revenue gains with alternatives. This paper uses open-source data to provide tentative estimates of the impact of Pillars One and Two. The methodology has been detailed so that administrators can replicate it for comparison. Further, the paper provides an assessment from the perspective of developing countries of some of the key design elements of the proposals so as to understand whether they are administrable and to foresee possible challenges.
Two Pillar Solution for Taxing the Digitalized Economy: Policy Implications and Guidance for the Global South
by Irene Ovonji-Odida, Veronica Grondona, Abdul Muheet Chowdhary
The taxation of the digitalized economy is the single most important topic in international tax negotiations today. The OECD has devised a “Two Pillar solution” to the problem. Pillar One is focusing on a reallocation of taxing rights to market jurisdictions, which are largely expected to be developing countries, and Pillar Two is instituting a global minimum tax. The Pillar One solution, known as Amount A, will be codified into a Multilateral Convention (MLC) and is expected to be placed before countries for signature in early 2023. The solution ushers in a new paradigm in the taxation of multinational enterprises but has immense complexity and likely minimal revenue gains for most developing countries. It will also require them to give up the right of unilateral tax measures on all out-of-scope companies, meaning they will only be able to tax the fewer than 100 companies likely to be in-scope, if at all. The decision to sign or not is thus a historic one, as it will lock developing countries into a constricted new framework, at a time when revenue needs are especially critical to recover the economies from COVID-19 in the context of a turbulent state of the global economy.
However, the United Nations too has a solution, known as Article 12B. This operates in a different manner and is a minor modification to the existing decentralized international tax system which is based on bilateral tax treaties, and which developing countries are more familiar with. It is also likely to generate far higher revenues than Amount A, and does not restrict any of their sovereign taxing rights. This Research Paper assesses the various implications for developing countries from adopting the OECD’s or the United Nations’s respective solutions and concludes with a possible global South response to the Two Pillar solution.
Conceptualización de un Instrumento multilateral de la ONU
Por Radhakishan Rawal
Los cambios que ha sufrido recientemente la Convención Modelo de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Doble Tributación entre Países Desarrollados y Países en Desarrollo han dado lugar a disposiciones mas favorables a los países en desarrollo, al aumentar los ingresos fiscales a través de la imposición de tributos internacionales, por ejemplo, en la imposición de tributos a los ingresos procedentes del extranjero. En esta imposición se incluyen, entre otros, los impuestos sobre los ingresos procedentes de servicios digitales automatizados, pagos de programas informáticos y plusvalías. Normalmente, estos impuestos se incorporarían en convenios fiscales bilaterales a través de largas negociaciones. En cambio, un instrumento multilateral de las Naciones Unidas permitiria actualizar de una manera mas acelerada varios convenios tributatrios por medio de una sola negociación. Esto ayudará a los países en desarrollo a recaudar ingresos con mayor prontitud. En este informe sobre políticas se aborda la posible estructura de un instrumento multilateral de esa índole.
